









         Thesis submitted to the Nottingham Trent University in partial fulfilment  
                    of the  requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
                                      STEPHEN KWATELAI QUARTEY 
 
 








                                                            Dedication 
 
 
To the memory of my parents Mr Granville Quartey and Mrs Josephine Quartey, the two who 
















                                             Acknowledgements  
 
First I would like to thank the Almighty God for his grace and mercies. I am truly grateful to 
Dr Jon Gorry for his relentless encouragement, advice and guidance throughout the years. I 
would also like to thank Professor Matt Henn for his critical guidance, commitment and 
valued support. I wish to thank Drs Imad El-anis and Marie Gibert for their contributions and 
encouragements. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Kwabena 
Barima Antwi for agreeing to serve as my external examiner, Professor Rebecca Parry for 
serving as the Independent Chair and Dr Sahra Joharchi for her role as the Internal Examiner. 
Sadly but importantly I extend a posthumous gratitude to one of my outstanding supervisors, 
Dr Ros Hague for her calm guidance and encouragement. 
I would also like to thank my dear wife, Alice Adwoa Kissi, for her love, prayers and support 
throughout my study and personal life. I am very grateful to Reverend Brother Emmanuel 
Affum (SVD), Lydia Quartey and my family for their support in diverse ways. 
I wish to thank Professor Ishmael Mensah of the University of Cape Coast, Administrative 
Staff of the Doctoral School Nottingham Trent University, Public Record Office in London, 
Ghana Library Board and National Archives in Accra. 
There are many others who shared ideas with me and gave me reasons to advance in difficult 










Ghana is located along the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Guinea, with a land mass spanning 




The search for a sustainable Sub-Saharan ‘developmental state’ stands as one of the most 
cherished alternative models for economic transformation proposed by those who would 
question the neoliberal trajectory of African political economy in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. Although the particular example of Ghana offers an archetypal case 
study, scholarship contributions on this subject are surprisingly quiet or limited in their scope 
or level of analysis particularly in the so-called Fordist or pre-neoliberal era. This thesis was 
written as a response to this lacuna and aims to unravel the historical problems of 
underdevelopment in Ghana within a particular time-frame (1895-1992), offer theoretical 
interpretations, and suggest the need for fresh appreciation of development-based state 
strategies. Its overarching objective was to address the question of protracted economic 
underdevelopment in Ghana and understand why it has been resistant to a number of 
development efforts by both colonial and post-colonial governments utilising both state-based 
and market-based strategies. The purpose is to bring the past to life in order to generate 
historically relevant approaches to African political economy.  
In this thesis a theoretically-informed and historically-embedded approach is used to examine 
theories of the capitalist state, production process and development models in relation to the 
political economy of Ghana 1895-1992. By adopting a longitudinal comparative historicist 
analysis the study is able to investigate more than one subject of interest over many historical 
junctures. It critically examines the development efforts of three distinct state forms and the 
roles played in production, trade, distribution and development. This method of examining 
development under distinct state forms is relevant because it was essentially the state that 
conditioned economic development in the Fordist era under discussion. Rather than first 
constructing theory to explain history, this thesis thus utilise history as the vehicle for 
understanding why particular theoretical approaches to development in Ghana arose and then 
fell. The intent is not so much to model for the future but to understand the conditions and 
potentialities of the present through appreciation of the past. In this direction a desk-based 
research was used with data gathered from a wide-range of archival information from the 
Public Record Office in London, National Archives in Accra, Hansard online resources, 
African Studies Centre resources, newspaper publications, journal articles, books, World 
Bank reports and British online archives. 
The outcome of the study identifies distinct trends in Ghanaian development across the 
colonial and post-colonial periods: from a colonial strategy of development dependency 
1895-1956, to an import-substitution industrialization strategy 1957-1966, finishing with the 
more market-directed developments from 1967-1992, that finally ushered in the 
contemporary neo-liberal era. This interpretivist and historical method enable theoretical 
mapping of three distinct attempts at creating Ghanaian versions of the ‘development state’ 
that provide a clear and distinct analysis of efforts to modernise the political economy of 
Ghana, explain Ghana’s underdevelopment, and in so doing bring back politics into 
economics in order to make an original contribution to knowledge. It is hoped that policy 
makers, development partners, and scholars can learn from Africa in the same way they think 
and learn from the dramatic successes of East Asia. 
Keywords: Colonial and post-colonial development, capitalist state and capitalist economy, 
predatory state, vampire state, zombie state and developmental states, embedded autonomy, 
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SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION  
Chapter One: Introduction  
“Those who would judge us merely by the heights we have achieved, would do well to 
remember the depths from which we started”- Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah (1972:45). 
1.1 Introduction to the Political Economy of Ghana (1895 – 1992) 
This thesis is set out to primarily make an original contribution to knowledge and the 
literature on African development through a critical examination of the political economy of 
Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) from 1895 to 1992, to unravel the historical problems of 
underdevelopment in Ghana, offer theoretical interpretations and argue for an alternative 
paradigm of development. The main objective of this thesis was to examine the protracted 
underdevelopment in Ghana and make original contributions with a view to address this 
trend. The thesis aims to unpack and deepen readers understanding of the complex 
connections between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ spheres, the capitalist state and the capitalist 
economy with specific reference to Ghana during the years 1895-1992; explore and contest 
state theory and notions of the developmental state through a theoretically informed and 
historically embedded empirical study of Ghana 1895-1992; and to better understand Ghana’s 
political economy of development and decline, and the origins and transformation of the 
notion of development. This brings into focus the importance of state theory and development 
for an understanding of the political economy of Ghana, 1895 to 1992. The thesis relates state 
forms to three conceptual models in three historical junctures to provide a clearer and distinct 
analysis of efforts by our three distinct state forms and the roles they played to modernise the 
political economy of Ghana. The choice of examining development outcomes under distinct 
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state forms is relevant because it is the state that conditions economic development. The 
thesis is important because development trends in Ghana over the colonial and post-colonial 
periods, from a colonial development strategy of dependency (1895-1956) to a state-led 
import-substitution industrialisation (1957-1966), and further on to a market-led development 
(1967-1992) have proven to be ineffective in ensuring sustainable economic growth and 
development. The overarching importance is that Africa has not yet had a functional 
developmental state model that works for its development hence the search for a model 
inspired by the African context through a historically embedded theoretical analysis of the 
political economy of Ghana. The choice of Ghana is relevant because, as the first British 
colony in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) to attain political sovereignty, the economy had been 
used for experiments on a number of development approaches – colonialism, imperialism, 
and neoliberalism - in Africa. However, none of the development efforts has proved effective 
for sustainable economic growth and development. In addition, the historical achievements, 
relative political stability, cultural values, and economic challenges make Ghana suitable for 
scholarly attention to unravel the underlying causes of the protracted capitalist 
underdevelopment with a view to finding a suitable developmental paradigm for Ghana in 
particular, and Africa in general. 
The metaphorical constructs of our distinct state forms -‘predatory, vampire, zombie’- 
primarily enable the thesis to highlight the development attitude of the distinct state forms. 
‘Predation’ has been used in complex and varied analytical context (Moore, 1966: 469-473); 
to draw distinctions between “incoherent absolutist domination” and “klepto-patrimonial” 
predatory states (Evans,1989); and to conceptualise analysis (Bavister-Gould, 2011). 
Similarly, Thomson (2010) describes ‘vampire’ states as ‘blood sucking’ (kleptomaniac) 
government that mismanages state resources to conditions of economic decline. The ‘zombie’ 
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state is a metaphorical concept of the ‘unconscious reincarnated state’ , or better still, ‘dead-
alive’ state that aims to give radical life to a new political order to achieve economic recovery 
but does so with inadequate capacity and legitimacy (Drezner, 2015). 
In the late 1980s, the ineffectiveness of development programmes initiated by the ‘predatory 
state’ of the colonial period, ‘vampire state’ of the immediate post-independent era and 
‘zombie state’ of the 1980s were gradually giving way to a new approach of development in 
Ghana in particular, and SSA in general. Development experts, donors, policy makers, 
politicians and scholars have all been drawn to the notion of a ‘developmental state’ model 
for Africa that can learn from and rival the dramatic success of East Asia (EA) development 
model (Fourie, 2011). However, it is nearly impossible to find a developmental state model 
that serves as a paradigm in SSA because historical evidences suggest that developmental 
states have evolved out of ‘trial and error’ rather that central planning by the state (Routley, 
2014). Abstraction of ‘developmental state’ as one that is focused on economic growth and 
makes every effort to achieve economic development through political intervention (Johnson, 
1999) has been challenged for attempting to homogenise the diverse experiences of the EA 
developmental states (Haggard, 2004: 59; Ohno and Ohno, 2012) with some suggestions for 
heterogeneous analysis that allows for differentials in technological improvements and 
political variations (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). Despite the definitional difficulties, it is 
generally accepted that for definitional purpose, developmental state refers to the state’s 
capacity for, and commitment to economic growth and development (Vu, 2007; Mkandawire, 
2010). Routley (2014), streamlines the definitional difficulties and highlights economic 
growth, improved standard of living, and legitimacy as core elements for consideration in 
defining developmental state. What then is development? 
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Development is widely used in various disciplines and contexts of everyday life. The inherent 
difficulties in arriving at a precise definition is not for its scarcity but for the various contexts 
for which it is being advanced. In a study entitled ‘Managing Development’, Kathleen Staudt 
puts forward in excess of seven hundred definitions to highlight the enormous challenges to 
understanding the breadth and depth of development transformation and to demonstrate the 
widely differing cultural context within which the planning, implementation and evaluation 
of national and international development takes place (Staudt, 1991). This suggests that 
development is a social construct of the relative aspirations of a people to advance in a certain 
direction and therefore one development model is inapplicable across political economies 
with diverse socio-cultural backgrounds. However, in addressing the problems of 
underdevelopment ‘is democracy necessary for Africa’s development?’  
Although there is no easy answer to such a question, it is generally accepted that development 
is the process of enlarging people’s choices; of enhancing participatory of democratic process 
and the ability of people to have a say in the decisions that shape their lives; of providing 
human beings with the opportunity of developing their fullest potential and to work together 
to carry out the developmental goals of the state to promote economic growth, equity and 
self-sufficiency (Staudt 1991: 28-29). Robert Chambers defines development in essence as 
‘good change’ (Chambers 2005: 185-189), however, this definition does not indicate what is 
good, who determines it, and how to ensure its advancement.  
Despite the definitional challenges, on the one hand, it is generally accepted that development 
is a historical process of social change in which societies are transformed by the deliberate 
efforts of development actors such as the state in partnership with private enterprise to 
achieve desired visions (Thomas 2000: 29). On the other hand, underdevelopment does not 
imply the absence of development but rather a comparative disparity in the wealth of Western 
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Europe and North America as compared to Africa, Asia and Latin America (Rodney, 1972: 
21). In this sense, capitalist development is understood as rooted in unfair trading practices, 
egocentric price setting and tariffs, higher interest rates on investment capital, 
disproportionate ownership of productive resources and repatriation of surplus values from 
underdeveloped to developed states in a manner that impoverishes the former (Rodney, 1972: 
34). But since efforts at improvement are often focused at the historical process of capitalist 
development it is important to ameliorate the disordered faults of progresses (Cowen and 
Shenton, 1996), through state interventions that consider the interests of both labour and 
capital. 
1.2 Historical Overview of Development in Africa 
The concept of ‘improvement’ existed in traditional African societies before the arrival of 
European merchants on the coast of Africa in the fifteenth century (Rodney, 1972), but the 
idea of ‘development’ is traceable to European overseas contacts with Africa in the run-up to 
the twentieth century (Hodge, 2007: 7). From Catherine Coquery Vidrovitch’s ‘pre-
developmentalist development’ of the pre-1930s to David Anderson’s details of the British 
efforts in agriculture, forestry and health, development has been linked to central planning 
and the free-market strategies (Randall and Packard, 1998: 6-7). In the nineteenth century, 
Europe’s elites introduced a more self-conscious attempt at colonial development to address 
the socio-economic problems in Europe. The ‘New Imperialism’, as it became known, 
involved the expansion of Europe into Africa for extraction of resources and establishment of 
ready markets in the colonies for European products. In this sense, postmodernists argue that 
the emphasis on integrative planning and coordination (Hodge, 2007: 13) was an apparatus 
for control and surveillance to universalise European projects across the globe (Randall and 
Packard, 1998: 3), and in doing so, “became a framing device bringing together a range of 
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interventionist policies and metropolitan finance with the explicit goal of raising colonial 
standards of living” in the late 1930s and 1940s (Randal and Packard, 1998: 7). 
However, in contributing to the histories of development, Robert Cowen and Robert W. 
Shenton suggest that the purpose of colonial development orthodoxy since its inception has 
been to enable public policy “to assert the value of community in the face of the destruction 
wrought by an immanent process of development … to construct the positive alternative to 
the disorder and underdevelopment of capitalism” (Crush, 1995: 27-43). Interestingly, the 
ideological construct that defined western imperialism and colonial development during this 
period was grounded in theological beliefs and ancient civilization which holds that the task 
of cultivating unoccupied land was in fulfilment of God’s plan to extend his kingdom on 
earth, and anyone who first makes better such property assumes its ownership (Hodge, 2007: 
25). Furthermore, in the ‘Second Treatise of Government’ John Locke argued that 
“whatsoever a man tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his 
peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the cattle and 
product was also his…” (Cited in Crush, 1995: 27-43). These orthodoxies formed the nucleus 
of ‘New Imperialism’ and integration of Africa into a global capitalist system.  
1.3 Central Research Concern and Methodological Issues. 
The central argument of this thesis is that trends of development in Ghana over the colonial 
and post-colonial periods have proved ineffective to resolve the problems of poverty, 
unemployment, corruption, bad public policies and undemocratic governance. The 
ineffectiveness of development programmes initiated by the ‘predatory state’ of the colonial 
era, the ‘vampire state’ of the immediate post-independent period and the ‘zombie state’ of 
the 1980s drew interest from academics, donors, policy makers and development enthusiasts 
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in the late 1980s to the notion of ‘developmental state’ for Africa that can learn from, and 
rival the development success of East Asia. 
The two fundamental dimensions of investigating our social world relates to the ‘nature of 
society’ and ‘philosophy of science’ that is applied for our understanding of events. The 
‘nature of society’ is socially constructed and naturally predetermined, but the ‘philosophy of 
science’ focuses on the ‘logic of enquiry’ to enable researchers make claim about the 
ontology (what is knowledge), epistemology (how it is known), and methodology (the 
process of studying the subject of investigation) of the social realm (Creswell and Creswell, 
2018). 
The ontological strand by which knowledge is generated and analysed methodologically is 
firmly grounded within the contrasting views of the ‘subjectivist - objectivist’ debate, and 
‘positivist/empiricist – anti-positivist/interpretivist’ dimensions. While subjectivists assume 
that social events exist as one’s mental capacity, belief system and experience, objectivists 
take a more realist approach to how knowledge is generated by acknowledging that social 
phenomenon is independent of subjective opinions and experience. Positivist analysis of 
empirical economic phenomenon that devalues the relevance of interpretive 
conceptualization of the social realm within which phenomenon occurs, is insufficient for any 
meaningful consideration. In other words, the interest attached to economic indicators 
(quantitative research) must extend to its interpretations (qualitative research).  
Classical economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, John 
Stuart Mill and Karl Marx emphasised the interpretation of societal conflicts and 
interrelationships in the production process. However, many neo-classical economists focus 
on fictitious market system to limit interventions by the state in development, production and 
distribution of wealth and power. As Burnham (2010) suggests that although the empirical 
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features of economic problems are now familiar knowledge, there is scarcity of explanations 
within social sciences. Decision makers have become more familiar with empirical 
information about rates of employment, production, consumption, savings, investment, profit, 
and national income than the underlying classical economic theories that explain these 
indicators. This explains why the market mechanism, in lieu of a conceptualization of 
capitalist mode of production, has become a preferred option for neo-classical economists in 
the explanation of contemporary global financial predicaments. Given this, the ideal 
assumption of equilibrium price determinism through the unregulated interplay of free-
market forces of demand and supply has not been thoroughly proven. (Johnson,1982; 
Amsden, 1989; Wade,2004) noted that neo-classical interpretations of East Asia’s economic 
growth narratives on the basis of conforming market policies were deeply flawed in their 
descriptive, methodological and theoretical approach (Haggard, 2015).  
The epistemological strand of this study adopts a desk-based historiographical research 
method to gather data on a wide-range of archival information from the Public Record Office 
in London, National Archives in Accra, Hansard online resources, African Studies Centre 
resources, newspaper publications, journal articles, World Bank reports, and British online 
archives. In this research, history is used to investigate and understand the political economy 
of development and decline in Ghana not for the purpose of constructing a development 
theory or predictive model for its future but rather to make use of its important contribution to 
the continuities between late colonialism and Ghana’s post-independent development policies 
and practices. As Arthur Lewis noted, the use of archival information is important in 
providing credible insight about ‘why’ and ‘how’ Ghana became underdeveloped but it is 
difficult to use the outcomes to predict with certainty ‘what’ happens next in different 
societies (Lewis 1955: 10-18). Despite its shortcomings, archival information is indispensable 
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for a study of this nature for various reasons. First and foremost, many authors accept that the 
archives provide unique and irreplaceable socio-historical and socio-biographical data 
sources of the ideas, lives, behaviours and development thinking of colonial government 
officials, foreign merchants, indigenous politicians and social movements (Hill, 1993). 
Second, archival data as presented in the form of confidential memos, rough drafts, official 
correspondence, letters, personal and organisational records, and diaries offer reliable and 
direct account of historical events that avoids the fallibility of human error in interviews 
(Henn et al, 2009: 115). Third, historical information placed under distinct political periods 
and states is beneficial because “development discourse in its ahistorical and apolitical 
character is incapable of coming to terms with the realities of world power and global 
interests …” (Pieterse, 2001: 27-28). Fourth, the choice of archival resource affirms the 
mutual interdependence between history and social science in placing the political economy 
of Ghana in time and context. Fifth, ‘in order to explain the structure of contemporary 
societies, one must investigate their historical origins and development’ (Deflem and Dove, 
2013: 561). The sixth reason is that through the incorporation of ‘a stronger dimension into 
my analyses, tools of historical research can help to develop a better understanding of many 
political phenomena including, institutional change and durability, state formation, 
revolution, trajectories of economic development and globalisation’ (Halperin and Heath, 
2017: 239-240). Lastly, the convergence of Ghana’s history with her socio-economic 
experience helps the author to critically examine how past political structures and social 
relations enabled or constrained the present, and what in emerging development trends 
represents possibilities of developmental states in SSA. Furthermore, through ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ objective criticisms the researcher was able to establish the authenticity and 
reliability of primary and secondary information for the research. In choosing the sources, 
consideration was given to the authority, accuracy, accessibility and purpose of the data to 
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mitigate biases, exaggerations, errors and omissions. However, due to the nature of the logic 
of enquiry - the political economy of development and decline in Ghana (1895 to 1992) - 
historical referencing extending over several decades was unavoidable. 
The study adopted a longitudinal comparative historicist analysis because it allows for the 
investigation of more than one subject of interest (state and development) over many 
historical junctures (the colonial, immediate post-colonial, Ghanaian revolution). This 
approach places importance on time’ and ‘context’ to help better understand the relations 
between the events and trends in politics, economics, development and related dimensions of 
social science. By choosing the longitudinal comparative historical analysis, the researcher 
was able to explain the ‘critical junctures’ of Ghana’s development trajectory, and how its 
‘positive feedback’ (development outcomes) reinforced subsequent ‘path dependence’ 
(development policies). ‘Critical junctures’ are significant events that set in motion courses of 
remedial actions for ‘self-reinforcing feedbacks’ to determine ‘path dependence’ (Halperin 
and Heath 2017: 244-247). This approach allowed the researcher to present a more realistic 
interpretation of the political economy of underdevelopment in Ghana by bringing politics 
back into economics and development.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised in nine chapters. Next to the introduction and methodological issues, 
the theoretical foundation is discussed. The third chapter takes a historical overview of the 
political economy of Ghana in the period before 1929, with the fourth chapter focusing on 
colonial development efforts from 1930 to 1950. The fifth chapter takes a constructive look at 
the developmental ambitions and strategies of the Nkrumah government, whilst the sixth 
offers a critical examination of development initiatives by the immediate post-Nkrumah 
governments. The seventh offers a historical analysis of development efforts by the military 
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and Limann governments that collectively provided grounds for the ‘Zombie State’ in Ghana 
in the 1980s. The eighth chapter critically examines the rise and fall of the ‘Zombie State’ 
with particular reference to the Ghanaian Revolution, whilst the ninth highlights the original 


















Chapter Two: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
“Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow. The important thing is not to stop 
questioning”. - Albert Einstein  
This chapter takes a constructive look at the theoretical foundations adopted for this thesis. It 
discusses two fundamental issues in political economy – the state and development – relevant 
to the broader interest of development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In doing so, the chapter 
critically examines three main development theories – (i) dependency/world system theory 
that argues a (periphery) state remains underdeveloped due to the impositions of a core-
periphery capitalist system or neo-colonial structures; (ii) modernisation-type theories which 
argue that given the necessary financial assistance and technological adaptations any nation 
can develop so long as it adopts state-led interventions or roll-back the state and advance 
market-led liberalisation strategies; (iii) and at the heart of this thesis the more recent 
characterisation of developmental state that argues a state focuses its capacity on economic 
growth and commit to the achievement of economic development through political 
intervention rooted in embedded autonomy and Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy. The 
mechanisms for modernisation are either Keynesian-type ones that argue the need for state-
led intervention (i.e. a developmentalist state that utilises industrialisation and/or import 
substitution strategies etc.) as pathways to development; or neo-liberal ones that argue, 
because the Keynesian ‘developmentalist state’ is doomed to failure, roll-back and market-led 
liberalisation is the necessary strategy for development. The chapter gives consideration to 
state theories because it is the state that should arguably be entrusted with developmental 
responsibilities to address underdevelopment in SSA such as those associated with (i) 
poverty, (ii) bad governance, (iii) corruption, (iv) unemployment, (v) political instability, (vi) 
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radicalization, (vii) terrorism, (viii) economic migration and (ix) human trafficking. In his 
second encyclical letter, Pope Francis (head of the Catholic Church and sovereign of the 
Vatican City State) noted that “If in a given region the state does not carry out its 
responsibilities, some business groups can come forward in the guise of benefactors, wield 
real power, and consider themselves exempt from certain rules, ….”. And, “If politics shows 
itself incapable of breaking such a pervasive logic …, we will continue to avoid facing the 
major problems of humanity” (Francis, 2015).  
Against this background, the chapter takes a critical view of the development models pursued 
through the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western donors in SSA 
states during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Basically, the four major development 
ideas that were attempted during the period of this study are the dependency, modernization, 
state-led import substitution industrialisation, and market-led. The essence of the colonial 
dependency model is that it enabled mass exploitation of colonial resources from peripheries 
to the core and importations of relatively high priced commodities. In addition, 
modernization development restricted transfer of knowledge and capital from the Global 
North to the Global South except for the production of low priced goods by small-scale local 
industries. Meanwhile, the imposition of austerity measures under market-led development 
caused contractions in many underdeveloped economies.  
During the post-colonial period, economic liberalisation sought to form strong connections 
between democracy and development but in recent times it is contested by lessons from the 
EA economic experience where democracy was desirable but not a ‘sine qua non’ to 
sustainable economic development. In recent times, developmental state is trending as one of 
the key propositions for those who reject the Washington consensus and its neoliberal 
approach to development, and effective governance. This shift in development thinking does 
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not only focus on the role of the ‘state’ in development but also questions whether democracy 
is necessary for Africa’s development. Although answers to this fundamental question are 
complex, a critical analysis of the state and development draws us closer to answers for two 
main reasons. First, the analysis of the logic of enquiry underlying SSA development 
proposition takes a deductive lead from the Eurasia development trajectory. And second, the 
ineffectiveness of a series of attempts at development – dependency, modernisation, import-
substitution and market-led – all suggest a need for change. In doing so, the researcher 
acknowledges differences in geopolitics, economics, cultural values, and distinct periods to 
put forward that SSA states are capable of learning from the EA development success. 
The research aims to unravel the historical problems of underdevelopment in Ghana, offer 
theoretical interpretations, and argue for an alternative paradigm of development. In so doing, 
this chapter relates state forms to three conceptual models in three historical junctures. This 
method of examining developments under distinct state forms is relevant because the 
attitudes of citizens in particular states, or better still personalities in government, condition 
its economic development. The overarching objective is to address the protracted economic 
underdevelopment that has been resistant to a number of development efforts by colonial and 
post-colonial governments. In essence the ineffectiveness of previous development efforts 
reinvigorates the search for new approach to development.   
A study of the political economy of Ghana is assisted by the intellectual works and personal 
experiences of development philosophers, some of whom were invited to Ghana at the behest 
of the colonial government and Kwame Nkrumah to investigate and advice on the 
development of the country. This study owes a great deal to the network of specialist 
advisers, technical experts, colonial administrators, parliamentarians and policy makers who 
became the principal conduits (Hodge, 2017: 12), for continuity through change. This 
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approach is important because without their inclusion and the role they played, our 
understanding of colonial development would by incomplete (Hodge, 2007: 5). The 
researcher therefore draws on the development thinking of (i) Joseph Chamberlain – Colonial 
Secretary (1895-1903); (ii) Frederick Gordon Guggisberg – Governor (1919-1927); (iii) 
Arthur Lewis (Nobel Prize in Economic Science); (iv) Cardinall, (v) Seers and Ross, (vi) 
Killick, (vii) Roemer and Chazan, (viii) Kwame Nkrumah, (ix) Nana Ofori-Atta 1, and (x) 
J.B. Danquah. This analytical approach brings together the local experiences of African 
opinion leaders and theoretical knowledge of development experts. Interestingly however, 
Ghana’s development experience, to use the analogy of the strong wind that either brings one 
down or lifts one up ending with a bitter or better experience, has in the case of Ghana been 
of protracted economic decline and short-lived developments.  
The remaining of this chapter is organised in seven sections. Following the introduction, the 
theories of development and evolution of development thinking in Ghana are discussed. The 
third section takes a constructive look at colonial development strategy, with the fourth 
section focusing on state-led import substitution industrialisation. The fifth section examines 
neoliberalism and market-led strategies whilst the sixth section discusses capitalist world 
systems with particular reference to the works of Karl Marx, Karl Polanyi and I. Wallerstein. 
The seventh gives consideration to theories of the state and its role in development with the 
eight taking a critical view of two important dimensions of developmental states – Max 
Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy and Peter Evan’s embedded autonomy. The ninth section 
offers historical analysis of Ghana’s political economy, whilst the tenth discusses possibilities 
for the emergence of developmental state in SSA in general, and Ghana in particular.  
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2.2 Development Theories and Evolution of Development Thinking in Ghana. 
The central truth of every society is that its people seek to improve their daily lives through 
experiential and empirical ideas in what is referred to as development theory. What then is 
development and why is its historical expositions important to development efforts in 
underdeveloped states? According to Lewis (1955) development consists of much more than 
economic growth. Similarly, Seers (1969) suggests that while it is common to confuse 
economic growth with economic development and development in general, their 
undifferentiated use must not lead to the problem of contextual misrepresentation. Economic 
growth as measured by increased aggregate output is a component of economic development. 
Development therefore is a normative value judgement that is subjectively defined by the 
challenges of a particular society or state at a given period of time. It is both of physical 
reality and a state of mind aimed to achieve increases in basic life-sustaining goods, levels of 
income, a range of economic and social choices (Todaro and Smith, 2015: 23-25). 
Development extends beyond the physical to every aspect of human existence that has 
potential for improvement such as good governance, education, health, spirituality, mental 
wellbeing, and capacity building efforts. In explaining development, the conceptual analysis 
of contemporary development issues that ignores the historical context within which 
development took place misses an important facet of the development debate. Meanwhile, 
Pieterse’s (2001: 3) definition of development as “the organised intervention of collective 
affairs according to a standard of improvement” draws attention to the semantic ambiguities 
of ‘intervention’ and ‘improvement’ to different cultural, historical and power relations.  
Over the period, development thinking in SSA like other parts of the world has shifted from 
materialist to non-materialist traditions and eclectic dimensions, with associate problems of 
determinisms and projections of outcomes. African perspectives of development consists of 
three schools of thought – Marxist-oriented African leaders, post-colonial scholars, and 
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development agencies (Binns et al., 2018: 10-11). First, socialist-oriented African leaders and 
scholars argue for a halt to the exploitation of African resources by developed states and 
compensatory development assistance to make good for colonial underdevelopment (Rodney, 
1972). The most prominent and feasible colonial development strategy in the 1940s was 
postulated by Arthur Lewis. His principal idea of colonial development theory was that “in 
any programme of colonial development, agriculture must come first” (Colonial Economic 
Advisory Committee, 1944: 7-8).  The Lewis colonial development strategy consisted of the 
idea for a radical but systematic agricultural and industrial revolutions. This was to 
incorporate agricultural modernization and good economic management with expeditious 
industrialisation of the agrarian economy towards sustainable economic development. Lewis 
argued that although the prima facie of colonial development is proved by increased 
agricultural productivity, there is more to achieve through the provision of infrastructure, 
modernisation and effective economic management of agriculture (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 
26-27). In Britain, the CEAC advanced similar notions for African development consisted of 
African participation and foreign investment in agriculture. The committee argued that 
“development must be with the Africans” and external capital is necessary in the predominant 
occupation of the indigenous people to increase productivity and enable development (Lewis 
et al 1951: 70-75). However Lewis’s idea of a state-led development approach was resented 
by the Colonial Office (CO) because the CO was unprepared to accept financial 
responsibility for colonial development. 
Second, per President Truman’s Inaugural Address on 20th January 1949, many post-colonial 
scholars have argued for modernisation development through transfer of capital and 
knowledge in the form of ‘aid’ from the developed ‘North’ to the underdeveloped ‘South’. 
The presidential narrative influenced United States’ Foreign Policy, and by implication its 
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allies’ and international agencies’ such as the International Development Agency of the 
World Bank, United State Agency for International Aid (USAID) and United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). However, the modernization agenda aimed to transform 
the traditional systems of production through the establishment of import substitution 
industries (ISIs), was predicted to instigate unbalanced economic development even in the 
midst of growth (Lewis, 1954; Hirschman, 1958). 
Third, the emergence of neoliberalism in the 1980s contributed to the decline of the 
modernisation idea (Sahn et al., 1999). Besides, many scholars and development experts 
argue for more effective use of African resources and knowledge in lieu of aid (Moyo, 2009). 
In recent times development agencies have argued for the involvement of African ideas in 
international development policies. These perspectives suggest that both developed and 
underdeveloped states have key roles to play in reshaping the development of SSA. After all, 
development is a multi-dimensional concept of economic growth, poverty 
reduction/alleviation, rising rate of employment, equitable redistribution of income/surplus 
values, good governance and human flourishing to reflect changing needs of modern 
societies. According to Amartya Sen, the 1998 noble laureate in economics, development 
must not be conceived only as quantitative measurements of improvements but also for the 
uses that individuals and societies make of the commodities at their disposal (Todaro and 
Smith, 2015: 16-29).  
However, development theories are not universally effective except that which yields desired 
outcomes to particular society. The notions of development in Ghana are linked to four major 
development theories – (i) Dependency by the imposition of hegemonic core and periphery 
systems; (ii) Modernisation by means of state-led import-substitution industrialisation: or (iii) 
market-led strategies; and (iv) possibilities of Developmental state through an autonomously 
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embedded state-led efforts for economic growth and development. While the dependency and 
modernisation models emerged out of Western foreign government initiatives, the search for 
a developmental state for Africa is an African initiative with lessons from East Asia. 
Beginning with the dependency model, the study takes a constructive look at the four 
development ideas. 
First, during the colonial era, the colonial government designed the colonies of the 
underdeveloped South to serve as producers of raw material exports at relatively lower prices 
to the industrial North, and in return act as markets for manufactured imports from the North 
at relatively higher prices in what was also known as the ‘core-periphery’ model of 
dependency development. By this, all governors representing their respective governments 
were duty bound to initiate colonial development based on its relative importance to imperial 
trade objectives. Therefore this study challenges Binns et al. (2018: 11) claim that 
dependency theory began after Truman’s speech in late 1949 through the works of Hans 
Singer and Raoul Prebisch in a ‘Prebisch-Singer hypothesis’, but accepts their assertion of the 
impacts of dependency development. Thus the underdevelopment of countries like Ghana is 
mainly as a result of the disadvantaged manner by which the developed states integrated SSA 
into the global capitalist economic system from the onset and beyond.  
Second, by the early 1950s the ineffectiveness of the dependency model, struggle for 
independence in Africa and West Indies, rise of the cold war, and spread of Soviet influence 
in the colonies caused the West to introduce modernization development to mitigate the risk 
of losing control and trade in the colonies. In the late 1940s the United State and allies 
introduced ‘modernisation’ as a grand development strategy to provide technical and 
financial assistance to underdeveloped states with a view to counteract growing tendencies of 
communist influence in nascent states (Escobar, 2012: 34-35) but touted it as an initiative to 
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fight poverty. Led by President Truman’s Four-Point Programme to (i) support the United 
Nations’ peace efforts (ii) support the United State world economic programme (iii) 
strengthen global freedom and (iv) modernisation of development served as a response to 
mass poverty in underdeveloped states to legitimise the extension of western influence and 
objectives of globalisation (Hodge, 2007) and neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1965). Many put 
forward possibilities of how underdeveloped states could achieve economic growth and 
capitalist development through gradual transference of capital and knowledge from the 
developed states of the Global North to underdeveloped areas of the Global South. One of the 
most remarkable highlights to modernisation development was the address by President 
Truman of the United States in 1949 that “Greater production is the key to prosperity and 
peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern 
scientific and technical knowledge” (Cited in Rist, 2000: 71). This is truly so, but more 
importantly are the terms of trade and distribution of production surplus that operates within 
the global capitalist economy. As part of its strategic goals the USAID aimed at ‘Accelerating 
the development of countries and their people, by investing resources, transferring 
knowledge, creating opportunities, and advocating reforms’ (USAID, 2004: 72).  
Among many models that emerged during this period, the works of Walt Rostow’s linear 
stages of economic growth model dominated development thinking because it focused on 
how underdeveloped states could learn from the development trajectories of developed states. 
The main importance of Rostow’s model of extrapolation is that it provides a-five stage linear 
trajectory beginning with the economic conditions of the traditional society; to preconditions 
for take-off; take-off to self-sustained growth; drive to maturity, and finally to high 
consumption stages. This allows for easier assessment, planning, implementation and 
evaluation at each stage. Rostow’s model as complemented by Harrod-Domar growth model 
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emphasises on the mobilisation of domestic and foreign capital for investment and 
development. However, the underlying assumptions of homogenous conditions and 
possibilities of development by extrapolation under the stages-of-growth model is untenable 
because the dimensions of development, economic endowments, politics and cultural values 
of developed states are different from their underdeveloped counterparts. Although Harrod-
Domar’s concept of setting aside a proportion of national income to cater for depreciation of 
capital goods and additional investment for development are commendable, its assumed 
existence of an organised society, efficient state, skilled human resource and Weberian-styled 
bureaucratic institutions in underdeveloped states are technically flawed.  
With time, Rostow and Harrod-Domar’s models were replaced by two competing ideas – 
structural-change and international dependence – in the 1970s (Todaro and Smith, 2015: 
119). Furthermore, Lewis’ statistical analysis and modern economic theories argue for capital 
formulation and investment. In his ‘Report on Industrialisation and the Gold Coast’, Lewis 
suggests that given the level of underutilisation of resources in subsistence economies, a two-
sector model (agriculture and industry) of structural transformation was important to 
redistribute surplus labour power for balanced growth. Basically, as agriculture modernises, 
excess labour should migrate from agriculture to new industries to increase productivity for 
capital formulation and reinvestments. However, Lewis’s idea is criticised because many 
capitalists shift their investment priorities outside the dual sectors. In addition, the existence 
of a formalised labour system able to migrate to sectors with rising marginal wages is 
uncommon in many underdeveloped state. Another strand of Lewis’ idea relates to the 
international-dependence revolutionary model that aims to address internal and external class 
conflicts within underdeveloped societies and relations with developed states. The model 
takes its lead from Marx’s exposition of capitalists’ exploitation and class crisis. Whilst the 
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first suggests that the exploitation of underdeveloped states are externally engendered by 
developed states through unbalanced power relations, the second focuses on the implications 
of dualistic society and internal class conflicts. The third, delineates diversionary tactics by 
capitalists and attempts to present misleading development theories through financing of 
academic work to influence public policy. Many of these attempts were successful in 
demonising and derogating the role of the state in development to market forces of demand 
and supply.  
Third, many of these politicised development theories created space for market-led 
development as the appropriate approach to remedy the maladies of economic growth in 
underdeveloped states during the 1980s and 1990s. In the late 1980s and 1990s the triumph of 
neoliberalism marked the end of post-war development as international markets undermined 
the ability and role of the state in development (Hodges, 2015: 436). By this approach, a free-
market economy of trade liberalisation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, deregulation 
of trade and austerity management were aimed to achieve economic growth, create 
employment, increase incomes and produce the economic impacts necessary for 
development. However, in rolling back the role of the state and allowing market forces 
(demand and supply) to determine prices and redistribute income, the price mechanism 
widened the rich-poverty gap and created space for its critics. While proponents of state-led 
development relate failures of the free-market to restraints imposed on the state to intervene, 
apologist of market-led development suggest that failure of the market system was due to 
overregulation by interventionist state (Todaro and Smith, 2015: 118-141).  
Fourth, in the 1990s, it became increasingly obvious that neither the kind of ethnocentric 
development ideas of dependency, modernisation, nor post-development strategy of market-
led approaches had been effective in transforming the economies of SSA states, though the 
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potential of import-substitution industrialisation remains. It is in line with recent failings of 
the market system that the time has become right for African leaders to search for alternative 
development models to reform and replace capitalist development models that have proved 
ineffective in addressing the protracted underdevelopment in the continent. However, the 
structure of alternative development is a loose profile, post-paradigmatic, revisionist way of 
development thinking with broad interests that hinges on many theories (Pieterse, 2001: 104-
105). Mainstream and alternative development are at variances in terms of the thespian, 
modus operandi, and objectives of development, although the two ideas metamorphosis 
overtime as the former learns from its critics and adapts to contemporary interests. Similarly, 
contemporary notions of the term ‘development’ has its antecedent to classical notions. For 
instance, in the mid-1980s, a major focus on development in UNDP Reports was placed on 
Human Development as “the enlargement of people’s choices” (Pieterse, 2001: 5-7). In 
addition, mainstream development thinkers agree that improvement of the ecosystem should 
form part of the overall agenda at sustainable development conferences to avoid the 
fundamental error of detaching the environment, economics, equity and good governance 
from each other (Robertson, 2017: 44). Yet, the complexities and evolving character of 
development models blurs the distinctions of mainstream development with alternatives of 
the ecological, human rights and feminist dispositions. Having considered competing trends 
in development thinking over many decades, the chapter now gives consideration to the 
development thinking of the colonial government and Ghanaian leaders.  
2.3 Colonial Dependency and Modernization development  
The outcome of the Berlin Conference in 1885 - ‘Partition of Africa’ or ‘The Scramble of 
Africa’ - legitimised Europe’s colonization of Africa by defacto means and politicization of 
Africa’s development. Development became a powerful tool in the hands of the developed 
‘North’ to control and influence the affairs of the underdeveloped ‘South’. The chief policy 
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that defined British colonial development thinking during the first half of the 20th century 
was the Chamberlain Policy of Colonial Development (1895), named after the Right 
Honourable Joseph Chamberlain (Colonial Secretary, 1895-1903). The policy established 
how Britain may offer colonial assistance towards the development of British colonies to 
generate beneficial multiplier effects to the British economy (Colonial Development Act, 
1929). Chamberlain had believed more in state-led development than privatization for its 
benefits to the State and the people. During parliamentary debates Chamberlain remarked  
“… wherever it is possible, it is better that railways in these circumstances should be made 
either by the colony or by the Imperial Government, rather than handed over to private 
speculators. In these cases there is more probability of an economical progress of the work if 
it is taken up by the Government instead of by private speculators” (HC Deb 22 August 
1895). The colonial government assumed responsibility for the development of Africa but in 
a manner that served first and foremost its own interest. As Chamberlain remarked, “I regard 
many of our Colonies as being in the condition of under-developed estates which can never 
be developed without Imperial assistance…. I shall be prepared to consider carefully myself, 
and then …. submit to the House any case which may occur in which, by the judicious 
investment of British money, those estates which belong to the British Crown may be 
developed for the benefit of their population and for the benefit of the greater population 
which is outside” (HC Deb 22 April 1910). In effect, the whole colonial invasion was 
purposely for trade, and therefore the Chamberlain Policy of Development could not have 
been a grand plan intended to develop the colonies. Rather, it was the restructure of the 
colonial economy and its integration into a global capitalist system to facilitate extraction of 
raw materials such as cocoa, gold, diamond, bauxite, manganese, timber from Ghana at 




As recounted by Chamberlain, “Nothing is more extraordinary to my mind during my short 
experience at the Colonial Office than the extraordinary growth of trade in those West 
African colonies.  ... I believe at the present time the trade with those colonies alone is as 
much as that with some considerable European countries. ...the trade is rapidly increasing, 
because we are rapidly getting into communication with the interior” (HC Deb 22 August 
1895). Furthermore, colonies became pawns for asserting global dominance. During a 
parliamentary debate on ‘Foreign Tariffs and Home Industries’, Captain William Benn 
recounted a narrative by Chamberlain in October, 1903, where he (Chamberlain) had 
lamented about the waning pattern of the British economy. Chamberlain had stated that “we 
have seen industries in which we ought to have maintained our supremacy falling behind, and 
in some cases entirely taken away from us by our competitors'', (HC Deb 06 April 1910). 
This relates to the first decade of the twentieth century when competition from other 
industrialised states such as Germany and the United States outrun British exports to the 
protected markets in Europe. In 1895 and 1907, British exports to the protected markets 
amounted to £37,000,000 and £54,000,000 respectively, whilst Germany exports to the same 
market amounted to £43,000,000 and £96,000,000 for the same period (HC Deb 06 April 
1910). Chamberlain’s development policy was thus an urgent response by the British 
government to remedy the declining economic conditions in Britain, with inadvertent 
development in the colonies. The significance of the colonial trade provides explanation for 
the development gap between the Global North and South in comparative development 
analysis. 
A related study of the social relations between Britain and her tropical colonies from 1850 to 
1960 suggests that ‘colonialism’ and ‘development’ were contradictory concepts of 
constructive imperialism with deplorable outcomes (Havinden and Meredith, 1996; Kenny, 
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1997). Thus, the Colonial Administration focused on the construction of railway lines and 
road networks to connect the rural hinterland to the ports to facilitate raw material 
exportations to western industries with little regard to the overall developmental needs of the 
colonies. Despite the stance of the Colonial Office towards industrialisation and colonial 
development, a few colonies including the Gold Coast experienced a relatively small degree 
of economic development (Lewis et al., 1959: 20-21). And for the first half of the twentieth 
century, all colonial development policies with the exception of Guggisberg’s ten-year 
development plan (1920-1930) of agricultural improvements followed the same imperial 
trade trajectory within the framework of a series of Colonial Development Acts and Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts.   
Governor Guggisberg, being a brilliant and honest man, conformed to colonial economic 
management requirements but the ten-year Development Programme (1920–1930) was of his 
own belief and personal attachment to the people of the Gold Coast colony, not of the 
Colonial Office (Niculescu, 1957: 63; Kimble, 1963: 55). The colonial economic 
management policy took the view that the differences between private sector savings and 
investments, added to the differences between government tax revenue and expenditures must 
be equal to the difference between exports expenditure and import revenue to ensure that the 
colonies remain economically independent and without recourse to the British Treasury 
funds. Interestingly this formula and primary correspondences of senior bureaucrats within 
the colonial office in London as well as field studies of British tropical colonies contradict the 
imperial rhetoric of its commitment to colonial development (Havinden and Meredith, 1993; 
Series of Colonial Office Papers). Though not an economist but a surveyor by profession, 
Guggisberg based his development thinking on the fundamental economic assumptions that 
governed capitalist market and factors of production – land, labour and capital to note that in 
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the abundance of land and labour, capital was a constraint to colonial development. In 
addition, the price elasticity of demand and supply of Ghana’s exports suggests that with 
increases in production, prices were more likely to drop and therefore the need to find means 
of decreasing cost of production to improve overall profitability and government revenue in 
the midst of technological improvement and labour migrations. Per the supply construct of 
Ghana’s exports of mainly agricultural and mineral resources, the reduction in transport cost 
through the construction of railway lines, harbour and feeder roads were commendable to 
remove the bottlenecks and increase revenue.  
However, given the constraints imposed by the British treasury policy in relation to external 
debt accumulation, the alternative source of investment capital for these development 
initiatives were limited to private savings and responsible tax system that acts as an incentive 
to capitalists investments. According to Frimpong-Ansah (1992: 20) there was a contrary 
movement of labour from the urban to the rural areas as a result of the expansion in 
agriculture and mineral exports enabled by improved transportation systems. The current 
study puts forward that although the Ghanaian experience was in contrast to labour 
absorption theory in industrialised states - from rural to urban areas (Lewis, 1955), it was not 
out of context because the ten-year development programme led to agricultural improvement, 
not industrialisation as in the real sense of modernisation and establishment of manufacturing 
or service industries.  
Lessons drawn from Guggisberg’s development ideas and efforts to the constitutional 
developments of Ghana in 1925 places him ahead of his time. It also illustrates that given the 
appropriate opportunity, the average Ghanaian is capable of adapting to new ideas of 
development. Although the programme was not wholly successful, partly because of 
capitalist merchants’ agitation against increased taxation and other factors, it still remains the 
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best thought-out and successfully implemented development programme in Ghana’s 
development history (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 21). Yet the main binary constituents of 
Cardinall’s critique to Guggisberg’s development strategies are first, for diversification of 
exports and second, the long-term implications of commercialisation of labour (Cardinall, 
1931: 93). In addition, Cardinal introduced new ideas into the debate of land ownership, 
labour behaviours and agricultural modernizations. Although Guggisberg’s plan to diversify 
agricultural exports into commercial scale production of tobacco, cotton, cola, shea nuts, 
coffee and rice were unsuccessful, Cardinall reinvigorated Guggisberg’s ideas by his 
observations and critique.    
This development thinking highlights the detached approach of the British government from 
the overall development of the colonies except where it served the objectives of the imperial 
trade. In essence, the colonial modernization agenda as part of the development programme 
mainly focused on establishing import substitution industries with policies that led to 
unbalanced economic development (Lewis, 1954; Hirschman, 1958). Lewis’s development 
theory of ‘balanced growth’ suggests that when the primacy of agriculture is appreciated and 
industrialisation takes a lead from agriculture modernisation, the agriculture sector releases 
labour from the rural to urban areas to support the import substitution industries without 
causing labour scarcity in the agricultural areas. By this theory, agriculture modernisation and 
industrialisation must progress simultaneously or better still, agriculture leads to provide for 
industries. Lewis’s idea, though rejected by the Colonial Office in 1944 due to capital 
constraints, was revisited almost a decade later. However, the underlining presumption of the 
existence of a centralised and committed state with capacity to undertake the economic 
organisation and management of agriculture was in contrast to the detached attitude 
demonstrated by the Colonial Office (Lewis, 1984: 127). Despite the official pronouncement 
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of policy shift in development thinking from ‘dependency’ to ‘modernization’ the social 
relations between Britain and nascent African states during the early part of the 
decolonization period of the late 1950s and 60s was dominated by the political and economic 
interests of the former. Local governors received directives from the Colonial Office to 
selectively encourage agriculture for imperial trade; limit industrialisation to the production 
of simple goods; retain oversea real incomes to promote importation of industrial goods to the 
colonies; discourage development that involved heavy infrastructural expenditures, and retain 
the economic management philosophy to prevent colonies from becoming capital burden on 
the British Treasury (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 25).  
2.4 State-led Import Substitution Industrialisation Development  
The ‘Report on Industrialisation of the Gold Coast’ provided the model of development that 
Ghana was to adventure after its independence. The model consisted of an intensive 
agricultural programme aimed at adequate food production and capital for industrialisation, 
improvement of skills in the public services, and removal of inflationary bottlenecks (Lewis, 
1955). In this report, the idea for a simultaneous stimulus of agriculture and industrialization 
was reformed to an agricultural programme that would act as the catalyst to industrialisation. 
Despite this, the report provided the framework for improvements in road infrastructure to 
reduce transportation cost of agricultural products to make agriculture more profitable. The 
principal argument of Lewis’s theory is that the expansion of a productive sector of the 
economy (agriculture) provides resources for industrialisation until equilibrium is attained to 
make agriculture as efficient and lucrative as related industries. The main development 
thinking during the immediate post-colonial period was formulated around import-
substitution industrialisation to make Ghana self-reliant and distant herself from the perils of 
neo-colonialism and overreliance on foreign aid for development. This involved the adoption 
of modernisation strategies with assistance from developed states, particularly in the areas of 
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agriculture and mining. However Lal (1986: 17-19) noted that the kind of ‘big-push’ 
development strategy of the Nkrumah government risked fiscal crisis in the event of export 
price instability as was the case by the early 1960s. Meanwhile, the fragility of Ghana’s 
economy and adverse export revenue made it unsustainable for large-scale agriculture 
modernisation linked with rapid industrialisation except through heavy borrowing. 
2.5 Neoliberalism and Market-led Development  
Neoliberalism is used interchangeably as a philosophy, doctrine, form of statecraft, or an idea 
that has implications for markets and governing states (Schram and Pavlovskaya, 2018: 28). 
It is centred on the exercise of political sovereignty of governing states and organisations 
associated with capitalist economy. However, “Neo-liberalism is not Adam Smith; neo-
liberalism is not a market society. Neo-liberalism is not the Gulag on the insidious scale of 
Capitalism” (Foucault, 2008: 131). Basically, neoliberalism is a form of market capitalism 
associated with right-wing politics that argues for roll-back of the state and free interplay of 
demand and supply forces in determining prices of goods and services. Though neoliberalism 
takes its lead from classical economics, its generalisation to all aspects of human endeavour 
is problematic and disputable. For instance, marketization of essential public services such as 
health, education, and security have drawn interest in recent times.  
In the late 1990s, neoliberal approach to development was rejected for its failures to create 
employment, address poverty and promote development. Neoliberal agenda of the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund and US Treasury Department as set out in the 
Washington consensus to rehabilitate failing economies ignored local knowledge and peculiar 
ethnocentrisms of development (Pieterse, 2001). Although the market system contributed to 
economic growth in some developing countries, it produced an inefficient redistributive 
system that allowed capitalist exploitation of surplus values of production. A classic 
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economics conceptualisation of the exploitation provides plausible explanation for the 
unstable social relations between capital and labour prior to the 2008 global financial crisis 
(Burnham, 2010). In the context of development studies, it is argued that with all other things 
being equal, an unbalanced relationship exists between the global financial crisis and 
development. Thus economic crisis precipitates development retardation in same direction. 
As a facet of social sciences, development is influenced by classic economic thinking and 
social ideas (Preston, 1996; Martinussen, 1997).  
Evolving trends in development suggest that traditional development objectives 
metamorphosed into neoliberalism, human, and alternative developments as reactions to 
changing needs and criticisms of particular societies. In addition, the shift in trusteeship of 
development from unilateralism (state) to multilateralism (United Nations agencies, World 
Bank, transnational corporations, philanthropic and quango organisations), and the variations 
in power relations and influence between these two major actors of development draw 
interest in development discourse. According to the World Bank (1998), the nature and scope 
of development has advanced from ‘hardware’ (agricultural infrastructures) to ‘software’ 
(knowledge transfer) and from hegemonic to pluralistic development. This makes it necessary 
to evaluate development approaches by outcomes and initiate plans that reflect diverse 
characteristics – culture, indigenous structures and beliefs – of beneficiaries. Recent shifts in 
development trend support the view that development is not what it used to be, would not 
remain what it is, and would continue to generate tensions until states form social relations of 
embedded autonomy with society to understand and adapt timely to changing needs (Evans, 
1996). Besides, the responsibility for development is not solely destined to politics or 
economic but of the concerted effort of both and related discipline to achieve developmental 
goals. Against this background, “Politics must not be subject to the economy, nor should the 
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economy be subject to the dictates of an efficiency-driven paradigm of technocracy. …there 
is urgent need for politics and economics to enter into frank dialogue in the service of life, 
especially human life” (Francis, 2015: 90). Therefore the realisation of development lies 
within the committed and capable actions of the state and its embedded autonomy 
(Evans,1995) with multilateral development actors to meet the changing needs – materialist 
and post materialist – of particular societies (local, regional, national, global) at specific 
periods.  
2.6 Marx, Polanyi and Wallerstein’s Concepts of World Capitalist System 
The search for possible emergence of developmental state in Africa is helped by the critical 
examination of conceptual contestations and relationships between – capital, class and crisis; 
state forms and societal relations; recent trends in development and developmental states – in 
the spirit of Karl Marx, Karl Polanyi and Wallerstein’s expositions of the world capitalist 
systems. These intellectual works illustrates tensions within the colonial proposition of 
development that focused more on economic liberalisation and less on political 
transformation in the hope that as wealth was created, powerful forces would emerge from 
within society to shift politics towards democracy but this did not take place. The congruence 
between mainstream development economics and contemporary Marxian thought in relation 
to their concerns about inequality and poverty, as self-perpetuating vicious circle which could 
only be broken by structural transformation (Killick, 2010: 27) illustrates the importance of  
Marx’s ideas in development discourse. For Nkrumah identified himself as a Marxist and was 
influenced by Marxian ideas. However, given the critics of Marx’s abstract models of 
concrete realisation in our contemporary social world, the current thesis takes a constructive 
look at Wallerstein’s idea of the capitalist world system. Wallerstein’s analysis of the 
capitalist world system suggests that the economic structure of contemporary underdeveloped 
states was not what it was when the latter first engaged with the developed states but became 
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so as a result of the core-periphery development strategy (Wallerstein, 2000: 76). Much of 
this analysis hinges on the implication of ‘unequal exchange’ instigated by the strength of 
core’s strong state-machinery over the weak periphery. Contrary to Marx, Wallerstein 
suggests that capitalism was not of nation-states but an affair of the world-economy that 
gained root at the creation of European division of labour in the mid-fifteenth century 
(Wallerstein, 2000: 87). Furthermore, though Wallerstein argues that there are no longer 
socialist or feudal systems but one world-system (Wallerstein, 2000: 102), this view is 
contested by neo-Marxist scholars. 
Marx’s general idea on capitalism holds that as human societies develop, class struggle 
ensues between the minority ruling class (bourgeoisies who own and control factors of 
production) and the majority working class (proletariats who actively engage in production 
for wages) over distribution of surplus value leading to a proletarian revolution to abolish the 
state. Therefore the survival of a state depends on its capacity and commitment to mitigate 
capitalists’ greed by a moral-based statecraft.  Although many of his ideas run counter to Karl 
Marx’s, Polanyi explored his predecessor’s idea to challenge traditional economic notions of 
scarcity and utility/profit maximization to put forward his ideas of how humans can engage 
responsibly with their natural and social environments to make a living. Polanyi’s central 
argument holds that the development of human societies is not necessarily underpinned by 
predetermined stages of human development but through committed and conscious 
endeavours based on moral principles. Although Polanyi’s work is recognised as one of the 
major intellectual contributions in international political economy during the twentieth 
century and beyond, his critique of market self-regulation evokes central tensions and 
intellectual complexities.  
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A recap of Marxian capitalist form of production and development theories – capital 
accumulation and composition, class conflict and crisis – is first and foremost essential in the 
explanation of the socio-economic relations existing between factors of production, and 
second, to the understanding of economic development in capitalist economies. According to 
Polanyi “Industrial capitalism is the latest and most important form of capitalism. When we 
talk of capitalism, we usually mean industrial capitalism. It means the use of capital in 
industrial production and the creation of capital by means of industrial production, therefore 
the existence of a class of capitalists whose interests are identified with those of industrial 
development” (Block, 2003). Yet explanation of the fundamental and intrinsic dimensions of 
production, especially capitalist form of production and distribution are complex. Marxian 
expositions relies on a set of social laws such as the ‘Trinity Formula’, ‘Tendential Fall of 
Profit Rates’, and ‘Valorisation’ to explain capitalist thinking and behaviour in production 
and development. However, “production is not always rational, and is usually tied to 
economic variables which assign to products a value that does not necessarily correspond to 
their real worth (Francis, 2015: 90). 
First, Marx suggests that by the ‘trinity formula’, land is rewarded with ground rent, labour 
with wage, and capital in terms of interest and profit, holds in itself all the mysteries of social 
production process and capitalist development (Mandel, 1981: 953-955). In a dialectical but 
difficult analysis, Marx critique apologists of capitalism for justifying their approach of 
capital accumulation, surplus value, exploitation of labour power and class struggle between 
capital and labour, in particular. The formula holds that although incomes accrue to each 
factor of production as interest, ground rent and wage in variable proportions of the product 
value, their ostensible source of wealth belongs to entirely separate spheres. The ideological 
variations implicit in the definition of labour value creates uncertainty in the labour market 
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and ample space for capitalists to undervalue labour power and overvalue profits as well as 
interest. Marxian assumption of land, as a natural given that contributes nothing to production 
beside its original value is rightly challenged because contemporary technological 
advancements and enhanced methods of land cultivation improve the productivity of land. 
With reference to capital, Marx suggests that interest on capital is certainly the most irrational 
formula for capital because it is out of insatiable greed of profit maximization that class 
struggle ensues between owners of the factors of production and the working class over 
surplus value (Mandel 1981: 955). However, Polanyi moderates this concern with his idea of 
a system of government that coordinates and regulates capitalist forms of production with 
moral responsibility.  
In 1934, Polanyi wrote “Mankind has come to an impasse. Fascism resolves it at the cost of 
moral and material retrogression. Socialism is the way out by advance towards a Functional 
Democracy”. Polanyi’s view is that the solution to the crisis inherent in democracy and 
capitalism is not resolvable through proletarian revolutions but by morally orientated 
representative body – the state – that includes the diverse interests of other groups in its own. 
This idea is distinct from Marxian perspective whereby the state represents the interest of the 
bourgeoisies and risks its annihilating through proletarian revolution. As capitalist 
development relates more to capital than the other factors of production the present study 
redirects its effort to the composition and role of capital to economic growth and 
development.  
One of the principal arguments of this study is that in capitalist economies, economic 
development is dependent on the availability of investment capital in the hands of particular 
state forms - democratic or authoritarian - that is committed to, and capable of forming 
partnership with private business to induce economic growth and human flourishing. Yet the 
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composition of investment capital is derived through the accumulation of surplus values 
exploited from labour’s contribution in the production process. This phenomenon generates 
class struggle between labour and capital that when unregulated in the long term affects 
wages, consumption, productivity, profit and development. A fairer system of distribution – 
capitalist or social market – through state interventions redefines the nature of development 
and class relations. However, distributive systems are known to constitute a major cause of 
class crisis and societal conflicts. Refereeing to the English society, Polanyi noted that “The 
productive forces of the country increased enormously, yet the state and conditions of the 
people were miserable” (Block, 2003). In volume one of ‘Das Kapital’ Marx postulated that 
the “accumulation of capital is therefore multiplication of the proletariat” (Mendel, 1976: 
764).  
Second, tendential fall of profit rates holds that profit rates fall as increased capital is 
combined with same level of labour (Mandel and Fernbach, 1981: 317-338). Modernization 
and over-mechanization of the capitalist production process renders itself to gradual 
decreased rates of profits which in effect instigates further exploitation of labour to 
compensate for profit short falls. In the absence of countervailing remedies – state 
intervention with quality leadership - marginal profit of invested capital declines over time to 
cause contractions in employment and render labour vulnerable to exploitation. The fall in 
profit rates reinvigorates capitalists to further exploit labour. However, “the theoretical 
problem is not to explain the particular causes of this or that crisis, any more than the task of 
scientist is to explain the precise date on which spring arrives in any particular year. The task 
is to explain the regular recurrence of economic crisis as a normal part of the developmental 
conceptualization of capitalist mode of production” (Clarke, 1994: 4.). The relevance of 
understanding the crisis theory is that it accentuates the long term implications of decline in 
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investible profits to capital accumulation and its impact to developmental visions. Burnham 
(2010) was therefore right to suggest that crisis is integral to economic development. Crisis, 
from a Marxian perspective is concerned with the causes and consequences of the tendency 
for profits to fall in capitalist markets over a period (Mandel, 1981). However, as profit 
constitutes capital for economic development, its unregulated distribution leads to economic 
breakdown. In his critique of political economy, Marx puts forward a distinct correlation 
between crisis and development to assert that crisis is a necessary element and actor of the 
capital production process and development (Negri, 1988). The important debate is how this 
surplus value is constituted and distributed in a way that mitigates exploitation of labour 
power and simultaneously generates reinvestment capital for development. Burnham (2010) 
suggests that in bourgeois economies, the process of capital constitution is a form of social 
class relation based on class exploitation and process of capital accumulation that gives rise 
to under consumption and unemployment. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that even though 
capitalists have capacity to absorb short term falls in profit rates to keep wages intact, 
neoliberal economists reject this idea. As the effects of capitalist production to developmental 
aspirations is evident, possibilities of development lies with state initiatives to form cohesive 
state-private business partnerships for growth. In such instances, the idea of a developmental 
state approach that allows interventionist states to deliberately distort the free-market mode of 
capital accumulation through selective industrial policies of coordination, tariffs, taxation, 
subsidies and provision of finance is appealing (Radice, 2008). 
Third, valorisation (profit maximization) explains the overriding objective of capitalists as 
illustrated by a process of exchanging ‘money’ to acquire ‘commodity’ (raw materials, assets 
and labour power) to exchange the produce at a surplus value (Fraser and Wilde,2011). By 
this process ‘capital’, as a means of production, is transformed into mobile property (money 
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and commodity) and engaged in a limitless circulation to create surplus value through a 
process of valorisation of capital (Mandel and Fernbach, 1981: 953). However, Polanyi 
challenges the idea of “fetishism of commodities” on the basis that money, land, and labour 
are not commodities in the actual sense because real commodities are produced for sale. 
Though Polanyi attempted to distinguish his formulation from Marx’s by introducing the 
concept of ‘fictitious commodities’, his initiative in this regard seems nothing more than a 
tactical effort to illustrate his theoretical shift. In his contribution to how underdeveloped 
states could achieve great transformation, Polanyi re-echoes the importance of an 
interventionist capitalist state to perform regulatory and coordinative roles to mitigate the 
negative effects of self-regulatory economy. He noted that “to allow the market mechanism to 
be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the 
amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society” 
(Block,2003). Although there are no pure forms of capitalism and socialism in practice, the 
role of the state and its autonomous embeddedness with society narrows the market-society 
dichotomy to mitigate the tension between capital and labour at the point of production and 
distribution of surplus values. Valorisation therefore explains the unfair appropriation of 
surplus value and exploitation by market-self regulation under capitalism (Robertson, 1979; 
Block, 2003). Capitalism personifies capitalist’s behaviour of wealth accumulation and power 
through a self-valorisation process driven by avarice and pursuit of self-enrichment and 
dominance. Against this background, the Marxian concept of referring to capital as ‘dead 
labour’ and labour as ‘living labour’ implies that the survival of capital depends on its ability 
to ‘suck in’ the life blood of labour without proper reciprocation. This parasitic analogy of 
capitalism forms the conceptual basis of categorising the capitalist political economy in 
Ghana as ‘predatory, vampire and zombie’ states. 
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2.7 Theories of the Modern State and its Role in Development 
This segment takes a constructive look at the fundamental ideas of the state from the 
perspectives of Marx, Weber, Hegel, Polanyi and Foucault. The trajectory to economic 
development remains competitive between state-led and market-led development approaches 
but the role of the state in the development of modern societies has been one of the most 
contentious issues in radical discursive breaks. Theories of the state are basically about 
governmental acts because the will of the state reflects the will of the government that 
represents the people (Laski, 2015: 28-29). Moreover, explanation of state theories provides 
logical foundations to understand value-forms of states – how states relate with civil society; 
roles of the states; how modern capitalist states are organised; and how state bureaucratic 
structures can relate with civil society to transform underdeveloped economies towards 
developmental state.  
The first two dominant traditions of state theory are accredited to the classic works of Karl 
Marx (Engels) and Max Weber. Leftwich (1993) suggests that despite the variations and 
sometimes specificity of Marxian and Weberian theories of the state, their scholarly 
contributions are very relevant in the developmental state narratives of developing 
economies. First, definitions of the state have widely been contested for attempts to place a 
heterogeneous concepts into a homogenous prism. Weber’s (1964) definition of the state as 
“compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them” is 
critiqued for not providing critical analysis of the role of the state. Major parts of Weber’s 
thesis – authority, monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, sovereignty, territory and 
security have all come under intense debate. Besides, in reality state sovereignty is not 
guaranteed because through neo-colonialism, foreign policies and classified activities, 
dominant states interfere in the internal affairs of less militarised sovereign states under the 
pretext of posing ‘subjective’ risk to dominant state’s interests. Pre-emptive use of physical 
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force remains a subject of legal discourse. Trotsky (in Rosen and Wolff, 1999), suggests that 
“every state is founded on force”. Today, however, although the use of force is ultimately 
vested in the state, it is also rightfully devolved to citizenry for the protection of self and 
individual properties - within the legal perimeters of reasonability, proportionality and 
necessity – as subject to the law (Rosen and Wolff, 1999; McKinnon, 2012). Conceptual 
contestations about state sovereignty; legitimate use of force; claims of advancing the 
common interest of society; collective binding decisions and recognition of a state by other 
states are not uncommon.  
According to Weber and Locke, the idea that the state derives its legitimacy from the people 
is intrinsically and fundamentally grounded on a ‘social contract’ between the state and the 
citizenry (Rosen and Wolff, 1999). It is presumed that by legitimising the roles of the state, 
the electorates have consented to the authority of the state for their well-being. However, this 
is a false sense of assurance and political charade because the elite minority always find 
means to advance their interest over the poor majority. In real politik, democratic states 
subvert the will of the people through elite-oriented legislations and lobbyist activities in the 
interest of wealthy international corporate organisations. In today’s societies, “some 
economic sectors exercise more power than states themselves. But economics without politics 
cannot be justified, since this would make it impossible to favour other ways of handling the 
various aspects of the present crisis”, Francis (2015: 94). This re-echoes the importance of the 
state and its adaptation of the appropriate statecraft and strategies for development. In one of 
his classic works, the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852/1973), Marx noted that “for 
the bureaucrat, the world is a mere object to be manipulated by him”, and argued for a 
relatively autonomous state that is capable of restraining the state bureaucratic machinery 
from manipulations by bourgeoisie interests. 
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Next, Hegel’s state theory interpretation of the modern state as in its original German version, 
‘Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, das der Staat ist’, meaning ‘The march of God in the 
world, that is what the state is’ illustrates a metaphysical thinking of the state as a divine 
strategy from God (Avineri, 1972: 176). Although Hegel’s concept of the state presents an 
authoritarian government structure, his fundamental idea was not to prescribe an ‘ideal’ state 
for replication but to suggest that the state should be organised on rational freedom for the 
benefit of all people. In one of his works he wrote ‘In considering the idea of the state, we 
must not have our eyes on particular states or particular institutions …, On some principles or 
other, any state may be shown to be bad,… The state is no ideal work of art; it stands on earth 
and so is the sphere of caprice, chance and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many 
respects. But the ugliest of men, or a criminal … is still a living man. The affirmative, life, 
subsists despite his defects, and it is the affirmative which is our theme here’ (Avineri, 1972: 
177). Basically, Hegel’s analysis of the state provides us with the fundamental of discussing 
further dimensions of the state – democratic, authoritarian, predatory, vampire and zombie. 
In contrast, Foucault challenges the centrality of the state and advances the notion of a 
decentred state with delegated service provisions to market agents and quangos (Schram and 
Pavalovskaya, 2018). Foucault’s idea that, “the state has no heart, as we well know, but not 
just in that sense that it has no feelings, either good or bad, but it has no heart in the sense that 
it has no interior” (Foucault, 2008: 90), sadly amounts to objectifying the state in an attempt 
to roll-back the state at a time when market forces have proved ineffective in redistribution of 
societal wealth. The diminishing importance of the state is executed through reductions in 
government funding, tightening of eligibility criteria for international aid and trade, activities 
of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.  
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Theoretical exposition of the state’s role justifies the case for state intervention in the 
development process. State theories remain prominent in the developmental state discourse in 
so far as the central role of the state to development prevails. However development is not 
automatically guaranteed by either of the two mainstream systems of economics and political 
systems - liberal free-market capitalism and State-socialist planned economy (Radice, 2008). 
Possibilities of development depends on the ideologies, of who – state and private – owns the 
means of production, and how surplus-values are distributed between the factors of 
production. Moreover, the state form – democratic or authoritarian – that coordinates 
production and market systems are important for consideration. Although Japan was an 
autonomous developmental state, in praxis it was semi-democratic and authoritarian 
(Johnson, 1982).  
The notion of democratic states being aligned to capitalist markets, while authoritarian states 
to social market system is misleading. Haggard (1990) noted that many of East Asia’s 
developmental states that embraced neoliberal economic policies were ab initio authoritarian 
in nature. It is therefore not only a matter of labelling states or market systems that explains 
the status quo, but the form and method of connectivity - both historical and existing - 
between labour and other forms of production that describe the social structure of the state 
and its economy (Evans, 1995). Clarke (1983) argues that, in capitalist economies, the state is 
both a regulatory actor and part of the production process. However, Lal (2000) argues that 
although the market system is known to have wide spread imperfections, attempts to remedy 
the situation through the implementation of dirigisme system – capitalist economy with direct 
investment and strong state influence – by ineffective state bureaucracy compounds the 
problem. Lal’s concern was not directed at state intervention per se but at the effectiveness of 
the interventionist state to instigate and coordinate development. More importantly in 
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contemporary debates, it is how the role of the modern state has evolved from its traditional 
facets of ensuring national security, maintenance of internal law and order to incorporate 
economic transformations with developmental outcomes that attracts public opinion (Evans, 
1995).  
However for development to be attained, expert knowledge must be complementary with 
local knowledge (Pieterse, 2001). The development of a strong civil society requires the 
partnership of a strong state with the appropriate market system (Friedmann, 1992: Brohman, 
1996). This can be achieved through ‘embedded autonomy’, whereby the capitalist state 
bureaucracy maintains intimacy with civil society to facilitate growth and redistribution, but 
able to distance itself from adverse influence by interest groups (Peter Evans, 1995). Evans 
further suggests that the notion of a relatively autonomous state has its sharpest empirical 
manifestation in uncommon examples of developmental states in contemporary developing 
economies.  
2.8 Developmental State, Bureaucracy and Embedded Autonomy  
The idea of developmental state is aided by theories of Max Weber’s ‘ideal-type’ 
bureaucracy of how the modern state and its administrative institutions can socially-engineer 
economic development in capitalist states, and Evan’s embedded autonomy. To Weber, the 
legitimacy derived by a rational-legal authority of state bureaucracy that is founded on 
impersonal, meritocratic and long-term rewards typifies the history of developed capitalist 
states (Leftwich, 1993). Although Weber’s hypothesis is not assigned to specific state form – 
democratic/authoritarianism, and critique for being prescriptive, it offers conceptual clarity 
and coherence of how modern states operate rather than their forms or characteristics 
(Albrow, 1970; Leftwich, 1993; Evans, 1995). Weber argued that unlike the intense nature of 
patrimonialism that was practiced by pre-capitalist states to sustain legitimacy, the modern 
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state derives its legitimacy from the functioning of his ideal-type bureaucracy. However, 
successful application of Weber’s typology to engineer economic development has been 
uncommon in developing economies where ethnic politics based on cultural practices 
dominate. In spite of this, it is the state bureaucracy that depicts the true characteristic of the 
state itself. Thus in East Asia “the politicians reigned but the bureaucrats ruled” (Johnson, 
1982).  
The technical advantages of Weber’s ideal-type modern bureaucracy – precision, knowledge 
of record keeping, speed, unity, cost effectiveness, continuity, unambiguity and strict 
subordination – over its predecessors make a case for its adaptation in Africa. Weber had 
argued that his ideal-type bureaucracy is more effective than other bureaucratic forms in 
transforming economic growth and development. It is intriguing that despite Weber’s 
occasional critiques of Marx’s views, Weber alluded with his predecessor on the necessity for 
a nominal structural paradigm of state administration to serve as the official entity to organise 
political actors in industrial society towards economic development. Gerth and Mills (1948) 
echoed Weber’s proposition that in capitalist states, successful bureaucratization is founded 
on calculable rules and impersonal relations, that substitutes personal emotions for rational 
reasoning in decision making for economic growth. Weber’s notion is typified by : (i) 
impersonal duties by personally free staff; (ii) assigned and clear specification of duties of 
offices; (iii) hierarchy of administrative authority and responsibilities; (iv) meritocratic 
recruitment policy; (v) promotion based on merit or seniority; (vi) contractual based 
employment; (vii) fixed structure for salaries and pensions; (viii) intolerance for acts of 
prebendalism; (ix) systematic disciplinary policy; and (x) bureaucratic work as being the 
single occupation for incumbent bureaucrats (Weber,1964: 333-334). Although Weber made 
reference to ‘relative-autonomy’ in the structural sense of Marx’s idea to constrain capital 
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accumulation, Peter Evans’ idea of the ‘embedded - autonomy’ of the state offers more 
conspicuous explanation to understand modern capitalist bureaucracies. In his book, 
‘Embedded Autonomy’ (1995: 59), Evans invoked an amalgamation of neo-Weberian ideas 
with embedded autonomy. He argues that Weberian bureaucracy on its own is insufficient to 
transform capitalist economies, just as the separation of ‘autonomy’ from ‘embeddedness’ 
would yield perverse results –“the secret of the developmental state lies in the amalgam”, he 
emphasised. Yet the empirical contribution of this amalgamation to economic developmental 
is difficult to ascertain. Moreover, Evans (1995) challenges Weber’s attribution of the 
problems of developing states to ‘excessive bureaucracy’ and argued that, it is rather the 
‘scarcity of bureaucracy’. 
In a related study, Evans and Rauch (1999) suggest a link between effective bureaucratic 
arrangements and economic growth that furthers Weber’s classic contributions. Yet, unlike 
other known indicators of measuring economic growth - Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – it is difficult to measure contributions of 
‘Weberianess’ to economic growth. In a cross-national study of 29 developing countries for 
the period 1970-90, Evans and Rauch (1999) sought to measure the effects of ‘Weberianess’ 
to economic growth in terms of  real GDP per capita and average years of schooling (1965 as 
the base year). The study concluded by establishing an association between Weberianess and 
‘unexplained growth’, with recommendation for an inclusion of Weberianess as a measure of 
economic growth. In another study, Henderson et al. (2003) further developed this idea to 
measure the effects of Weberianess – as a measure of growth – to poverty reduction, and 
concluded that although there is a strong relationship between the two variables, it is unclear 
how direct the relationship is. This thesis presuppose that economic growth in itself does not 
automatically translate to economic development, but that the bureaucratic qualities of state 
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institutions with pragmatic application of embedded autonomy is a decisive element for 
economic transformation and human flourishing. The essential features of Japan’s 
developmental state were the existence of a small, inexpensive and aristocratic bureaucracy 
with sufficient scope for effective operation and leverage to take initiative, in a market 
conforming interventionist state economy (Woo-Cumings, 1999). 
Weber’s critics argue that the general practice of an ideal bureaucratic typology with long-
term traits is hindered by unpredictable traditional variations in specific states over different 
epochs. Despite the criticisms, the economic transformation of Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1980s were founded on the Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy, with subtle 
modifications to accommodate variations in time and place.  Although many social scientists, 
from different ideological backgrounds have at least acknowledged with some variations, the 
roles of the state in development, the unanswered puzzle persists about the state form that 
leads to economic development to provide logical paradigm for the ‘African’ developmental 
state vision. What then is development in the context of developmental state? 
2.9 Developmental state – an idea, concept or paradigm for Africa 
Protracted underdevelopment in Africa, sharp rise of East Asian economies and the 2008 
global economic crisis reinvigorate the developmental state discourse and search for a 
capable and committed state (Vu, 2007) to engineer economic growth and human flourishing 
in SSA. More recently, development has shifted from the neoliberal perspective of the 1980s 
to a more humanistic and post-materialist approach of human development and capacity 
building with possibilities of adaptation by underdeveloped states. However, Johnson (1982: 
315-323) cautions that although “it may be possible for another state to adopt Japan’s 
priorities and its high growth system without duplicating Japanese history……., the danger of 
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institutional abstractions are as great as potential advantages”. Here, ‘adaptation’ rather that 
‘adoption’ of Japan’s success is advocated for emerging developmental states. 
Developmental state itself is not a novel idea in political economy studies but has rather 
attracted more focus after the Second World War through series of academic debates. 
Notably among these debates was Chalmers Johnson’s narrative of the success of the 
Japanese economy that practiced Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy in East Asia’s 
interventionist capitalist state. Johnson (1982) defined it as ‘a state that is focused on 
economic development and takes necessary measures to accomplish that objective’. Although 
this concept opens a problematic discourse between economic growth and development, 
Woo-Cummings (1999) ameliorates the problem with a stratified approach of prioritised 
development objectives. She suggests that ‘”a state’s first priority will define its essence”, 
and argues for developmental states to first of all focus on achieving economic development, 
and thereafter a welfare or equality state. Thus, aspiring developmental states are encouraged 
to seek first the ‘kingdom’ of economic growth, and all other aspects of development shall be 
added. While many development thinkers would agree to this ‘biblical graft’, some contend 
that, economic and political objectives can take off simultaneously in emerging 
developmental states. In the developmental state discourse, Japan is well noted for its 
economic achievement. 
Additionally, Johnson suggests that the administrative functions of the state bureaucratic 
systems must be seen as more coordinative and less regulatory to achieve sustainable 
economic growth. Weber’s ‘elitist’ bureaucratic state form of far-sighted state interventionist 
market policies was a major contributory factor to Japan’s developmental success story 
(Woo-Cumings, 1999). However, Johnson (1982) rejects classical arguments that capitalism 
as a market system, generates class strife and political instability. Johnson considers 
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coordinated state intervention in the capitalist market system as essential to economic growth. 
He argues that, the role of the capitalist state as a capable and committed driver of steering 
economic development visions to its logical conclusion cannot be underestimated in the 
developmental state discourse. It is therefore misconceived that democratic and authoritarian 
states are aligned to free-market and command economies respectively. In practice, the 
economies of many contemporary states are hybrid variations of state and market forms. The 
contestation however, lies with the ideas and structures that influence states and market 
actions. Johnson further suggests that the use of legal and economic coercive apparatus must 
be rarely evoked to encourage cohesive state-private business initiatives as became evident in 
his study on variations of state involvement across newly industrialised states in East Asia – 
Taiwan and South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. However, the generalisation of 
developmental experiences of EA states gives a misleading notion of homogeneity.  
Although Johnson is critiqued for not being prescriptive enough, determinism and 
development are not symmetrical. Thus it is difficult to offer prescriptive ideas that determine 
the outcome of an evolving concept – development. Suggestions of an ideal state form – 
democratic/authoritarian that can reinvigorate protracted underdeveloped economies to the 
developmental state vision are complex. This renders an adaptation of the EA developmental 
state model to Africa problematic. In relation to state forms, Deyo (1987) rejects Johnson’s 
argument that a measure of state authoritarianism has been beneficial for developmental 
objectives of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Johnson explains that East Asia’s economic 
narrative would have been different, and perhaps a failure, without the element of initial strict 
obedience to authority. Johnson’s idea was echoed by the late Ethiopian President Meles 
Zenawi, who argued that, whilst democracy is essential for legitimacy; the need for 
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developmental state to be autonomous from society could only be in the form of ‘semi-
democratic and semi-parliamentarian at best’ (Routley, 2014). 
Another strand in the developmental state debate has been the confusion and misleading use 
of the term as a ‘buzzword’ or ‘concept’ in political and academic circles to describe states 
that focus on, and demonstrates a commitment to economic growth (Routley, 2014). The 
semantics of the developmental states concept is contestable, with problematic facets (Evans, 
2010). The meaning of ‘Democracy’ or ‘Authoritarian’ developmental state (Johnson, 1987; 
Evans, 1995; White, 1998), ‘Patrimonial’ and ‘Pro-rural poor’ developmental state (Vu, 
2007; Mkandawire, 2010; Routley, 2014) have left scholars to contend with the semantical 
problems.  
Failing outcomes of neoliberal economic orthodoxy of minimal state development has 
generated apologist for interventionist states policies. Similarly, narratives of East Asia’s 
economic success have reinvigorated support for the key roles of developmental state in 
developments. However the non-standardised nature of state forms – democratic or 
authoritarian – pose one of the greatest challenges to the idea of replication of the EA 
developmental state model in Africa. Evans (1991) suggests that states are not standardised 
commodities as they come in different shapes, sizes and styles. Given the diverse 
developmental experiences of EA developmental states, critiques (Haggard,2004: 56; 
Putzel,2002; Ohno and Ohno,2012) to Johnson’s homogenous idealization(1999: 43) have 
argued for a more heterogeneous analysis that allows for fluidity in technological 
developments and unstable strategic geopolitical interests (Musamba,2010). Despite a lack of 
consensus on conceptual and definitional issues of the developmental state discourse, it is 
satisfactorily acceptable among researchers that the state’s capacity for, and commitment to 
economic growth and development suffices (Vu, 2007; Mkandawire, 2010). Routley (2012) 
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simplifies the definitional complexities and highlights economic growth – standard of living – 
legitimacy as core elements to define the developmental state. 
Developmental state is characterised by fluidity of knowledge contribution in development 
studies. Discursive contributions to the model have progressively shifted from classical 
capitalist prescriptive orthodoxy to comparative history and empirical studies of development 
in modern states (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). Even though, neo-liberal arguments for minimal 
state intervention was mainly favoured in the early eighties, the global events two decades 
later vilified the neo-liberal agenda and vindicated Johnson’s interventionist state 
suggestions. As a model of development in Africa, developmental state, rather than being out 
of magnificently planned initiatives, has inadvertently emerged from opportunism by colonial 
governments to solve their economic problems and reassert eco-political dominance on their 
colonies. In essence, colonial authorities were not primarily committed to development of the 
colonies but for exploitation of resources (Havinden and Meredith, 1993). Thus the colonies 
suffered predation – exploitation of raw material, rich mineral resources and rent-seeking by 
the predator without commensurate fulfilment of social obligations in terms of developing the 
colonies. 
2.10 Analysis of the Political Economy of Development and Decline in Ghana 
Notions of predatory has been used in varied, complex, and misleading forms - Barrington 
Moore (1966) in an analytical context; Evans (1989)  to make vital distinctions between 
“incoherent absolutist domination” and “klepto-patrimonial” predatory states; Bavister-Gould 
(2011) to bring clarity to the concept as used in classical and contemporary debates. Thomson 
(2010) describes ‘vampire’ states as ‘blood sucking’ (kleptomaniac) government that 
mismanages state resources to conditions of economic decline. On the other hand, ‘zombie 
state’ is a metaphorical concept of the ‘unconscious reincarnated state’ (Drezner, 2011). In 
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other words, a ‘dead-alive’ state that aims to give radical life to a new political order aimed at 
economic recovery but does so with inadequate capacity and legitimacy. 
The different meanings assigned to development over different periods, make a plausible 
argument for development analysis of contemporary trends to be placed in historical contexts 
(Pieterse, 2001). This study contests and contributes to Frimpong-Ansah’s (1992) seminal 
analysis of Ghana’s effort at economic development – 1919 to 1983, of neo-classical 
perspective, and adopts a classical theoretical stance to explain the historical political 
economy of Ghana – 1895 to 1992. Frimpong-Ansah’s contribution has been inspired by 
inadequate comprehension of improper arrangements of Ghana’s development from pre-
industrialised economy. In related studies of the political economy of Ghana, Frimpong-
Ansah’s piece is well cited in many scholarly articles. However, as the governor of Bank of 
Ghana (1968-73) in the period shortly after President Nkrumah’s overthrow by the military in 
1966, Frimpong-Ansah’s work is slightly biased to the development visions of Nkrumah, as 
he was a senior government official of the main opposition - United Party - of Prime Minister 
Busia’s (1969-72) administration. Indeed Frimpong-Ansah (1992: 73-92) made a 
conspicuous detail of Nkrumah’s Pan-African initiatives, ‘over-ambitious’ development 
plans, rent-seeking bureaucracy, and social-market ideas. However, Frimpong-Ansah 
overlooked other important factors - internal and external subversions – that hindered social 
relations and foreign relations of Nkrumah’s administration. 
In addition, Frimpong-Ansah’s historical classification opens itself to criticism for its lack of 
objectivity in labelling the state bureaucracies of Governor Guggisburg and Dr Nkrumah as 
‘predatory’ and ‘vampire’ even though these administrations demonstrated commitment to, 
and capacity for development. This critique is based on contemporary studies that it has to be 
possible to classify a state as developmental based on hegemonic ideology to development 
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rather than outcomes (Woo-Cummings, 1999; Johnson, 1999; Mkandawire, 2001). Moreover 
the analysis was almost mute on feminist productive contributions to the economy as women 
and children dominated the agrarian sector of Ghana’s rural agriculture. Marx suggests that 
‘anyone who knows anything of history knows that great social changes are impossible 
without feminine upheaval’. Despite these criticisms, Frimpong-Ansah’s analytic view of 
both theory and practice of development in historically embedded neo-classical context 
provides a structured medium of understanding the political economy of Ghana in well-
presented historical junctures – Predatory and Vampire states. Besides the antagonistic 
abstractions of classical and neo-classical economic theories, this study takes a rare challenge 
to consider both as complementary ideas that explain capitalist political economy from 
different perspectives. The study takes its lead from Frimpong-Ansah’s (1992) seminal 
analysis on the political economy of Ghana, but departs from the neo-classical positivist 
approach towards a classical interpretive conceptualisation, and introduces the ‘zombie’ state 
as an extension to the ‘predatory’ and ‘vampire’ state forms.  
Against this background, critical examinations of each of the historical state forms may be 
summarised as follows. First, the kind of development theories – dependency and 
modernisation – advanced in the colonies aimed to achieve the objectives of the colonial 
economic management, and with it a core-periphery social relations that did not help to 
develop the colonies (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). These practices contributed to the primitive 
nature of the production base of the Ghana economy on the eve of independence. 
Additionally, the family system of farming and fragmentations within the agrarian economy 
hindered economies of large scale production and introduction of advanced technologies. 
And even though Sir Arthur Lewis, Cardinall, Seers and Ross identified the weaknesses of 
the economy, their recommendations were circumvented to please the Colonial Office in 
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London. It could be argued that given the weak productive base and fragility of the Ghana 
economy, the colonial government could have intervened with agricultural incentives such as 
subsidies, technological transfer and international trade agreements, but it did not because the 
industrialisation of the colonial economy was perilous to western interests. Second, the 
constraints imposed on the development of Ghana by the combination of effects mentioned in 
the first could not have been remedied by the mere granting of political independence without 
reforms to the social relations that underlined the economic dimensions of colonialism. The 
notion that Ghana was economically underdeveloped in the modern sense should not have 
disqualified her from becoming the modern industrialised state that its founders travailed for, 
but failed to achieve. A significant analysis of the colonial capitalist predatory state was that 
it furthered a dual society that enabled a prosperous export sector to superimpose its interest 
on an improvised peasant economy (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 62-63). Third, one of the 
implications of the colonial legacy of underdevelopment was that it provided rational for the 
Nkrumah government to ignore the weaknesses and advance rapid development to make up 
for development lags without careful considerations to monetary and fiscal implications. In 
response, the West and allied financial institutions restricted external capital inflows to 
Ghana that in the end compelled Nkrumah to seek support from the East, and with it came his 
overthrow. Objectively, the fragility and weaknesses of the Ghana economy at independence 
contained the seed of its own destruction (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 91-92). Fourth, the 
immediate post-Nkrumah governments did not fully appreciate the implications of the 
Nkrumah legacy to public policies. In realising the challenges, the Rawlings government 
abandoned its original socialist-oriented development ideas and agreed to the neoliberal 
Economic Recovery and Structural Adjustment Programmes to attract external loans. This led 
to a series of devaluations of the cedi, divestiture and sale of state-owned enterprises, fiscal 
discipline, trade liberalisation and return to democratic governance in January 1993. 
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SECTION TWO: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PREDATORY STATE 
Chapter 3:  The Political Economy of Ghana during the Colonial Era – Before 
1929 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter attempts to recreate and critically examine the developmental approach under 
the colonial rule that transpired from the commencement of the nineteenth century to the eve 
of the independence of Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast). During this period, the colonial 
government in London was at the helm of governance and ruled the colony through a colonial 
Governor, appointed by the Crown. The issue of colonialism bears with it some emotional 
connotations that remain unresolved and perhaps it would be inconceivable to completely 
disdain these sensitivities. This study makes use of prime information on production, trade, 
government expenditures and related developments that took place within specific periods to 
examine the extent of colonial development in the Gold Coast. The merit of using the 
government expenditure in relation to colonial development is that government expenditure 
funds colonial development programmes and any changes to colonial policy reflects the 
pattern of government expenditures. Moreover, this approach allows for easier analysis of 
colonial predation because the volumes of production and trade does not necessarily depict 
development but rather how much was used out of the generated surplus to enhance the 
society where production took place (Rodney, 1972). However, the use of government 
expenditure as measure of the State’s commitment to development has some limitations. 
Firstly, government expenditures such as administrative and a few other recurrent 
expenditures are not directly traceable to economic development. Secondly, government 
expenditures for a specific year encapsulates expenditures that caters for existing 
programmes and thus do not portray an expansion to the status quo. Thirdly, monetary and 
fiscal policies such as revaluation, inflation and devaluation policies can lead to 
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misrepresentation of development when in actual fact there has been significant increase in 
government expenditures. Moreover, every government is constrained by its capacity to 
extract wealth as the nature of economic structure impacts on development (Sederberg, 1971: 
179). In addition, high defence expenditure, corruption by state bureaucrats and transfer of 
such monies into personal foreign accounts do reflect as high government expenditure in the 
government’s balance sheet but without corresponding development to society. Despite these 
limitations, government expenditures is by far a more logical and reasonable reflection of a 
State’s capacity and commitment to socio-economic development.   
Though archival information of the Gold Coast’s political economy is accessible from the 
Public Record Office in London, it was mainly compiled by representatives of the Colonial 
Office (CO) in London. This casts doubt about the accuracy of the actual magnitude of 
exploitation because colonial bureaucrats owed it to the Crown to conceal the extent of 
colonial exploitation from the colonised. However, it is reasonable to attach a degree of 
integrity, validity and reliability to these colonial documents for the purpose of this study. 
Despite the aforementioned imperfections of colonial data, it is acceptable that information 
captured from colonial archives on production and trade, official correspondences between 
personnel of the colonial bureaucracy, studies by officials of the Crown Colony, Hansard 
archives would suffice for this chapter of the study.  
The chapter then takes a lead from the seminal analysis of Frimpong-Ansah’s ‘Vampire 
State’ and Rodney’s ‘How Europe underdeveloped Africa’ to contribute to knowledge about 
the wider implications of colonialism to Ghana’s underdevelopment and possibilities of a 
developmental state. The developmental state concepts has re-engaged global interest to the 
problems associated with economic decline and underdevelopment in African and Latin 
American developing countries (Routley, 2014). However, while it is necessary to seek a 
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solution to overcome the protracted epochs of underdevelopment in Ghana, it is equally 
important to understand how and why Ghana became economically underdeveloped. 
Underdevelopment does not imply the absence of development, but rather a comparative 
abstraction that expresses a specific relationship of exploitation by a predatory State over a 
subjugated State (Rodney, 1972). This relationship renders the subjugated State incapable of 
increasing jointly her capacity to deal with her environment when on the other hand the 
predatory State advances on her capacity. As a result, the predatory state flourishes at the 
expense of the subjugated state and establishes a negative correlation such that as the predator 
jointly increases her capacity, the capacity of the subjugated decreases. Given the relationship 
of exploitation under the colonial regime, it is fair to suggest that the British government 
undermined the capacity of the Gold Coast people to increase jointly the management of their 
own natural environment. Through the social relation of imperial exploitation, Africa made a 
lot of sacrifice to solve the economic problems in Europe, as George Padmore a prominent 
Pan-Africanist literally phrased it, ‘the black man (Africa) certainly has to pay dearly for 
carrying the white man’s (Europe’s) burden’ (as cited in Rodney, 1972). The dawn of 
colonialism and capitalism in Africa during the late nineteenth century contributed to the 
integration of the Gold Coast economy into a global capitalist system that defined her 
underdevelopment (Howard, 1978: 15-17). Centuries of underdevelopment in Ghana has 
reinvigorated the need to search for a sustainable paradigm to development.  
From a philosophical standpoint, it is futile to search for prognosis without knowledge of the 
diagnosis.  It is against this background that the history of the political economy of Ghana 
becomes even more important to possibilities of turning around the country’s misfortunes 
towards a developmental state. In spite of this, the possibility of a developmental state does 
not solely depend on the historical imperatives of a State but rather what the modern State 
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makes out of the historical facts to achieve development. A state that laments about its 
historical setbacks without taking advantage of current opportunities to make radical changes 
towards development is doomed. But while the historical developments of the political 
economy of Ghana is pertinent to provide explanations about ‘why’ and ‘how’ of Ghana’s 
underdevelopment, it is difficult to use the outcomes to predict with certainty ‘what’ happens 
next in different societies (Lewis, 1955: 10-18).  
The people of the Gold Coast had presumed that colonial development entailed the ability of 
a nascent society to enhance collectively her capacity to deal with the natural resources, as 
well as the freedom and skills to produce and negotiate trade. On the contrary, under colonial 
rule, the colony was made by the metropole (colonial power) and for the metropole. Land 
was acquired at peppercorn rent and by coercion, capital was invested where exploitation 
opportunities were rife, and indigenous labour was exploited through slavery and 
subjugation. The scope of exploitation in the colonial economy through the imperial trade 
system with apathy to colonial development defines a monumental predation that lasted for 
over five centuries – 1471 to 1957 – in the British West African colonies such as the Gold 
Coast. Although the European trade began in the Gold Coast about five centuries ago, it is 
important to assess the development status of the Gold Coast prior to the commencement of 
colonialism – a system of formal control of the Gold Coast by the British – by the end of the 
nineteenth century. Subsequent chapters of this thesis consider suggestions that the 
underdevelopment of Ghana was a self-inflicted disposition created by indigenous 
government mismanagement of resources.  
Many political economists and historians would contend that the development of any society 
requires the exploration of its natural environment with the most appropriate scientific and 
technological approach, and a strong political system that respects individual freedoms but 
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able to coordinate economic activities towards a fair distribution of labour surplus. Yet, 
development as being of the collective capacity of society to experience enhanced skill and 
human capacity, creativity, greater freedom, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-
being (Rodney, 1972) is a comparative concept. The development of any entity is only 
meaningful by comparing levels of its own development between different periods, or by 
comparison with another entity for the same period. In this sense, the principal objectives of 
the predatory state analysis are to examine the implications of the colonial legacy to colonial 
development efforts, and to discuss the politicisation or de-politicisation of colonial 
development. This chapter features three main segments of the study – the Pre-capitalist 
Predatory State (before 1895); the Reconstruction period (1895 – 1910); and the First 
Planned Development Programme in the Gold Coast (1911 – 1930). This approach aims to 
unravel the developmental thinking of the colonial government, predatory trade and 
development policies, and the overall colonial attitude towards colonial development in the 
Gold Coast. 
3.2 The Pre-capitalist Political Economy of the Gold Coast in the period before 1895 
This period begins with the reigns of empires in Europe and ends with the colonisation of 
Africa by Europeans. It marks a significant period of political and economic transformations 
across the world.  In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia introduced a landmark principle in global 
politics - sovereignty of the state - which redefined not only European history but also her 
economic and political engagements with other political establishments across borders. 
However, in practice this principle did not extend to the African territories. The provisions of 
the Treaty only imposed obligations on European states to respect each other’s sovereignty 
and exposed Africa to European exploitation and subjugation, because by the provisions of 
the Peace Treaty it was uncustomary for European states to oppressively exploit each other. 
The African soil thus became more vulnerable to a monumental era of European exploitation.   
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The history of political and economic development in Ghana, although not specifically 
schemed, dates to the arrival of the Portuguese merchants in 1471 to trade in rich minerals 
and natural resources. The Portuguese built some of the oldest trading castle along the Gulf of 
Guinea such as the Elmina Castle (formerly Feitoria da Mina or São Jorge da Mina, translated 
as St. George of the Mine Castle) in 1482 to facilitate the shipment of primary products and 
rich natural minerals to Western markets. During the 15th century, the Gold Coast produced 
35.5 percent of the overall world’s gold production (Frimpon-Ansah, 1992). This mainly 
attracted European merchants to engage in the imperialist trade of expansionism and 
colonization to facilitate mass exploitation of the colony. Furthermore, the expansion of 
plantations in Europe and the New World in the 15th century came with unprecedented 
increase in demand for labour - slaves - to the West as trade in minerals became limited. 
Indeed, the African west coast – primarily the Gold Coast - became the principal route for 
trans-Atlantic slave trade for the New World. It would be a misrepresentation of the fact to 
ignore the contributions of the African slaves – labour – to the overall social relation that 
existed between the ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ economies. The Gold Coast played 
two key roles in the early development of capitalism in Western Europe (Howard, 1978: 17). 
Firstly, as the source of gold for European trade with the Arabs and Asians, and secondly as 
the principal conduit for the Trans-Atlantic slave trade that worked under inhumane 
conditions on plantations in America and the West Indies. 
During the pre-capitalist period, ownership of labour predominantly resided with Capital 
through the subjugation of labour power in a system of slavery that conferred no rights on 
labour to negotiate for a fair share of labour surplus value. Rodney (1966), suggest that 
slavery as a form of labour in the production process, had existed under the control of 
absolutist African kings before the arrival of the western merchants in the 15th century. 
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Whereas the slaves originated from poorer families and debt defaulters, the merchants were 
the indigenous elites and powerful heads of the tribes. That the complicity of Europe to 
slavery had primarily been influenced by the pre-capitalist opportunism and in response to 
the expansion of economic activities in the New World with unprecedented high demands for 
labour is historically proven. Rodney (1972: 83) suggests that the slave trade was lucrative 
enough to attract the interest of Queen Elizabeth 1 (1533-1603) who directly participated in 
the venture by providing a vessel named ‘Jesus’ to John Hawkins for a dividend. Hawkins 
was later knighted with an embossment of a chained African. However, by 1807, anti-slavery 
movements such as the one led by William Wilberforce – a member of the British parliament 
and a political activist – argued for the proscription of the slave trade. By 1860, slave 
merchants such as Barclays and Quaker - British interests with connections to the Colonial 
Office - have entered into negotiations for monetary compensations for the release of slaves 
in their custodies. A general discontinuation of the slave trade was finally successful by the 
eve of the 20th century. For many authors of the slave trade, the abolishment was in 
fulfilment of a global moral obligation to uphold the freedom of the oppressed labour force. 
However, (Rodney, 1969) rejects the humanistic proposition presented by his contemporaries 
for the abolishment of trans-Atlantic slave trade, and argues that the real motive of the 
capitalists – states and merchants – has been mispresented. Rodney’s proposition that the 
abolishment had principally been instigated by the urgent need to restructure the western 
economy is plausible because, the abolishment occurred during the industrial revolution. The 
western industrial revolution was marked by enhanced mechanization but resulted in mass 
unemployment, over productivity and low consumerism in industrial Europe. This warranted 
for the abolishment of slavery to ease the unemployment problems, increase the labour force 
in the colonies to produce more raw materials at cheaper prices for the industries in Europe, 
and to revert the problem of low consumerism by exporting the finished products to the 
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colonies. However, many scholars contest this view because it exposes the exploitation and 
oppression of African labour by Western imperialism, an idea that is ill suited for capitalist 
objectives in Africa. 
During the 16th and 17th centuries the Danish, English, Dutch and Swedish, influenced by 
the economic theory of mercantilism – profit oriented exploitation of foreign territories by 
merchants, joined the Portuguese in the trade to augment their economies and assert political 
power. The Gold Coast attracted much interest from European merchants with the Portuguese 
ships giving the search for gold their highest priority (Rodney, 1972). However, by 1631, 
Britain has established trade relations with the Gold Coast and for the next 250 years 
captured economic and political rights from the Dutch and Danes to trade in gold, palm nuts 
and later slaves (De Freitas, 1963).  
In the early nineteenth century, the Gold Coast was predominantly inhabited by the Akan - 
Bono – kingdoms in the southern and central areas, while the northern and parts of the 
southern areas were later occupied by the Dagbon and Ga Adangbe respectively. In the 
period up to the 15th century, the predominant social relation of the indigenous people as 
defined by their political and socio-economic engagements was initially synonymous to 
communalism of family and kinship, with members of the family having matrilineal or 
patrilineal ties. Land was owned by the family and protected by the head of family, labour 
was family based, capital was generated from family resources and productive activities were 
mainly agrarian. In the period shortly after the 15th century through to the late 19th century, 
the social relation that developed was similar to the feudal system of trade and governance. 
Feudalism is set forth as the antecedent to capitalism, shrouded by powerful ruling class 
engaged in a production process to exploit the peasants, for economic and political 
dominance. The Monarchy or traditional authorities held Land in trust for the people, and 
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allocated to loyal subjects in exchange for allegiance and rents – royalties or percentage of 
agricultural outputs. The traditional laws of the people of the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo 
regions, the main cocoa and natural mineral producing areas of Ghana entrusted land to the 
‘stool’ – the king or traditional ruler – as a collective property of the people. A portion of 
land was released for agricultural purposes as per the fulfilment of customary obligations by 
the farmer. However, the trend has changed with the advent of large scale agricultural and 
property rights reforms (Kimble, 1963). During the same period, Capital was predominantly 
owned by the elites and powerful of royal ancestry, while the working class provided labour 
for subsistent wages. The King provided local development leadership in consultation with 
the tribal leaders within this semi-authoritarian and feudal systems, but commanded ultimate 
authority in decision-making, enforcement and adjudication. Development was funded out of 
communal resources and labour, and was more ethnocentrically driven to the immediate 
needs of the people. Family heads organised members of their families to engage in peasant 
agriculture. They also provided communal labour and materials to build places for social 
activities, worship, health, education and adjudication of justice. Although some economic 
activities were exchanged in monetary terms, others were battered. However, there is scant 
information about the export prices and output levels of cocoa and many other precious 
mineral productions in the period before the 20th century. This pre-capitalist system of 
production and exchange of value shaped the existence of the pre-colonial class society and 
defined their concept of development. As the social relations of the people of the Gold Coast 
evolved (from pre-capitalist to capitalist) the acquisition of, and obligation to offer land, 
labour and capital also changed and came with it the progression of exploitative systems of 
distributing labour surpluses.  
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The class conflicts that emerged out of these social relations in the Gold Coast also evolved 
from clashes between family heads and family members, to Chiefs and European merchants 
and finally the bourgeoisies and proletariats. Yet both capitalist and Marxist scholars are clear 
that the sequences that characterised the modes of production in Europe were not replicated 
in the Gold Coast (Rodney, 1972) to bring development to the colony. It is paradoxical to 
suggest that a fact-based analysis of the early historical development in the Gold Coast was 
based on a deepened understanding of her trade relations with Europe.   
During the 19th century, the British government responded to native opposition by meddling 
with local politics and adopted ‘divide and rule tactics’ to exert control over production and 
trade of raw materials as well as market for British products. The Anglo-Ashanti conflict was 
a series of five major wars that lasted for almost a century. Price (1967: 24) suggests that the 
Gold Coast colony was initially confined to the southern sector of the Gold Coast prior to the 
Anglo-Ashanti war. However, when the Ashanti kingdom waged war on her southern 
neighbours (Fante and Ga tribes) with great prowess to dominate the southern territories, their 
action offered grounds for the British army to intervene on the side of the southerners under 
the pretext of protecting the southerners but in effect to consolidate the Gold Coast territory 
for imperial trade objectives.  
After the people of Ashanti had engaged in a protracted war with the British for control of 
political and economic power in the Gold Coast, the British emerged victorious. The defeat of 
the Ashantis in the ‘War of the Golden Stool’ in 1900, marked the establishment of the 
colonial defacto government and with it the British government assumed ultimate control 
over the economic resources in the Gold Coast. The Ashanti territories became a protectorate 
of the British Empire. The protectorate area was very rich in natural minerals such as gold, 
diamonds, bauxite, timber, manganese and cocoa plantations. During the wars, traditional 
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chiefs and tribal leaders such as Nana Prempeh 1, Yaa Asantewaa and other relatives who the 
British government regarded as very rebellious were exiled to the Seychelles Island where 
some died from inhumane conditions. The resentment by the people of Ashanti against 
British dominance in the Gold Coast was a landmark of political rebellions towards the 
colonial government by a traditional authority. Although the people of Ashanti were brave 
and resilient, they were defeated with unparalleled military weapons by the British army. 
However, although Britain dominated Gold Coast trade in many respect the Colonial Office 
failed to develop cotton and coffee plantations in the late 19th century. As aspects of the 
imperial trade flourished, it enabled the establishment of the first British bank in 1883. The 
rich gold fields at Obuasi in the Ashanti region attracted the first biggest British investment in 
1898. Related commercial interests in agriculture such as Cadbury and Quaker companies 
participated in the exportation of cocoa to meet the increased demands for chocolate products 
in Europe.  
There were other strategic British investments in the exploration of manganese, diamonds, 
bauxite, and timber industries during the two wars (De Freitas, 1963). It is evident that 
development is conventional to the people of Ghana (then the Gold Coast) before the arrival 
of Europeans merchants in the 15th century to trade. This is because the Songhai, Mali and 
Ghana empires (not present day Ghana) were known to have been more economically 
developed than many European nations in the pre-capitalist era (Rodney, 1972). However, to 
further the objectives of colonialism, Britain integrated the Ghanaian economy into a global 
capitalist system that defined Ghana’s underdevelopment (Howard, 1978: 15-17). In 1884, 
the Berlin Conference marked the official sanctioning of oppression in Africa and 
exploitation of its resources by metropolitan imperialist ‘alien’ governments that legitimised 
the ‘Scramble for Africa’ by Europeans. It is common knowledge that Africa has had lengthy 
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contact with European trade and that contact between different societies raises possibilities of 
changing the rates of development in both societies (Rodney, 1972). However, the experience 
of Africa in her relations with European was a development of negative correlations.  
3.3. The Reconstructing Era of a Colonial Predatory State: Chamberlain Policy (1895 – 
1919) 
The chief policy that defined British colonial development thinking during the first half of the 
20th century was the Chamberlain Policy of Colonial Development (1895), named after the 
Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain1. The policy established how Britain may offer 
colonial assistance towards the development of British colonies to generate beneficial 
multiplier effects to the British economy (Colonial Development Act, 1929). However, five 
decades after its inception the Chamberlain Policy struggled to gain parliamentary consensus 
as the first state-led planned development for the colonies. During Parliamentary debate in 
November 1950, Leopold Amery2  had argued that the first policy for a reconstructive 
colonial development came into effect under the Chamberlain Policy of Colonial 
Development (1895), and not by the Colonial Development Act of 1929. Amery stated, “It 
was started, I suppose, in the modern sense, by Joseph Chamberlain. His work for the 
development of tropical medicine and for the reconstruction of the West Indies by grants-in-
aid marks the beginning of the policy of constructive Government intervention in the 
problems of development and welfare” (HC Deb 09 November 1950). However, the evidence 
 
1 Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain was a British statesman and Colonial Secretary (1895-1903). He built 
his career as a businessman in screw manufacture and later Mayor of Birmingham though he never attended 
university. He was a radical Liberal Unionist who served as Leader of the opposition (8th-27th Feb. 1906). 
Chamberlain believed in the immense economic potential of the colonies in West Africa and alluded to Lord 
Salisbury's (Leader of the Conservatives) wariness of their main rival, the French. Chamberlain sanctioned the 
conquest of the Ashanti in 1895, and annexed the territory of the Gold Coast for British control. 
2 Rt Hon. Leopold Stennett Amery was born on 22 Nov. 1873 to Charles F. Amery and Elizabeth Leitner. He 
served as MP (U) for Sparkbrook (formerly South) Division of Birmingham, 1911–45. He died on 16 Sept. 1955. 
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suggests that there was wide gap between the ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ of science as an 
important resource for the advancement of ‘New Imperialism’ (Hodge, 2007: 15). 
Chamberlain had believed that state-led development was more beneficial to the State and the 
citizenry than privatization. In 1870s, he was instrumental in the effective administration of 
public utilities in Birmingham where he served as a Mayor, and later as Member of 
Parliament. When Chamberlain assumed office as the Secretary of State for Colonies in 1895, 
he conceded that the British Empire was in a state of gradual economic decline and 
considered imperial expansion based on imperial economic imperatives as the panacea to the 
economic problem in Britain. However, the achievement of the imperial economic objectives 
had required the CO to initiate a colonial development policy that would enhance 
infrastructural development in the areas of telecommunications and railway lines to harness 
the increasing opportunities in production and trade in the colonies. 
 The Chamberlain Policy of Colonial Development served as the chief instrument of British 
colonial development in the early twentieth century. On 22nd August 1985, Chamberlain 
defended his idea of a state-led development initiatives that included the construction of 
railway lines and communications in the colonies for the development of trade. However, 
colonial development was first and foremost for British interest. Given the remunerative 
mineral resource potentials of gold in the Gold Coast, Chamberlain was convinced that of all 
the colonies in West Africa, the Gold Coast held the greatest potential of a rapidly expanding 
returns for private profit and revenue from state-led railway investment if the interior mining 
sectors were linked to the coast by a railway network to reduce transport cost to one-sixth and 
transport time to one-tenth (Dumett, 1975: 298). The economic and geopolitical benefits of 
the Gold Coast to Britain formed the basis upon which Chamberlain sanctioned the fourth 
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Anglo-Ashanti war (1896) and War of the Golden Stool/Yaa Asantewaa War (1900) to 
subjugate the Ashanti Empire under the Crown.  
The relationship between Britain and her colonies was marked by incredulity of the 
development capabilities of the colonies although the deplorable economic conditions and 
lack of indigenous investment capital had been made known to the CO. In a related study of 
Britain and its tropical colonies covering the period of 1850 to 1960, (Havinden and 
Meredith,1996; Kenny,1997), noted a large contradiction between ‘colonialism and 
development’ and asserted that the ‘constructive imperialism’ policy of Joseph Chamberlain 
and British imperial power relations with her colonies as in the Gold Coast were 
“deplorable”. The Colonial administration focused infrastructural developments on the 
construction of railway lines and road networks to connect the rural hinterland to the ports to 
facilitate raw material exportations to western industries with little regard to the overall 
developmental needs of the colonies. Despite the anti-industrialisation and anti-development 
attitude of the colonial office, a few colonies, including the Gold Coast experienced a little 
degree of economic development attributable to exogenous and endogenous political and 
economic conditions (Lewis et al., 1959: 20-21). 
In the period prior to 1890, the Gold Coast economy was largely agrarian. By 1879, Tetteh 
Quarshie a native trader and an agriculturalist had returned from Fernando Po (now Equitoral 
Guinea) to the Gold Coast with a few pods of the Amelonado type of cocoa. The missionaries 
and the colonial government welcomed Tetteh Quarshie’s initiative to cultivate cocoa in 
Akropong in the Eastern regions of the Gold Coast and helped to transform the production of 
cocoa into a major cash crop for export to meet Western demands for chocolate products. The 
agrarian sector of the Gold Coast was predominantly peasant with a small commercialised 
sector operated by the merchants and colonial administration who determined prices within 
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the imperial trade system. Although the colonial administration was not directly involved in 
the cultivation of agricultural crops, the administration focused its efforts on how to increase 
the productivity of cocoa and gold through the maintenance of law and order, as well as the 
construction of railways and communications. However, during this period, the colonial 
government restricted the Gold Coast economy in order to exert British dominance in other 
areas of the economy such as the mining of gold, diamonds and manganese (Szeresewaki, 
1965). There was no monumental development during the over 450 years of early European 
trading in Africa, but rather Africa helped Europe to develop in the same proportion that 
Europe helped to underdeveloped Africa. The European merchants and governments were not 
primarily interested in colonial development, except for that which facilitated the commercial 
interests of the West such as building of forts, internal communications, road and railways to 
transport primary products from the hinterlands (Bourret, 1960: 23-24; Frimpong-Ansah, 
1992). This position was maintained with the colonial territories until the inauguration of the 
first well-thought colonial development plan in 1920.  
3.4 First Planned Colonial Development Plan (1919 to 1929): Modernization of 
Agriculture 
The economic development ideas held by the CO and its political representatives such as 
Lord Luggard (Governor of Northern Nigeria), Sir Guggisberg, and excerpts documentations 
of the Economic Advisory Committee deliberations would be examined. Sir Guggisberg 
(1919-1927) conducted a special survey of the Gold Coast in 1902 at the bequest of the CO 
and was appointed as the Director of Survey in 1905. He was thus familiar with conditions in 
the Gold Coast and the wider implications of the imperialist trade on colonial development.   
In the early period of the 20th century, there was rapid expansion of international trade 
boosted by a fast growing agricultural and mineral production. The evidences suggest that a 
significant implication of the First World War was an increase in European demand for 
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colonial raw materials for the reconstruction of European industries. This was in line with the 
colonial idea of promoting primary production for export to industrial Europe. During this 
period the Gold Coast was adjudged as the world’s leading producer of cocoa with a rapid 
increase in production capacity from 7,000 tons in 1905 to 244,000 tons in 1931 (Guggisberg, 
1924 as cited in Frimpong-Ansah,1992: 59). The country simultaneously did well to maintain 
its global lead in the production and export of gold, diamonds and manganese. During the 
immediate decade after the First World War (1921 to 1930) gold production rose from 
203,400 fine ounces to 246,100 fine ounces, diamonds increased from 1,800 carats to 
848,200 carats, whilst manganese production expanded from 7,200 tons to 396,000 tons for 
the period (Cardinal, 1931 as cited in Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 59). As the production base 
expanded, general wage levels were reasonably stable whilst prices of imports fell and 
improved the real incomes of the farmers. The practice of peasant and plantation based 
agriculture yielded cash and food crops simultaneously.  
However, the trends in the production of gold, cocoa, diamonds and manganese were not 
correlated to development. Even as part of the economic development of the Crown colonies, 
there was no debate about the earliest idea of planned development of Africa, until the early 
20th century (Lewis, 1944). In the Gold Coast colony, the predatory state connived with 
capitalist merchants to selectively develop only areas that satisfied the imperialist trade while 
efforts by local farmers and indigenous capitalists to develop their homeland threatened 
Europe’s interest and manipulated by arbitrary reduction in export prices. Exportation of 
agricultural products and natural mineral resources to western industries at cheaper prices in 
return for expensive finished products to the colonial markets are well documented. Although 
the Gold Coast served as one of the prime hubs of natural resources it was not considered to 
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merit industrialisation and development because these two were at variance with the 
objectives of the metropole as mentioned earlier. 
In 1919, Sir Guggisberg was appointed as the governor of the Gold Coast - 1919 to 1927, and 
became the most eminent author of Ghana’s early economic development. Prior to his 
appointment as governor, Guggisberg had conducted special surveys in the British colonies 
on behalf of the CO and had formed a sincere and personal opinion about the colonies that 
was similar to Lord Luggard’s for the Nigerian protectorate. Yet unlike many of his 
colleagues in the colonial office, Guggisberg was convinced about the development abilities 
of the colonies and believed that the Crown had a moral obligation to develop her colonial 
territories. The three main ideas of the Guggisberg development theory were (i) removal of 
obstacles to large-scale agricultural productivity through the improvement of transport and 
communication; (ii) strategic public policies to encourage civic engagement in development 
projects; and (iii) stimulus packages to producers for increased productivity. However, these 
were constrained by the economic management approach of the CO and subsequent price 
falls in the immediate post war era. The basis of the imperial economic management was to 
restrict colonial development expenditure to each colony’s ability to generate from its own 
resources the revenue for its development. This was to be achieved through increased 
personal savings, taxation and exports without being a disincentive to productivity and 
employment. By this, the CO in London required all colonial administrators to strictly adhere 
to the Colonial Economic Management Policy to avoid recourse to the British Treasury for 
colonial development.  
In contrast to the advanced economies, the economic management rules of the British 
Treasury was unsuitable to any prospects of development in the Gold Coast. Besides, the 
European economic feats are linked to state-led development strategies consisting of 
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agricultural subsidies, incentives for industrialisation and unbalanced budgets until the 
economy grew to withstand global competition. Indeed nearly three decades ago on 22nd 
August 1895, the then Secretary of State for Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain had submitted to 
the British Parliament to make exceptions to the Treasury rules with a view to promote trade 
and development in the colonies. Chamberlain remarked, “It appears to me to be absurd to 
apply to savage countries the same rules which we apply to civilised portions of the United 
Kingdom. Cases have already come to my knowledge of colonies which have been British 
colonies, perhaps, for more than 100 years, in which up to the present time British rule has 
done absolutely nothing; …and if we left them to-day we should leave them in the same 
condition as that in which we found them” (HC Deb 22 August 1895).  However, the colonial 
government did not heed to this plea. 
Guggisberg’s development thinking of the colonial economy thus delineates his commitment 
to development in the colonies. In view of the parsimonious nature of colonial development 
policies, he adopted economic development strategies that diverted economic burden from 
the CO. His development theory hypothesised that with increased productivity during the 
latter part of the inter-war period, a fall in aggregate revenue because of price falls was 
inevitable. Yet as it was colonial policy to discourage accumulation of external debt, 
Guggisberg’s model raised capital for development from internal sources - tax revenues and 
private savings – to complement colonial development funds and other fund raising activities 
in Britain. In response to the antipathy by the local producers of his tax reforms, Guggisberg 
remarked, “no country can develop trade to its full paying capacity without incurring a debt 
for the reconstruction of the necessary infrastructure”, (Guggisberg, 1924). Although the 
colonial economic management was the abstraction of the CO, Guggisberg was committed to 
bring development to the colonies without contravening the colonial policy.  
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In 1920, Guggisberg introduced the first well-thought and comprehensive ten-year 
development programme (1920-1930) based on his development theory (Frimpong-Ansah, 
1992). Guggisberg believed from previous studies that accessible transport was the key to 
unlock the economic prosperity of the Gold Coast. The implementation of the ten year 
development programme resulted in the expansion of road and rail networks, and the 
construction of a sea port in Takoradi (by the Atlantic Ocean) to enhance the productivity, 
distribution and exportation of mining and agricultural products with a view to generate 
enough export revenue for colonial development. This enabled the timely transportations of 
bulky natural minerals and perishable agricultural products to market centres and seaports for 
onward trade. Due to the improved market accessibility and growth of agro-business, average 
cost of production (total cost divided by output) decreased and surplus values increased to 
raise aggregate revenue and improve savings. This enabled the local producers to self-finance 
the construction of more feeder roads to link the principal roads as Guggisberg had predicted. 
In his view, although the Gold Coast economy was already well endowed with land and 
labour resources for increased agricultural productivity, the production process was 
constrained by lack of investment capital (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). However, capitalist 
private investors in the agricultural and mining sectors continued to pay wages far below the 
fair value of labour productivity. Tax revenue from cocoa and mining exports complemented 
the contribution made by the local people for infrastructural developments. The critics of 
Guggisberg’s development theory would contend that although the Gold Coast economy was 
largely agrarian with fragility of labour movement and capital constraint, it was the beacon of 
economic development in West Africa during the period.  
In 1922, J.E. Casely-Hayford, a renowned African Nationalist and founding member of the 
National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) and the Gold Coast Aborigines Rights 
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Protection Society (ARPS) recounted pre-colonial African development achievements. He 
stated, “…before even the British came into relations with our people, we were a developed 
people, having our own institutions, having our own ideas of government” (J.E. Casely 
Hayford, cited in Rodney, 1972).The colonial government in the Gold Coast had assumed a 
monopolistic position in trade that allowed for massive exploitation of the Gold Coast, and 
any colonial development that occurred was either accidental or structured to suit the imperial 
metropole (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). However, some scholars contend that colonialism set 
strong foundations for economic development in the Gold Coast. For instance Mr Churchill 
(then Secretary of State for Colonies, 1921-1922; and later Prime Minister) resented the 
suggestion of Colonel Wedgwood3 for construction of railway lines in the cocoa districts of 
Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo as a result of pressures from the traders. This confirms that the ten-
year development programme of the Gold Coast by Guggisberg was of his own ideas and not 
the development thinking of the Colonial Office. During the debate in Parliament on 3rd 
August 1922, Mr Churchill misled his colleagues that “the Colony will be vastly richer and 
more efficient”, because of the construction of the railway lines and Takoradi harbour. The 
fact remains that although the infrastructure eased the transportation problem, its main 
purpose was to facilitate the predatory trade exportation of natural minerals and agricultural 
products such as cocoa at cheaper prices to satisfy the rising demands for chocolate products 
in Europe. Colonialism and imperialism as capitalist ideologies did not seek the interest of 
the colony but rather sought to protect the principal objective of the Capitalist – profit 
maximisation – by means of predation and labour exploitation. 
 
3 Colonel Josiah Clement Wedgwood was a British Liberal and Labour politician who served in the Ramsay 
MacDonald government. He served as Member of Parliament (MP) for Newcastle-under-Lyme at the 1906 and 
1910 general elections. Wedgwood was a proficient in mathematician and prominent single-tax activist taking 
his lead from the political economy reformer Henry George. 
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Allan Wolsey Cardinall, a census officer with well-informed knowledge of the demographics 
for economic development challenged the plausibility of Guggisberg’s programme. By the 
mid-1920s, European consumers have developed strong taste for chocolate products resulting 
in a sharp rise in the demand for cocoa from the Gold Coast. Belgium, Switzerland, Britain, 
France and other European countries expanded their chocolate industries but needed cocoa. 
In response to the increased demand for cocoa products in Europe, the Gold Coast increased 
her cocoa production capacity from 7,000 tons in 1905 to 238,000 tons in 1929 (Frimpong-
Ansah, 1992). Cardinall made valid contributions that if higher incentives were paid to cocoa 
farmers, it would induce a monoculture agricultural practice that would be perilous to 
development (Cardinall, 1931). Thus the concentration on growing cash crops without paying 
attention to food crops to feed the colony could trigger food scarcity and increase food 
importation and engender inflation. This could lead to a balance of trade deficit where import 
expenditures exceed export revenues. For instance higher food import bills as a result of 
monoculture farming practices and neglect of food crop agriculture to feed the colony 
contributes to demand-push inflation and erodes the feats of increase in cocoa export revenue. 
The relevance of Cardinall’s contribution was that a diversified and modernised agrarian 
economy is capable to withstand the effects of price fluctuations and thus provide a more 
stable base to generate both private and public capital for development. Cardinal’s 
development thinking for a diversified and modernised system of agriculture were thus 
tenable to the overall development programme as the concerns related to the fragility of 
labour migration was not grave as anticipated by Guggisberg. Although the ideas of 
Guggisberg and Cardinal were evident of an attempt to develop the Gold Coast, the Colonial 
Office rolled-back these efforts and promoted a predatory trade relations with restrictive 
economic management that contributed to underdevelopment. Guggisberg’s development 
thinking was in tandem with the people of the Gold Coast who had conceded the importance 
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of capital accumulation to development and the promotional role of the government and 
chiefs to colonial development. During this period, the traditional leaders argued for the 
devolution of powers to local authorities and a review of the construction of infrastructure 
that only advanced the exports of raw materials to incorporate the whole community 
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). In critically examining Guggisberg’s development thinking about 
the Gold Coast community, it is fair to note that although Evans (1995) coined the concept of 
‘embedded autonomy’ decades after Guggisberg’s administration, the latter applied the idea 
by involving the traditional system of governance in colonial development whilst able to 
distance his administration from the pressures of tribal groups. In referring to the final 
address of Guggisberg to the Legislative Assembly in 1927, Nana Ofori Atta 14 re-echoed 
excerpt of Guggisberg’s remark, “I make one claim, and that is, the Government of 1919 – 
1927 has been a Government of Cooperation, as far as any government can justifiably be of 
the nature” (LA Deb 1931-32).  
With cocoa as the principal export commodity, tax revenue for economic development 
focused mainly on cocoa farmers and foreign merchants. Despite the economic management 
policy of the British Treasury at that time, the development plan of Guggisberg was well-
thought through to generate tax revenue from production and trade for local development in a 
manner that would not necessarily affect aggregate output (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 20). This 
 
4 Nana Sir Ofori Atta 1 was the Paramount Chief of Akyem Abuakwa in the Kyebi traditional area, also known 
as ‘Ofori Panyin Fie’ (House of Elder Ofori). The Okyehene as he was officially called was the head of one of the 
most distinguished and influential kingdoms of the Gold Coast. He was the eldest sibling to Dr. J.B. Danquah 
(founding member of the UGCC – Ghana’s first political party) and became a member of the Legislative Council 
in 1916. Nana Ofori Atta was married to Agnes Nana Akosua Duodo, and father of Kofi Asante (4th Speaker of 
Parliament in Nkrumah’s government); Akwasi Amoako-Atta (Governor of Bank of Ghana in the 1st Republic); 
William Ofori-Atta (founding member of the UGCC and one of the ‘Big Six’);Jones Ofori-Atta (Finance Minister, 
2nd Republic); Susan Ofori-Atta (first Ghanaian female surgeon); Adelaine Akufo-Addo (mother of Nana Addo-
Dankwa Akufo-Addo - Ghana’s current president); and father-in-law of Edward Akufo-Addo (former Chief 
Justice and later President of the 2nd Republic). 
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conforms to the canon of progressive taxation and Guggisberg’s personal belief that taxes 
should not be disincentive to production. The introduction of the cocoa export tax did not 
reduce earning as had been anticipated by the Colonial Office; in fact, cocoa output increased 
from 124,000 to 133,000 tons (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 59). On the issue of West African 
Trade and Taxation, the Duke of Sutherland inadvertently commented on how at lower prices 
cocoa farmers were helpless in influencing supply to increase price. He said “As regard 
current Revenue and Expenditure the Export Tax on cocoa does not appear to have 
injuriously affected the trade as, in spite of lower prices, the export at 133,000 tons was 
actually higher in 1921 than in 1920” (HL Deb 10 May 1922). 
Guggisberg’s personal philosophy about the capabilities of the Gold Coast that even with 
little assistance from the Colonial Office the people of the Gold Coast could develop their 
nascent economy influenced the programme (Kimble, 1963). Even though the programme 
itself was the first theorized development approach to have been experimented in the British 
colonial empire (Niculescu, 1965), Guggisberg’s able leadership, commitment and good 
policies of the ten-year development programme yielded monumental socio-economic 
developments. Athough revenues from cocoa exports and other tax revenues were inadequate 
for the anticipated development, there were estimated surpluses. The financial position of the 
Gold Coast as at 1st April 1923 shows that a loan of £4 million to the Gold Coast in 1920 has 
already yielded £3.9 million. The loan improved colonial trade by enhancing the 
transportation networks to the core areas of raw materials producing sectors. The capital and 
current expenditures incurred for this objective during the mid-Guggisberg era comprised of 
the construction of the Tafo to Kumasi Railway - £2,098,000; Sekondi to Kumasi Railway - 
£1,295,000; Topographical survey - £93,389; Takoradi Harbour- £620,000; Accra Harbour - 
£100,000; Survey – £31,000. The previous year’s surplus amount of £1,883,064 made good 
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the deficit of £237,389 incurred in 1923 due to the transport project (HL Deb 10 May 1922). 
The overall estimated cost for the construction of the Takoradi harbour including rail 
facilitates amounted to some £2 million.  
Even though there was a strong demand for cocoa in Europe during the 1920s, the 
Guggisberg administration could not raise adequate revenue from cocoa export duties 
because of the Preferential Duties arrangement imposed by the British Parliament on selected 
products including cocoa and supply time constraints. The merchants had lobbied the British 
Parliament to restrain the colonial governors from imposing export duties to safeguard their 
profits. The principal products under the Preferential Scheme were cocoa, coffee, tea, wine, 
spirits, sugar, and tobacco. However, since the grant of the preference, cocoa production to 
the Empire defied the odds and continued to rise from 50 to 90 percent (HL Deb 16 July 
1923). In a report prepared by Guggisberg’s government to the British parliament, Earl 
Beauchamp noted that under the Preferential Duties Scheme a 50 percent reduction in cocoa 
duty has enabled the Gold Coast government to increase its revenue by £190,000 (HL Deb 16 
July 1923). With a relatively price inelastic demand for cocoa at that time, a reduction in the 
export price of cocoa as a result of the scheme resulted in more than proportionate increase in 
quantity demanded and anticipated government revenue until 1927. 
The analysis of production and trade during this period in relation to development focuses on 
cocoa, gold and a few other mineral exports due to their major contributions to the 
cumulative gross domestic product of the Gold Coast economy. However, due to the problem 
of inconsistent record keeping of actual export prices by colonial administrators and 
merchants, the researcher relied on weighted price index of latter years to give a more reliable 
value of the market prices of exports as by this time a few indigenous elites have gained 
employment in the Gold Coast colonial administration. Available data shows overall 
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increases in the production of exports but the revenue generated is largely dependent on 
prices. From the eve of the British conquest of the Ashanti kingdom in 1901 to 1929, the 
colonial government revenue experienced an upward trend from £693,893 in 1901 to 
£4,121,523 in 1928, before taking a slight dip to £3,913529 in 1929 (The Gold Coast 
Bluebooks, 1901 – 1929). During this period, government expenditure also rose from 
£469,459 in 1901 to £3,618,831 in 1928 and £4,629,295 in 1929. It is important to 
acknowledge that the fastest rise in the rate of government expenditure occurred between the 
era of Sir Guggisberg, thus from £1,781,170 in 1919 to £4,328,159 in 1927(The Gold Coast 
Bluebooks, 1901 – 1929). However, the colonial administration was hypocritical of its 
commitment to the Gold Coast, because although it was averse to fund colonial development 
from the Treasury’s resources, it also opposed any idea by Guggisberg to impose taxes on 
cocoa exports for development. 
 Indeed during Parliamentary debate on 25th July 1923, Wedgwood resented the idea to 
impose tax on cocoa exports for the construction of the Takoradi harbour. Wedgwood 
remarked, “I put in the first place the extravagant capital expenditure of these Colonies, and 
there, I am afraid, I shall have the Under-Secretary against me. …you are going to saddle the 
taxpayers of these Crown Colonies with enormous burdens for such works as the 
development of the new harbour at Takoradi and the new railway… you will strangle the 
development of these Colonies,… In the long run such capital expenditure will be a handicap 
and not a means of developing the Colony” (HC Deb 25 July 1923). Meanwhile the idea for 
the construction of the Takoradi harbour although had first been conceived in 1895 by the 
Chamberlain Policy, was commenced in 1921 by Guggisberg. There were viable economic 
indicators capable to transform the Gold Coast economy from an underdeveloped to 
developmental status had the colonial government not restrained Guggisberg’s programme. 
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For instance, in the 1925/26 fiscal year alone, the revenue of the Gold Coast reached its 
historical peak of £5,871,556 with a surplus of £1,616,430 (The Gold Coast Bluebook, 1901-
1939). Moreover, the highest government expenditure recorded in the first half of the 
twentieth century occurred during the last fiscal year of Guggisberg’s administration – 
1926/27 – to an amount of £4,328,159. With the exception of Guggisberg, the colonial 
government encouraged a system of ‘capitalist predation’ that was relatively circumscribed in 
matters of socio-economic development. This explains the colonial government’s reluctance 
to engage in capital expenditures in the Gold Coast even as surpluses were realised. Even 
though government surpluses were viewed by the capitalist traders as a threat to their 
profitability, it was a clear vindication of how Guggisberg and for that matter any colonial 
governor could have administered extraction policies in a judicious manner to advance socio-
economic development in the colonies. The overall attitude of the colonial administration was 
defined by its key functions to protect British interests against rivalry from other capitalists; 
ensure optimum conditions under which capitalist entities could exploit the colony; and to 
resolve conflicts between competing capitalists (Rodney, 1972: 164). The general principles 
of the British Treasury guided the Colonial Office’s philosophy on colonial development to 
the extent that the latter vehemently opposed any development in the colony except that 
financed from colonial resource. The Colonial Office and British Treasury prematurely 
removed from office, Representatives of the Crown who acted on their own moral conscience 
and contrary to this cardinal principle, as was the case of Governor Sir Gordon Guggisberg of 
the Gold Coast in 1927.  
Before his recall by the Colonial Office in 1927, the ten-year development programme had by 
far been implemented with unparalleled developments in all sectors earmarked. Among his 
achievements were the construction of many roads and rail networks across the country, the 
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establishment of Korle-Bu teaching hospital in 1923, Achimota College in 1924 (now 
University of Ghana) and Takoradi harbour in 1928 (Ghana’s premier commercial port). 
However, as noted by Colonel Wedgwood, colonial development loans attracted instant 
interest to the British Treasury and was not a burden to the British tax payer. Colonel 
Wedgwood remarked “At the present time, on nearly all the loans that the Colonies raise, the 
Colonies pay interest at once, so that there is no burden on the British taxpayer” (HC Deb 18 
July 1929). Guggisberg’s critics – colonial office, capitalist merchants and elite cocoa 
farmers were very critical of his development ideas even though his programme was paid for 
by the colonies themselves. In spite of the general held view that the colonial administration 
was apathetic to colonial development, the commitment of Sir Gordon Guggisberg resonates 
with the important leadership qualities expected in developmental process state. The 
developmental state concept, as defined by Johnson (1982) is ‘a state that is focused on 
economic development and takes necessary measures to accomplish that objective’. Woo-
Cummings (1999) suggests “…a state’s first priority will define its essence” and argues for 
developmental states to first of all focus on achieving economic development, and thereafter 
a welfare or equality state. Although with only seven years out of the ten years of the 
programme being fully implemented, Guggisberg’s administration established reserve funds, 
doubled the average annual revenue of any previous septennium, and doubled the average 
annual trade (Greenstreet, 1964). Guggisberg’s administration was developmental and defies 
the ‘predatory odds’ characterised by the colonial administrations prior to, and after the 
administration of Governor Guggisberg. 
Another strand of Guggisberg’s idea on colonial development was to enhance the human 
capacity of the Gold Coasters through the provision of educational and health facilities, 
aimed to improve the efficiency of labour to adapt to modern technology, improve 
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employability and wages, as well as provide a beacon of good healthcare in the Gold Coast. 
Guggisberg’s comprehension of development for the Gold Coast was beyond the perimeters 
of materialist development at that time, and of uncharted knowledge to the imperial 
capitalists.  Although human capacity development was common knowledge and key to the 
economic development in Europe, the colonial development thinking in respect of the Gold 
Coast was averse to any such idea in the colony. Improvements in health and education - 
knowledge transfer of scientific and administrative acumen – were withheld from the Gold 
Coasters to protract European economic and political development, and consolidate imperial 
exploitation. ‘Dependency’ had been the widely held development theory for the colonies 
during the interwar period.  
Dependency development refers to a capitalist idea of development that promotes transfer of 
raw materials from the colonies to western industries with exclusive rights to industrialised 
empires over colonial markets for accumulation of capital through exploitation. Possibilities 
for the colonies to assume a lead role with a view to manage their own development in the 
near future was not a matter of urgency to the CO. Indeed the colonial bureaucracy was not 
accustomed to the notion of human capacity building for the colonies at that time, and 
therefore viewed Guggisberg’s idea to educate the indigenes as contentious, though ground-
breaking two decades later. The indigenes travail for higher education and promotion in 
colonial administration were perceived by the CO as prototype of decolonization and perilous 
to imperial dominance.  However, from his earlier engagement with the colonies, Guggisberg 
had become convinced of the development capabilities of the indigenous people when offered 
the necessary assistance. Guggisberg said, "…my practical experience... during the last 
twenty-seven years has convinced me that what individuals have achieved, in spite of ill-
selected systems of education, can be achieved by the race generally, provided we alter our 
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educational methods. …neither an African nor a European will have any claim to promotion 
to Staff Appointment on account of his colour, but because he is the best man for the 
appointment” (cited in Metcalfe, 1964: 601-602). Guggisberg justified the ‘Africanization’ 
scheme on the basis of reducing administrative expenditures and in the spirit of justice and 
fair play as it became economically and politically injudicious to maintain 481 expatriates 
and 28 senior African staff in the Gold Coast colonial administration by 1926 (Shaloff, 1974). 
The scheme aimed to bring some austerity measures to the colonial administrative budget and 
avert political unrest by the indigenous elites (Metcalfe, 1964: 601). However, the paradox of 
elite antipathy to colonialism held back the progression of the Africanisation of the colonial 
administration. As such, although many colonial administrations were conservatively 
detached from colonial development, a generalisation of all colonial policies as ‘predatory’ 
takes an exception to the exemplary commitment and achievements of Sir Gordon 
Guggisberg. 
Another development during the Guggisberg era was the adaptation of a system of 
governance. Prior to the Guggisberg administration in the Gold Coast, Lord Luggard, a 
British soldier and later Governor of the Northern Nigeria Protectorate (1914-1919) had 
recommended for the adaptation of a ‘dual mandate’ and ‘indirect rule’ as forms of 
governance in the colonies (Luggard, 1926: 76). The ‘dual mandate’ enabled the Colonial 
Office in London to administer a colony for the economic interest of the metropole whilst 
promoting colonial development. Colonial governance by means of ‘indirect rule’ enabled the 
CO to rule the people of the Gold Coast through the local chiefs but under the strict 
supervision of the Gold Coast Governor. Although the CO did not reject Luggard’s idea, the 
development fund available for colonial development a few years afterwards was minimal. 
The cumulative effect of the Colonial Office’s attitude towards colonial development 
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generated unrest in the Gold Coast and reverberated in other parts of British Tropical West 
African regions. The 1925 Gold Coast Constitution is credited to the diligence, commitment 
and good interpersonal skills of Sir Guggisberg. The constitution maintained the Governor’s 
veto in all decisions, with an exclusive Eurocentric Executive Council, and official majority 
in the Legislative Council but provided the bases for indigenous contributions. By 1939, the 
Gold Coast Legislative Council had been expanded to include 15 official and 14 unofficial 
members (Price, 1967: 24).  Of the 14 unofficial, 9 were Africans, 6 of whom were elected by 
the Provincial Council of Chiefs and 3 others elected by the Southern cities of Accra, Cape-
Coast and Sekondi-Takoradi based on their property franchise. The 5 European unofficial 
members were representatives of the British Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Mines, 
shipping, banking and mercantile interests. After Guggisberg was prematurely relieved of his 
post in 1927, his successor, Governor Richard Slater5 introduced development views that 
were in contrast to his predecessor’s as evident in his remark “that it would be difficult to 
find an African with the necessary independence and strength of character who would be 
reasonably acceptable to the native population who would be placed in his charge” (cited in 
Shaloff, 1974).   
Guggisberg’s main idea were the removal of transportation bottlenecks to open up production 
and trade in the hinterlands; introduction of cocoa taxes for socio-economic development; 
agricultural modernization for increased productivity and labour efficiency; promotion of 
education and social welfare for human capacity development; and review towards 
democratic governance and increased African representation. Given that the economic 
predictions of Guggisberg in relation to colonial development had won the admiration of the 
traditional authorities and indigenous elites, the Gold Coasters regarded as a tragedy for 
 
5 Sir Alexander Ransford Slater held the office of Governor of the Gold Coast as Governor from 1 April 1919 to 
8 October 1919; Sierra Leone from 1922 to 1927; then again the Gold Coast from July 1927 to 5 April 1932. 
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colonial development his recall by the Colonial Office. A critical examination to the cause of 
Guggisberg recall suggests that it was an appeasement to the CO, capitalist merchants, and 
right-wing members of the British parliament. They have argued against Guggisberg’s tax 
reforms and have regarded his ideas of colonial development as extravagant and 
economically unsustainable. Shortly after Guggisberg had departed from the Gold Coast in 
1927, the revenue from cocoa exports decreased due to a fall in cocoa prices even though 
output increased from 210,000 to 230,000 tons (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 28). The removal of 
Guggisberg from office enabled the CO to retard colonial development. Development in the 
Gold Coast was reverted in line with the foremost imperialist mind-set that primarily saw the 
colonies as a resource to, and property of the British Empire. The overwhelming view of 
colonial development by the British government in the late 1920s was summed up in 
Parliament in Mr Barclay-Harvey’s6  comment “That this House is of opinion that the pursuit 
of a vigorous policy furthering Imperial trade and developing Imperial resources is desirable 
in the interests of the industries of this country and of the Empire” (HC Deb 14 March 1928). 
Once again a decade has ended with very little to note about the commitment of the 
colonialist towards the welfare of the colonised. Indeed, even though the colonist and the 
colonised had viewed colonial development from different perspectives, lessons of 
Guggisberg’s theory within the constraints imposed by the economic management policy of 
the British Treasury leaves a legacy worthy of emulation by underdeveloped economies. The 
key exceptionality of Guggisberg was that, even though it was the Colonial Office’s doctrine 
to keep government machinery to a minimum (Sederberg, 1967), he adopted other means to 
bring development to the Gold Coasters whom he regarded as his own people and believed in 
their ability to develop when privileged with a fair social relations.   
 
6 Sir Charles Malcom Barclay-Harvey served as MP for Kincardine and Western in the House of Commons from 
6 December 1923 to 8 March 1939. 
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Chapter 4:  The Political Economy of Ghana during the Colonial Era -1930 to 
1950. 
“The development of every state is intrinsically linked to good trade policies and diplomatic relations 
with other states” - De Freitas (1963). 
4.1 The Evolution of Statutory Development Acts and Protracted Development in the 
Gold Coast.  
This epoch is considered as an important landmark in the annals of colonial development in 
the Gold Coast because it delineates how Europe redefined her social relations with the 
colonies from 1930 to 1950. During this period, the capitalist markets in Europe and the 
United States experienced deep economic crisis and a major war. The simultaneous loss of 
confidence in the two major stock exchange markets, that became known as the ‘London 
Stock Exchange Crash’ and ‘Wall Street Crash’ of 1929 caused Economical Crisis 
management in the so-called Advanced West. This was followed by the ‘Great Depression’ 
of the 1930s and subsequently the Second World War from 1939 to 1945. 
In Europe, high unemployment, low productivity, mass poverty, inter-state conflicts and loss 
of Britain’s market share in Europe, North Africa and parts of Asia offered grounds for the 
British government to expand their imperialist exploitation by extending a series of restrictive 
economic stimulus to the colonies for expected returns. During Parliamentary Debate in the 
House of Lords on 9th December 1929, Viscount Elibank suggested that Britain has lost a 
significant amount of trade with her Colonies and Dominions to the United States, with the 
latter controlling 44 percent of global trade. He asked, “…what is being done to remedy this 
deplorable and dangerous state of affairs?”  (HL Deb 09 December 1929). The fragility of the 
British economy was the key factor for the British government to summon a meeting with her 
colonies and dominions in the immediate year following the onset of the economic crisis.  
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In 1930, the Imperial Economic Conference was held to remedy the economic crisis in 
Britain with possibilities of residual benefits to the colonies. In December 1929 Lord Arnold 
stated “the object of this Conference is to consider and devise ways of increasing inter-
Imperial trade” (HL Deb 09 December 1929). Lord Arnold’s narrative asserts the Empire’s 
position on trade expansion through a series of economic strategies including but not limited 
to protectionism trade and Keynesianism. The preferential trade policies of the Empire trade 
were a series of nepotistic economic strategies with political undertones that allowed the 
imposition of preferential tariffs on trade between Britain and her interests. The primary 
objective was to regain the Empire’s market share from the United States and to hold in 
check the ascension of US global hegemony.  
Keynesian economic growth theory teaches us that with all other things being equal, 
economic growth is attainable through the judicious implementation of state-led strategies 
that encapsulates increased money supply, lower interest rates and increased government 
spending. During Parliamentary Debate on Empire Trade in March 1928, Captain Eden 
suggested, “If we are agreed as to that, then by what means does it lie in the power of the 
Government and in the power of this House to further Imperial trade? Many methods are 
open to us. There is, first, the method of preferential tariffs.” (HC Deb 14 March 1928). 
However, the economic and political challenges in Europe at that time had far reaching 
implications in the colonies and dominions of the British Empire. The roll back of colonial 
development in the 1930s was not in tandem with the expectations of the colonies who had 
begun to seek political autonomy with a view to advance their own development. For 
example, the protracted underdevelopment and political oppression in the Gold Coast gave 
cause to travail decolonization by the indigenous elites and traditional rulers. The Gold 
Coasters had believed that decolonization was necessary to accelerate local development 
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because they saw colonial rule as auspicious to mundane development. As local opposition to 
colonialism grew, the Gold Coast people became more sensitized that the achievement of 
their desired form of colonial development lies with an indigenous government rather than 
the colonial government. The resentments in the Gold Coast as in other parts of British West 
Africa, resonated with the views held by many locals in the British West Indies. This made it 
imperative for the British government to take expedient measures with a view to retain her 
market share for raw materials and finished products, as well as to win their - African and 
West Indies - loyalty for the war.  
Consequently, the colonial government reviewed her approach to colonial development in 
selected colonies and made accelerated policy reforms in her relations with her colonies 
through financial assistance as per the provisions of a series of Development Acts. Between 
1929 and 1955, the British Parliament enacted six consecutive Colonial Development Acts, 
with each giving away a small extent of the colonial predation. The issues of contention in 
the Acts were about who should be the beneficiaries of colonial development, role of the 
metropolitan government in colonial development, who has rights to make decision, and 
financial control of development funds were key concerns that required reforms (Wicker, 
1958). The concerns and mind-sets of the two key partners involved in colonial development 
– the metropole and the colonies – resonates with the Marxian class conflict and crisis 
inherent in capitalist production process. On the one hand, the colonial administration and the 
capitalist merchants believed that colonial development should benefit the metropole hence 
did not give considerable thought to the development needs of the colonies during legislation. 
On the other hand, the colonies presumed that colonial development should result in 
economic prosperity and development of the local economy. The differences in development 
thinking and expectations defined the social relations of both parties and the extent of reforms 
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in successive development legislations. Meanwhile, the colonial government took a rather 
piecemeal approach to resolve these issues, allowing her enough time to consolidate colonial 
predation and retard colonial development. Even though the Development Acts evolved 
systematically during the three decades, the development thinking held by the British 
government and her social relations with the Gold Coast did not shift significantly from the 
existing exploitation and oppression to development in freedom. The Acts consisted of (i) the 
Colonial Development Act of 1929, followed by (ii) the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act 1940; (iii) Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945; (iv) Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act 1949; (v) Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1950; and (vi) the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act 1955, with each making some improvement on its 
predecessor.  
The development thinking of the Colonial Government in the affairs of development in the 
Gold Coast was similar to that in other colonies under the British Empire. The power to, and 
procedures for, the implementation of colonial development schemes in the Gold Coast were 
set out as part of the respective Acts of Parliament that evolved during the three decades. The 
respective Acts delineated the development thinking of the British Government in the affairs 
of colonial development. The Secretary of State for Colonies with the concurrence of the 
British Treasury cascaded the development thinking of the British Parliament in the forms of 
the Statutory Policies, Parliamentary Bills and official correspondences from the Colonial 
Office in London, for onward implementation through the Colonial Governors in the 
colonies. This vertical chain of administrative command was generally preferred by the 
British Government to guide against aberrations in development thinking that were contrary 
to the objectives of the imperial trade. The Colonial Office sanctioned Local Governors and 
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officials who acted on their own beliefs and development thinking as in the case of Governor 
Guggisberg in 1927. 
The principal cause of this chapter is to unpack the historical facts of the political economy of 
the Gold Coast during 1930 and 1950, and critically examine the developments that took 
place in this colony, in order to determine whether the British colonial administration was 
predatory in her social relations with the Gold Coast or not. It is a fact that the social 
advancement of a people is dependent on the exploitation of land and labour by capital, 
however, development as a comparative concept is possible when a reasonable proportion of 
the derived surplus (from exploitation) is put at the disposal of the people from whom the 
exploitation has been derived (Rodney, 1972, p. 149) and properly managed by a responsible 
authority. Given this, the nature of exploitation that was inherent in the colonial imperial 
trade system, cannot be said to represent the social advancement of the Gold Coasters. The 
colonial trade itself was marked by a pattern of consistent expatriation of labour surpluses to 
Europe by expatriate capitalist investors. This explains a paradox of underdevelopment in 
which the Gold Coast as a society with rich natural resources became underdeveloped 
relative to European states that were naturally endowed with lesser natural resource.  
An overview analysis of this social relationship during this epoch cannot be overlooked in 
this study, as it brings into tandem the gap between the development resourcefulness of Sir 
Gordon Guggisberg (Gold Coast Governor, 1919-1927) and of Kwame Nkrumah – Ghana’s 
first Prime Minister (1951-60) and later President of Ghana (1960-66). A second aim of this 
chapter is to deconstruct the politicization of development in the Gold Coast, and unravel any 
misrepresentation of the Gold Coast political economy in the immediate period leading to 
independence.   
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4.2 The Colonial Development Act of 1929: An Introductory Statutory Colonial 
Development Plan 
The epoch of expeditious evolutions in colonial development thinking began with the 
implementation of the first legislated policy of colonial development – the Colonial 
Development Act of 1929 that replaced the extemporary approach of its predecessor - the 
Chamberlain Policy. The significance of the Colonial Development Act of 1929, was that it 
allowed for the scrutiny of colonial development programmes, budgeting of an annual 
financial assistance to the colonies for colonial development, and served as the key impetus 
to future development initiatives as evident in the preamble of its successor - the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act (1940). Moreover, the 1929 Act made statutory provisions for 
Parliamentary Appropriation of an amount not exceeding £1 million per annum to be 
disbursed among the British colonies for development and established an Advisory 
Committee for consultation on matters related to colonial development (Colonial 
Development Act, 1929).  
In principle, these evolutions in British colonial policy can be argued as improvements in the 
social relations that characterised imperial production, trade and development between 
Britain and the Gold Coast from the early 1930s to the period leading to self-government. In 
practice however, the Colonial Office’s commitment to, and capacity for colonial 
development were two different ideas. Although the British economy had emerged as one of 
the fastest growing economies by the dawn of 20th century, with the capacity to develop the 
primary hub of British industries – the colonies, her commitment toward development in the 
Gold Coast was dormant, with the exception of the Guggisberg administration. The colonial 
attitude towards colonial development during the nineteen thirties was traditionally right-
wing except where the development initiative was generally beneficial to the objectives of the 
imperial system of production and trade (Crook, 1986). Indeed, prior to the enactment of the 
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1929 Colonial Development Act, the colonial government had adopted a relatively laissez 
faire attitude to the role of the state in colonial development and had only shown interest in 
economic programmes that benefited capitalist exploitation by the imperial colonist 
(Sederberg, 1971).  
Having argued that, there were some changes in attitude, approach and individual initiatives 
to colonial development during this epoch that are also worth mentioning in this study. The 
Colonial Development Acts of 1929 made statutory provisions for the establishment of 
parliamentary committees with powers to make recommendations for colonial development, 
established the Colonial Development Fund, expanded the development schemes for 
consideration, and set statutory amounts for allocation for development in the colonies. For 
instance in 1929, the Colonial Development Act Advisory Committee was able to make 
recommendations to the British Parliament for the approval of loans from the Colonial 
Development Fund for the six schemes that the committee had considered appropriate for 
pursuance. The six schemes were for (i) transportation, (ii) agriculture, (iii) public health, (iv) 
education, (v) water supply, and (vi) other survey as recommended by the Colonial 
Development Act Advisory Committee. During Parliamentary debate in November 1929, Mr 
Lunn, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the House that £1,020,310 
being part of the £4,400,000 (estimated total cost for the six schemes recommended by 
Colonial Development Act Advisory Committee) has been disbursed to the colonies (HC Deb 
06 November 1929).  
However, a critical examination of the wordings in the Colonial Development Act of 1929, 
gives a misrepresented impressions about the true intent of the British government in the 
affairs of colonial development. This is because the phrasing of the Act even though seems to 
promote colonial development rather allowed the colonial administration to directly predate 
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on the Colonial Development Fund through the powers vested in the Treasury. Under Sub-
section (4) of the Act, “All sums issued on account of moneys provided by Parliament under 
this section shall be paid into a fund to be called the Colonial Development Fund" …, 
however Sub-section (7) of the same Act empowers the Treasury to invest any moneys 
standing to the credit of the Colonial Development Fund in Government securities (Colonial 
Development Act, 1929). The essence of this provision is undoubtedly to accumulate interest 
for the British Treasury, bearing in mind that the Act wilfully disallowed unspent monies to 
be carried forward into another year for disbursement to the colonies. Consequently, the 
British Treasury did not disburse the whole allocated amounts that had been voted by 
parliament for development, and profiteered by investing the unspent amount for interest at a 
time when colonial development proposals were rejected without recourse to appeal.  
Sir H. Young’s comment during Parliamentary debate on 18th July 1929, affirms the 
Treasury’s position that it was not obliged by the Act to dispense the total amount of £1 
million voted for all colonial development. Sir Young stated, “We received the impression 
that this was to be a true grant-in-aid, and that we were to vote a sum, not necessarily 
£1,000,000 every year, to the Colonial Development Fund. …it is not to be a Vote to' the 
Fund, but a Vote for the specific purposes for which the Fund is to be employed. Therefore, 
unless these specific purposes can be fully advanced in the year, there may be a short issue” 
(HC Deb 18 July 1929). At the end of the eleven year period, 1929 to 1940, only £6.4 million 
had been expended even out of the £9 million that had been appropriated by Parliament 
(Wicker, 1958: 175). The differences being invested outside the colonies for profits by the 
Treasury was a direct predation on the meagre appropriation for colonial development. 
The development thinking related to the Colonial Development Act, 1929, demonstrates the 
extent of predation and lasses faire attitude of the state in her role to colonial development. 
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During the debates in 1929, two senior members of the British upper house of parliament - 
the House of Lords – made corroboratory remarks that give the impression that the Colonial 
Development Act 1929 was not mainly intended to develop the colonies but rather to resolve 
unemployment in Britain. Both Lord Privy Seal - who introduced the Colonial Development 
Bill, and Lord Passfield7, suggested that the principal motive of the bill was as a measure to 
resolve the lamentable conditions of unemployment in Britain.  The development thinking of 
Lord Passfield for example, in relation to the Colonial Development Act 1929, was that the 
Act was a means to imperial interest. Having previously served as the President of the Board 
of Trade in 1924, and as the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the relatively socialist 
Labour peer stated “the principal motive of this measure is connected with the lamentable 
conditions of unemployment in this country, and this is an attempt to stimulate British export 
trade”, (HL Deb 5th Series LXXV, col. 173). The bill was introduced with the preamble “this 
measure has been introduced by a Labour government, not only because we believe in 
colonial development and because it is urgent, but because I think it will assist me in carrying 
out my ideas of dealing with unemployment” (HC Deb 5th Series, CCXXIX, col. 1300). 
Given these parliamentary narratives, it would be inaccurate for Wicker (1958) to suggest 
that the Colonial Development Act of 1929 was principally aimed for colonial development 
because it set into law a system of unbalanced development in the social relations of Britain 
and her colonies.  
As suggested at the Imperial Economic Conference in 1930, the Colonial Office had relied on 
the economic imperativeness of Keynesian ‘multiplier effect’ concept to provide funds to the 
colonies with a view to stimulate economic growth during the ‘Great Depression’. This was 
against the background of negative economic growth in the British economy as world trade 
 
7 Lord Passfield – Secretary of State for Colonies (1929-31) noted that the principal motive of the Colonial 
Development Act of 1929 was connected with the lamentable economic conditions in Britain. 
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fell by a half, outputs of heavy industry by a third, 3.5 million unemployed labour force and 
overall fall in employment profits. Meanwhile, the magnitude of unchartered developments 
and the siphoning of statutory appropriation by the Treasury meant that colonial development 
was inevitably underfunded. In 1933, a Keynesian counter-cyclical public spending approach 
was cautiously adapted by the Colonial Government in her trade and development 
engagements with the Gold Coast. In his book ‘The Means to Prosperity’ published in 1933, 
Keynes argued for increase in government spending to induce a rise in aggregate demand, 
with a view to boost economic activity through a ‘multiplier effect’ concept to reduce 
unemployment and deflation. The Chamberlain policy, though not part of the 1929 general 
election manifesto of the Labour party, was hastened for implementation at the onset of 
MacDonald’s administration. However the honest objective of the colonial investment was 
not for colonial development and the adaptation of Keynesian economics in the colonies was 
strongly doubted. For instance possibilities of a Keynesian style development in the Gold 
Coast as in other colonies was contested by many academics at that time. In Schumpeter’s 
(1946) view "Practical Keynesianism is a seedling which cannot be transplanted into foreign 
soil, it dies there and becomes poisonous as it dies". 
Moreover, the operations of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee was influenced 
by the interest of home industries. The committee to a large extent adopted a ‘quid pro quo’ 
attitude whereby it made favourable recommendations for the disbursement of funds to 
schemes that ordered machinery and capital equipment from British industries. By the same 
token subsides were introduced to British manufacturers and exporters to reduce the cost of 
production and make prices of finished products competitive with a view to increase profit, 
savings, investment and reduce unemployment in Britain. In effect much of the colonial 
development budget was never transferred to the colonies for the presumed multiplier effects 
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but remained within the British economy. The Colonial Development Act of 1929 Act was 
thus ‘a means rather than an end’ to the overall imperial objectives.  
These suggestions do no negate the possibility that a minority of British politicians, scholars 
and good hearted public had genuine desires for colonial development in the long term. The 
facts about the real motives for colonial development has not been fully explored. Whereas 
(Wicker, 1958), suggests that any benefits that had accrued to Britain out of the 1929 Act 
were only ‘sequential and subsidiary’ Abbot (1970), points to the rigidity and deleterious 
character of the 1929 Act with an overall heavy indebtedness to the colonies that militated 
against any developmental opportunity for the colonies. Despite the complex nature of 
colonial development, the development thinking of the colonial government and 
achievements of the Colonial Development Act of 1929 was an improvement of the 
Chamberlain Policy and established the foundation for statutory mechanism for colonial 
development with systematic improvements of future schemes. Its main setbacks had been 
the underfunding of development schemes, limitations it placed on the Advisory Committee 
to make recommendation for capital projects and tenacity to the predatory objectives. 
4.3 Colonial Development Act (1929) and the Gold Coast: Conservative Predatory 
State 
In 1929, the Chamberlain Colonial Development Policy of 1895 was metamorphosed into the 
Colonial Development Act of 1929 with a ‘conceptual hangover’ as it bore identical 
characteristics of its predecessor (Abott, 1970). The Colonial Development Act (1929) made 
provisions for Parliamentary appropriation of an annual development budget of up to £1 
million for all colonial development in the British Empire to stimulate production and trade 
(Colonial Development Act, 1929). Of this amount, the Gold Coast received between 1930 
and 1940, only £142,002 for an agriculture scholarship, urban electrification and water 
supply (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 24). This represents a meagre 1.42 percent of the total 
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disbursement for colonial development during this period and represent only a small fraction 
of government expenditure in the 1920s for any particular year. This elucidates the 
discriminatory approach to individual nation’s development programmes and capacity as well 
as conservative strategy by the colonial predatory state to retard development through cut 
backs of budgetary expenditures for colonial development. Budgetary expenditures in the 
Gold Coast was reduced from £4,252,000 in 1928 to £1,737,000 in 1933 as cocoa export 
price halved from £49 to £21 per ton for the same period (Ingham and Simmons, 1987). In 
essence, the Colonial Development Act of 1929 was a change to course of action in relation 
to the Guggisberg’s development programme because it constrained development 
expenditure. Other factors that led to the contraction were the lack of commitment and 
interpersonal skills on the part of succeeding governors. These militated against the 
government’s ability to have the local’s support for extraction of taxes for development. For 
instance, during Governor Slatter’s administration, the locals demanded for self-government 
when the colonial administration attempted to introduce an indirect tax. 
Moreover, the few development schemes that were recommended by the Colonial Advisory 
Committee were mainly aimed to generate simultaneous economic benefits for the expansion 
of imperial trade and industrialisation. In addition to the meagre loan facilities when 
compared to government expenditure under Guggisberg, the Act lacked a true commitment to 
colonial development because there was no compelling requirement to develop the colonies 
except that directed by the imperial interest. The preambles in Part (1) and (2) of the Act – 
Power to make advances for the purposes of colonial development – did not obligate the 
Colonial Office to fulfil the objectives of the Act. For example, in Part (1), “the treasury, with 
the concurrence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies……may make advances to the 
Government of any colony….” (Colonial Development Act, 1929). The wordings conferred 
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no obligation on the Colonial Office to ensure economic development in the colonies and 
thus fell short of the expectations of the Gold Coasters. More so, the unhealthy interpersonal 
relations that transpired between the colonial administration in the Gold Coast and the cocoa 
farmers did not lend itself for collaboration to proper implementation of micro and macro-
economic policies – price stabilization, indirect tax and marketing of cocoa – to yield best 
economic results for development. 
The inadequacies of the 1929 Act and the protracted deplorable conditions in the colonies led 
to a social force of labour and political unrests that required for the establishment of 
Commissions of Inquiry by the British government. But after all, there was no intent for a 
colonial development as reiterated by Mr Glenvil Hall in the House of Commons on 7th 
February, 1945, where he argued that, “Within a few weeks of the Election held in that year, 
the then Lord Privy Seal, not in order to help the Colonies, but in order to try and find a 
solution of the unemployment problem in this country, introduced the first Colonial 
Development Bill, in the late spring of 1929” (HC Deb 07 February 1945). Given that the 
Colonial Development Act of 1929 was the first presumptive statutory development plan, it 
can only be expected that subsequent legislations would bring the needed improvements in 
colonial development to make better the setbacks of the 1929 Act. 
4.4 Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940: Consolidation of Colonial 
Predation 
In the early 1940s, the colonies and dominions of the British Empire committed their troops 
to fight on the side of their colonial master in the Second World War (1939-45). As the war 
progressed it became imperative for the British government to demonstrate reasonable 
commitment to the development and welfare of the colonial people. The implications of the 
war reinvigorated the search for more efficient capital-intensive methods of food production 
to meet home and war demands as well as enable the redeployment of manpower for the war.  
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The circumstances that prevailed during this period shifted development thinking of the 
colonial government from being passive and conservative to find new ways to consolidate her 
imperial relations in production and trade. The main contributory elements to a rethink and 
review of colonial development policies during 1940s were the implications of the Second 
World War and global pressures for decolonisation. Of the influential persons in the Colonial 
Government during the early part of the Second World War, the most eminent have been 
Lord MacDonald – Secretary of State for Colonies (1938-1940); and Lord Moyne – Secretary 
of State for Colonies (1941-1942) whose development thinking of ‘dependency’ dictated the 
pace of colonial development and Sir Arthur-Lewis whose ‘modernisation’ idea was 
relatively less predatory. But it was the ideological rivalry between Western capitalism and 
Eastern communism with possibility for colonies to sway their allegiance to the east that 
compelled the British Empire to set up a commission of inquiry.  
The West India Royal Commission – chaired by Walter Edward Guinness, 1st Baron Moyne 
and Secretary of State for the Colonies (1941-1942), was established to investigate the causes 
of the unrest and to make recommendations. However, unlike other previous commissions 
that had concluded that violence in the colonies was ‘unprovoked’, members of the Moyne 
Commission asserted that “the resistance that disrupted in the Caribbean was not a 
spontaneous uprising with lofty cause but rather a demand from the labouring class for better 
and less restrictive lives”(Basdeo, 1983). The report revealed that the colonial power 
structure and imposed institutional barriers have reduced the labouring population, to 
conditions of mere subsistence.  
The deplorable economic conditions in the West Indies resonates with the situation in British 
West African colonies due to their similar economic structure of predominantly agrarian 
economy borne out of the idea of ‘dependency’. Price falls of agricultural produce affected 
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general revenues, wages, industrial profits, employment, provision of social services and 
general standards of living. Findings of the Moyne Commission were not so different from 
the conditions in the Gold Coast at that time. The commission learnt that the inauspicious fall 
of revenue from agricultural exports had rendered colonial governments incapable of funding 
development, and has therefore contributed to industrial strikes and social upheavals.  
The recommendations of the Moyne Commission were incorporated in the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act (1940). However this failed to address the general economic 
problems of the colonies and inspired indigenous political demands for decolonization. The 
deplorable economic conditions that were evident under the dependency theory of 
development, created a social force delineated by labour unrest and increased momentum for 
decolonization. Dependency theory represents the chief development idea of the colonial 
administration in the 1940s to the effect that resources must flow from the underdeveloped 
colonies to the metropole to develop the latter at the expense of the colonies. The minimalist 
approach to colonial development and repressive responses to relatively socialist ideas to 
development (Lewis et al., 1951), by the British Government rather encouraged indigenous 
political activism in the Gold Coast. Agricultural policies in the Gold Coast were mainly 
designed to support the imperial trade system, the establishment of a few secondary industries 
were to produce items of less monetary value. The metropole was to retain the real value of 
the sterling to encourage the importation of finished products to the Gold Coast, with strict 
adherence to the economic management concept of the British Treasury.  
During this period the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee (CEAC) rejected the expert 
advice of Sir Arthur Lewis for a state-led development, agricultural modernisation, 
industrialisation, proper research and development planning, and change of attitude to 
colonial development (CO/852/1003.3). The most prominent and feasible colonial 
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development strategy in the late 1940s was postulated by Sir Arthur Lewis, a development 
economist and a member of the CEAC in the Colonial Office (CO). The two requirements for 
African development – African participation and foreign investment in agriculture (Lewis et 
al., 1951: 70-75). As the CO was not obliged by the recommendations of the CEAC, the 
latter’s role was purely advisory. The political and economic effects of the Second World 
War – economic depression and emergence of the Cold War politics – presented growing 
challenges to the CO in the management of the colonies. Parliamentary deliberations in 
London about colonial management was mainly focused on how to appease the colonies with 
superficial economic development to procrastinate the growing demands for independence 
and to prevent defections to the East in the aftermath of the Second World War. As many 
colonial resentments were predominantly economically motivated, the CEAC was charged to 
advice the CO on the disbursement of a limited Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and 
to recommend development plans that demonstrated the ‘good intent’ of the British 
government to develop the colonies. The Lewis Colonial Development Strategy, though 
rejected by the CO, consisted of the idea for a radical but systematic agricultural and 
industrial revolutions. This was to incorporate agricultural modernization and good economic 
management with expeditious industrialisation of the agrarian economy towards sustainable 
economic development. His principal idea of colonial development theory was that “in any 
programme of colonial development, agriculture must come first”, (CEAC, 1944: 7-8). But 
increased agricultural output per se was only part of the solution to the colonial development 
problem, as price fluctuations of agro exports made it implausible to adopt a unilineal agro-
based approach to development in the colonies. Industrialisation of the agrarian economy of 
the Gold Coast was therefore touted as inevitable to the stability of development capital due 
to the ability of industrialised economies to withstand the effects of price fluctuations in 
capitalist markets. Although the prima facie of colonial development is proven by increased 
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agricultural productivity, there was more to achieve through the provisions of infrastructure, 
modernisation and effective economic management of agriculture (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 
26-27). Yet even in the event of increased agricultural productivity, development capital 
could not be guaranteed as it was not feasible to rely on external development funding and 
unsustainable government revenue. The economic problems in the Gold Coast was 
exacerbated by the colonial economic management policy that restricted colonial 
development funding and touted the generation of internal capital for development. In this 
view, fluctuations in government revenue presented a huge problem to development. To 
mitigate the negative effects of price fluctuations in relation to development capital, 
industrialisation was to serve as the buffer to absorb the unpredictable capitalist market of the 
war era. The colonial government was therefore expected to assist with the enlargement of 
farms and promotion of greater knowledge through its modernisation and economic 
management policies. However Lewis’ idea of a state-led development approach was 
resented by the Colonial Office who was not prepared to accept this responsibility due to the 
financial burden that was attached to it. 
Despite the rejection, it became obvious to the British government that an improvement to the 
provisions of the Colonial Development Act of 1929 was the best way to maintain her 
economic and political relations with the colonies. This contributed to the promulgation of 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 that came with a shift in development 
thinking from the previous approach of colonial self-sufficiency to being more involved in 
colonial development. The Act provided for the establishment of the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Committee in the British Parliament to oversee the planning and review of 
colonial developments. The provisions of the 1940 Act reinforced the role of the Economic 
Department of the Colonial Office to cater for the expanding responsibilities related to 
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colonial development. The establishment of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund 
came with an increased annual disbursement of £5 million (previously £1 million) for the 
succeeding ten years because low funding had been the primary failure of the previous Act. 
The fund was to cover for existing and new colonial development initiatives with key 
emphasis on the expansion of agriculture through research studies. The Act made an 
additional provision for the appropriation of an annual amount of £500,000 for colonial 
research (Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940). Statutory provision was made for 
the establishment of an international marketing bureau to aid the contraflow of information in 
relation to trading opportunities in the colonies, with a view to increase production, trade and 
revenue. Moreover, there was the inception of a Social Services Department to facilitate the 
social well-being of the Gold Coast people (Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940). 
Compared to the previous amount of £142,002 as per the 1929 Act, the Gold Coast received 
an amount of £858,778 over a ten year period under the 1940 Act to cater for electrification, 
water, education, and agricultural research (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). 
Although an advancement of its predecessor, the provisions of the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act of 1940 was inadequate to the surmountable development needs in the Gold 
Coast; the Act did not amount to any significant change to the prevailing lukewarm attitude 
of the Colonial Office. The evolution in development thinking of the colonial government in 
relation to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, even though was thought of 
as an advancement of its predecessor in terms of the amount of colonial aid and projected 
scope of colonial development, was actually an attempt to consolidate ‘empire predation’. A 
government-led development approach was not favoured by the Colonial Office because it 
militated against the economic management principle of the British Treasury. During 
parliamentary debates in 1942, Sir Edward Grigg expressed his disapproval about how the 
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Colonial Office had engaged in Empire politics and under resourced colonial development. 
He argued that “I do not wish to disparage the importance of Scotland. But think of the 
attention one gave to the 5,000,000 people in Scotland compared with the attention we gave 
to 75,000,000 in the Colonial Empire… this office is treated as a counter in the ordinary 
process of English politics, and that, when changes are made they are prompted by the 
convenience of politics in this country and not by the convenience and welfare of the many 
millions at stake” (HC Deb 26 November 1942). The politics inherent in colonial 
development thinking was essentially for the interest of the metropolitan few and not for the 
interest of the colonial majority. 
The politicization of colonial development by the Colonial Office was more apparent in the 
late 1940s as Britain become even more determined to retain her influence over the colonies 
during the decolonization era. Being the life blood of a nation’s development, colonial 
politics was vital to the colonial administration to maintain the loyalty of the colonies during 
and after the war. During the Second World War, the political economy of the Gold Coast 
became very much influenced by demands of the war as the colony provided for economic 
supplies, markets for finished products and transit route for British and American troops. The 
Gold Coast was viewed as the oasis for Western troops travelling to the Far East during the 
war as economic activities in the cities of Accra and Takoradi were directed towards the 
crucial needs of the war. This transformed the pattern of agriculture towards the promotion of 
growth and storage of food crops for the troops in lieu of cash crops for export. This became 
even more imperative as Britain lost to Japan in 1942, some of her Asian colonies that had 
hitherto been part of the British Empire’s source of food and raw material supplies. 
Consequently, the Gold Coast colonial administration encouraged the diversification of 
agricultural production to remedy these shortages. Victory on the other hand, meant that new 
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markets emerged for British products and thus increased demand for agricultural raw 
materials from the British colonies. In 1943, the West African War Council was established 
and charged with the responsibility to supervise the complex demands of the war with the 
principal objective to achieve targets for increased food production for the troops, advice on 
the general management of each colony, and the overall coordination of colonial 
development (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). 
On the advent of decolonization, the Gold Coast was offered the option to join the new 
Commonwealth of Nations (formerly British Commonwealth), to become eligible for 
financial assistance from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, among other benefits. 
The Colonial Office was faced with the dilemma of being active or remaining passive. Thus 
whereas an accelerated programme of agricultural modernization and industrialisation was 
not thought of being in the metropole’s interest, being passive to such development gave 
support for decolonization. However, impediments to colonial developments were discretely 
encouraged in the areas of industrialisation, science and technology, and human capacity 
development to procrastinate decolonization. Remarkably, the colonial modernization agenda 
that was aimed to transform the traditional systems of production through the establishment 
of import substitution industries, was predicted to instigate unbalanced economic 
development even in the midst of growth (Lewis, 1954; Hirschman, 1958). Furthermore, the 
abstract assumption that African political leaders and policy makers would consolidate the 
expanded agricultural sector for domestic and external markets also failed (Frimpong-Ansah, 
1992). This practice of colonial development was part of the general colonial policy 
implemented across sub Saharan African territories, West Indies and other protectorates but 
generated economic problems with political implications. 
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Although the socially constructed presumption of the indigenes was that the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act (1940) has come as an improvement of its predecessor, the 
Act was insufficient to the realisation of satisfactory economic development in the colonies. 
Inadequate funds for colonial development, exploitation of colonial resources, and 
inauspicious rent seeking behaviour of the colonial administration contributed to the 
development gap between SSA and Europe. During a parliamentary debate on 26th January, 
1944, Lord Listowell – who later succeeded Sir Arden Clarke as Governor General of the 
Gold Coast - mooted for increased direct financial assistance to the colonies and a review of 
the colonial tax system. He remarked that, “There is no doubt that the £5,000,000 a year 
which was voted by us under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act will be a mere flea-
bite. Nor should it be forgotten that the preferential duties which are paid by our 527 
Dependencies, even if they do not contravene the terms of any treaty, are, in fact, an offence 
against the spirit of trusteeship” (HL Deb 26 January 1944). 
 Moreover, the adaption of the dual-sector or ‘Lewis’ model to neutralise the movement of 
labour from the agricultural sector and the proposed industries was rejected. The Lewis 
model aids to redistribute surplus labour between the subsistence and capitalist economies of 
production.  The model determines wages by the marginal returns of labour, so that labour is 
transferred from where it is overpopulated with zero marginal returns (agricultural) to where 
it is underpopulated with higher marginal returns (industrial) until the marginal returns of 
both economies in terms of wages equate to make it unattractive to transfer 
labour(Lewis,1961).  
In effect, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) was no better than its 
predecessor with regards to its non-consultative and predatory approach to colonial 
development schemes. As per Section (1) of the Act, the Secretary of State for Colonies with 
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the concurrence of the Treasury was “authorised to make schemes for any purpose likely to 
promote the development of colonial resources and welfare of its people” (Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, 1940). The CDWA of 1940 was short of a binding concession 
to obligate the Colonial Administration to allocate a fair percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product for colonial development, and was not in keeping with development needs of the 
Gold Coast. For instance, a budgeted percentage of the total revenue generated from the 
economic activities in the Gold Coast would have ensured that the colony got a fair portion of 
the extractions from its natural environment for development. That being said, the colonial 
development loans, repayable with interest to the British Treasury, was sourced from the 
reserves of colonial exploitation (Rodney, 1972). 
Despite the inadequacies of the 1940 Act to meet the rising development expectations of the 
Gold Coast people, its significance lies beyond the advancement of physical infrastructures in 
the Gold Coast. During the Second World War, Britain successfully persuaded her colonies 
for the latter’s collaboration in matters of political and economic nature as the war had put 
constraints on colonial development. For instance by 31st March, 1945, the British Treasury 
had disbursed only £150,000 towards the implementation of 51 research initiatives that 
actually costed of £414,128 (CO/28001/7/50). The limitations of the 1940 Act, rise in anti-
colonial activism, and changes to global politics after the Second World War compelled the 
British government to make far-reaching reforms in her approach to colonial development as 
enshrined in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1945. Although the 1940 Act was 
no real improvement of its predecessor for its predatory policies (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 
25), it made efforts to improve the role of the state in colonial development, and granted 
increased but not substantial participation of indigenous participation in decision making at 
the local levels (Ward 1967: 322-323). Post-World War II economic conditions and 
111 
 
associated political upheavals in the colonies also contributed to the gradual review of 
colonial development thinking. 
4.5 The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 
By 1945 the Second World War had come to a close with the establishment of a 
supranational organisation - the United Nations - to foster global peace through diplomacy, 
promote development initiatives, advance human rights advocacy, and use force as last resort 
to resolve conflicts. The imperativeness of the restoration of peace was twofold. Firstly, it 
encouraged the colonial government to increase financial assistance for development with a 
view to enhance agricultural productivity in the colonies to provide raw materials to meet 
increased supply needs of British industries. Secondly, it increased the colonial sentiments for 
decolonization, but the latter was kept at bay.  It was also presumed that the colonies would 
be able to increase their revenue base to defray the cost of colonial development. On 31st 
January, 1945 Colonel Stanley (Secretary of State for Colonies, 1942 to 1945) first presented 
amendments to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 that was subsequently 
replaced by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. 
On 15th February, 1945, J.B.Williams of the Colonial Office wrote on behalf of Colonel 
Stanley to A.J.D.Winnifrith of the British Treasury to seek the latter’s support in making a 
case to the British Parliament for an increase to the colonial development budget 
(CO/9275/62/45). This was in response to significant numbers of applications for 
development received by the Colonial Office from the colonial administrations in the various 
colonies. In April, 1945, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 was enacted by 
the British Parliament. The Act increased the amount that may be provided by Parliament 
towards colonial development schemes to £120 million for a period of ten years ending 31st 
March, 1956 – an improvement from £5million to £12 million annually (CO/28001/7/50). Of 
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this amount, an aggregate expenditure not exceeding £17.5 million was permissible in any 
financial year for colonial development with additional flexibility to utilize any unspent fund 
in the following years. This was an improvement to the previous Act that allowed the 
Treasury to invest unspent monies for interest. In addition, Research funding was increased to 
an amount not exceeding £1 million per year. The provisions in the 1945 Act replaced the 
previously fixed sum of £5 million and £500,000. These increases in development funding 
marked a crucial change in the development thinking of the Colonial Office, and a 
presumable intent of doubled effort in colonial development initiatives in the colonies. 
However, the economic management position of the British government was to remain in 
many respects. Colonial development was to be funded from colonial resources but the 
metropole reserved the right for ultimate decision making. This was re-emphasised in a 
despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament in which there were 
unequivocal suggestions that the financial provisions of the 1945 Act had been made in 
anticipation of an improvement in the economic position of the Gold Coast and other 
colonies.  
Colonial development in the Gold Coast was dependent on the improvement in productivity 
and economic efficiency of the Gold Coast economy, and not by the benevolence of the 
Colonial Government or a marked change in colonial development thinking. “In the long 
run”, Colonel Stanley said, “the social standards of a country must depend upon its own 
resources, must depend upon the skill and energy of its own people, and the wise and full use 
which they make of their internal wealth” (HC Deb 07 February 1945). In the aftermath of 
the war the people of the Gold Coast increased their demand for decolonization and political 
freedom to manage their own resources. However, as the Secretary of State for Colonies had 
earlier suggested, Her Majesty's Government was convinced that the administration of British 
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Colonies must continue to be the sole responsibility of Great Britain, the question of Colonial 
self-government was not a sine qua non for the colonies (HC Deb 26 January 1944). In the 
Gold Coast economy, the export and producer prices of cocoa have recovered to over five 
times the 1928 base rate, with gold retaining its status as the dominant non-agrarian export 
commodity (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 64). As cocoa regained its profitability, the interest on 
loans for agriculture became very expensive to as high as a hundred percent. Moreover, the 
restrictions imposed by the colonial administration on the use of road transport to sway usage 
to rail transport (with a view to recoup the cost of railway construction) resulted in higher 
transportation cost to the farmers. The high interest on loans and transportation cost gradually 
eroded the profitability of cocoa farming in the subsequent years. Another problem worthy of 
mentioning was that with increased profits and complacency of the colonial government, the 
formation of cartels became attractive to capitalists to exploit cocoa farmers (Bates, 1983). 
To mitigate the impacts of the cartels on the farmers, the formation of the West African 
Produce Control Board (previously Cocoa Control Board) was timely to avert the demise of 
the cocoa industry. A key aspect of colonial predation during the latter part of this period was 
a series of economic management policies - devaluation of the pound, exchange and trade 
restrictions - that were introduced by the metropole retracted colonial development and 
improved the exchange rate of the pound sterling (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). Perhaps the 
economic management policies had been thought of as an easier option for the British Empire 
to redeem herself from the debts of the war at a cost to no other entity but the colonies who 
devoted their lives and money to support the metropole in the war. On 7th February, 1945 
Colonel Stanley said “During the course of the war many colonies have built up considerable 
balances of their own, which in many cases have been lent to His Majesty's Government for 
the purposes of the war, free of interest” (HC Deb 07 February 1945). These fiscal and trade 
policies initiated by the Colonial Office offset the gains made by the colonies during the war. 
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4.6 The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1950 
The period after the World War II was marked by political upheavals in the colonies for 
economic development and further improvement to the parliamentary appropriation for 
colonial development. The Colonial Economic and Development Council (CEDC) 
established in 1946 was tasked to formulate a ten year development plan with an allocated 
appropriation of £120 million for disbursement among the colonies. In 1951, the council 
completed its work and was dissolved. In the early 1950s, the Colonial Empire encountered 
demands for decolonization and transformation of the global political economy. The 
Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Commonwealth) was charged with new 
responsibilities to former and existing colonies. This was an era when Imperial Western 
Powers in Europe gradually submitted to United States hegemony, and a Cold War ensued 
between the US and the USSR (now Russia). The global political economy was more 
partitioned into two folds – the West comprised of the US and her relatively Western 
capitalist allies; and Russia and her relatively Eastern socialist allies.  
In the Gold Coast, the struggle for political autonomy was led by the educated indigenes, 
traditional rulers, wealthy farmers, and ex-combatants of the World War II who had served 
on the side of the British and were opposed to colonial predation and oppression. Although 
by this time the people of the Gold Coast had viewed colonial governance as deleterious to 
economic development, the paradigm and appropriate time for a transition to constitutional 
self-governance was indeterminate. The constraints to a committed and capable state, 
required capital investments and appropriate expert advice constituted the three main factors 
that militated against increased production and development in the Gold Coast during the 
1950s. The establishment of the Cocoa Control Board was necessary to stabilise the cocoa 
producer prices and sustain the industry from collapse in the face of uncertainties in the 
European money market. However, the Colonial Office politicized this initiative by awarding 
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honours to indigenous lobbyist who acted in the interest of the imperial government (Bauer, 
1984 as cited in Frimpong-Ansah, 1992).   
On 6th December 1950, Arthur Creech Jones - the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
motioned for the early establishment and development of Colleges and rapid Africanisation 
of the Public Services to develop the human capacity of the Africans. He remarked that 
“development of Colleges in West Africa is a matter of paramount importance on both 
political and economic grounds. In these days of full employment in this country the 
recruitment of such people from here is a matter of great and continuing difficulty… We 
should set University Colleges….. It is only in this way that we can find the Africans who 
will be qualified to fill the big gap which now exists” (Colonial Office circular, 97357/50). 
This narrative confirms that the Africanisation of the colonial public services was 
inextricably linked to full-employment in Britain and the need to reduce the rising high 
current expenditures of colonial employees in the colonies at that time. This fed into the 
narratives for self-government as economic conditions in the Gold Coast deteriorated. 
Though the idea for self-government had been touted by the people of the Gold Coast, it was 
the arrival and radical ideas of Kwame Nkrumah (First Prime Minister and President of 
Ghana) that gave impetus to the attainment of self-government from British colonial rule in 
the Gold Coast. Nkrumah had accepted an invitation from the United Gold Coast Convention 
(UGCC) – led by J.B. Danquah8 - to join the party as its general secretary in 1947. During his 
time on overseas studies, Nkrumah had devoted his time to African Studies in the fields of 
Pan-Africanism and De-colonisation, and had favoured the relatively socialist approach to 
 
8 Dr Joseph Kwame Kyeretwie Boakye Danquah, affectionately called JB (18 December 1895 – 4 February 1965) 
– A founding member of the UGCC, a lawyer, politician, Pan-Africanist, scholar, brother of Nana Sir Ofori Atta I, 
member of the Legislative Council, one of the ‘Big Six’ and great-grand uncle of Ghana’s current president – 
Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo. He was detained at the Nsawan prisons on charges of subverting the CPP 
government and died of heart attack whilst in detention. He is revered by many Ghanaians. 
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socio-economic development with a strong belief that the African is capable of governing and 
developing herself when free from foreign oppression. During his membership with the 
UGCC party, Nkrumah advanced his intense dissent to colonial subjugation and advocated 
for radical reforms towards self-government. The tremendous charisma of Nkrumah and his 
developmental visions for nascent Gold Coast led to the formation of mass based political 
movements that socially engineered the struggle for immediate self-government. The dissent 
between the UGCC’s proposal for ‘self- government when possible’ and Nkrumah’s idea for 
‘self-government now’ contributed to Nkrumah’s resignation from the UGCC. Nkrumah’s 
development thinking somewhat resonates with Lewis’, that the success of Western Colonial 
statesmanship in Africa – to control and guide the forces of nationalism and social revolution 
towards political autonomy and economic industrialization – would be far-fetched unless it 
acts with rapidity in response to social forces in the colonies (Lewis et al.,1951: 11-12). To 
Nkrumah, political independence was a means to economic autonomy and development. In 
January, 1948, a two-month organised boycott against goods imported by the Association of 
West African Merchants – a consortium of capitalist merchants - popularly referred to as 
‘AWAM’ which literally means ‘dishonesty’, was supported by the UGCC to compel the 
consortium to reduce the prices of imported goods. The post war economic conditions in the 
Gold Coast were made worse by high inflation, unemployment and low wages. On 28th 
February, 1948, a group of Gold Coast veterans marched to petition Sir Gerald Creasy 
(Governor of the Gold Coast, 1948 -1949) at the Christiansburg Castle about the lamentable 
conditions of service. In the event three veterans were shot dead from six shots fired by 
Superintendent Colin Emery – British police officer. The tragedy stirred up civil 
disobedience and looting of shops in the capital, Accra and rapidly spread across other 
regions. In March of the same year, Creech Jones - Secretary of State for the Colonies- 
confirmed to the British Parliament that the movements of Nkrumah and five founding 
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members of the UGCC - ‘the Big Six’ - be restricted under the Emergency Powers Order in 
Council of 1939 for public safety (HC Deb 24 March 1948). The other five of the ‘Big Six’ 
were Ebenezer Ako-Adjei, William Ofori Atta, Edward Akufo-Addo, Joseph Boakye 
Danquah and Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey. All six were put in solitary confinements at 
different locations across the southern and northern parts of the Gold Coast. They were freed 
in April, following several demonstrations by the locals. In the midst of the unrest a 
Commission of Inquiry, the Watson Commission, was set up by the Colonial Office to 
investigate the causes of the disturbances in the Gold Coast and make recommendations 
(CO/964). However, during its hearings, Nkrumah felt betrayed by his colleagues with 
particular reference to alleged socialist sentiments within the UGCC, and therefore decided to 
exit the party as he became inconsolable to efforts to retain him. The committee 
recommended for the urgent formation of a multi-party political system to facilitate 
democratic elections. In 1949, the Conventions Peoples Party (CPP) was formed with 
Nkrumah as its leader. 
Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, (Governor of the Gold Coast, 1949 – 1957) implemented the 
recommendations of the Watson Commission but precluded Nkrumah from important 
political deliberation due to the belief that Nkrumah had maintained his radical approach to 
self-government. In response, Nkrumah initiated a ‘positive action’ of general strikes to 
oppose the imperialist economy in the Gold Coast. He was incarcerated in January, 1950 and 
released in February, 1951 after the CPP had won a landslide victory in the first universal 
adult suffrage held in SSA. Nkrumah accepted the position of ‘Leader of Government 
Business’– in lieu of prime minister in the Legislative Assembly, but was relentless for 
immediate self-government. His ardent views of political freedom as a necessity for 
economic development was key in his campaign. That political autonomy would usher in 
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economic transformation was evident in his remark “we prefer self-government with danger 
to servitude in tranquillity” (Biney, 2008). Nkrumah hypothesized that government 
investment in capital infrastructure and human development were the basis for rapid 
industrialisation and economic development. Yet the crucial problems at that time were the 
constraints to development capital and his contestation to capitalist forms of production. 
These would be unravelled in the next chapter as Nkrumah made initiatives to develop the 














SECTION THREE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE VAMPIRE STATE 
Chapter Five: The Vampire State in the Politicisation of Development in Ghana 
(1951- 1966)  
“Seek first the political kingdom, and all else will follow” - (Kwame Nkrumah, 1972: 25) 
5.1: Introduction 
The vampire state is a metaphorical concept of a rent-seeking state that ‘sucks’ the life source 
of the economy to its own obliteration. This resonates with the political economy of Ghana 
from the late 1950s to mid-1960s. In critically examining the role of the ‘vampire’ state in the 
development of Ghana, it is appropriate to recap the politics and economics of the cocoa 
industry during the 1940s and 50s to interpret the shifting relations in development thinking 
from the colonial dependency model of Adam Smith’s market self-regulation to the state-led 
development model of Karl Polanyi’s embedded market economy. By challenging the 
traditions of mainstream economics Polanyi developed his own Western Marxist analysis of 
capitalism. His critique of market self-regulation is recognised as a major breakthrough in the 
fields of economics and international political economy (Block, 2003). Polanyi argued for a 
society whereby the state takes an active role to harmonise the interests of productive forces - 
land, capital and labour - with the social relations that regulate their interactions. Polanyi’s 
formulation is important for this study because it shifts the argument from the determinist 
capitalist abstractions to realistic formulation of Ghana’s attempt at industrialisation (1951 to 
1966). Moreover, although there have been secondary writings to Frimpong-Ansah’s 
‘vampire state’ there has been little effort to critically examine the political economy of 
Ghana from Polanyi’s orientation. The focus of this chapter is to critically examine the 
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political economy of Ghana during the era of Kwame Nkrumah9 to interpret his development 
thinking and efforts at development. In doing so, the historical timing of the political 
developments of Ghana are important but secondary to the main argument here, which is 
primarily about the search for a market system and political establishment that provide the 
most powerful formulation in the search for a developmental state model for Africa in 
general, and Ghana in particular. In this direction the researcher sets aside the definitional 
discourse of developmental state to focus on the primary task. The discourse related to 
commitment and capacity (Vu, 2007); development without economic growth (Mkandawire, 
2010); standard of living and legitimacy (Routley, 2012); government and bureaucracy types 
(Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995; White, 1998); and human flourishing (Routley, 2014) would be 
considered in another chapter.  
In the immediate post-colonial period, the Gold Coasters presumed that constitutional 
democracy had come to replace colonialism to enable indigenous development to advance but 
they were wrong. Indeed, “the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to 
it is in theory independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty, but 
in reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” 
(Nkrumah, 1965: 239). The implications of the ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Disturbance in the Gold Coast, 1948’ presented to Sir Gerald Creasy10, and the ‘Gold Coast 
Report to His Excellency the Governor by the Committee on Constitutional Reforms, 1949’ 
 
9 Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah, affectionately called ‘show boy’ (21 September 1909 – 27 April 1972) – A 
politician, Pan-Africanist, socialist, scholar, General Secretary of the UGCC, one of the ‘Big Six’, leader of the 
CPP, first Prime Minister and President of Ghana, founding member of the Organization of African Unity. 
Nkrumah dedicated his life to a free, united and developed Africa, and is revered by many people globally. 
10 Sir Gerald Hallen Creasy (1897 - 1983) was the Governor of the Gold Coast from 12th January 1948 to 15th 
February 1949. He is remembered for the 28th February Christainborg Castle cross-road shooting of ex-
servicemen, the Gold Coast Disturbances and the detention of ‘the Big Six’ leading members of the United 
Gold Coast Convention Party. 
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presented to Sir Arden-Clarke11  fed into the Nkrumah administration. Yet, the reforms did 
not go far enough to ensure development ‘for the people’ because of internal and external 
factors. Others sources of importance consist of colonial office correspondences, personal 
diaries, newspaper publications, archival documentaries from the British Pathé and 
contemporary debates related to possibilities of developmental states in Africa. The critical 
examination of the political economy of development in Ghana was assisted by expert ideas 
of specialist studies undertaken by Seers and Ross (1952), Lewis (1944; 1953; 1959) and 
Frimpong-Ansah’s (1992) seminal analysis of the ‘vampire’ state.  
The remaining of this chapter is organised in five sections. Section 5.2 considers colonialism 
and underdevelopment – it is shown that colonialism impeded development in the Gold Coast 
but aided colonial exploitation through price fixing by European magnates with the support 
of the British government. Section 5.3 outlines nationalists’ reactions to colonial exploitation 
through political activism – it demonstrates the emergence of political parties and the politics 
of development. Section 5.4 sets forward a critical analysis of Watson’s Report into the 
disturbances in the Gold Coast and how cocoa farmers influenced politics. Section 5.5 
critically examines the recommendations of the Coussey Commission that set out the 1951 
Constitution and the institutional framework necessary for self-government. Section 5.6 
considers Nkrumah’s attempt to create a modern industrialised state through depoliticisation 
of development that rather fed into the prism of a ‘vampire state’ because the government 
overtaxed cocoa farmers when capital constraints, exogenous pressures and Nkrumah’s own 
determination for rapid industrialisation were not moderated. It concludes by addressing the 
opportunities, challenges and outcomes of his development programmes. 
 
11 Sir Charles Noble Arden-Clarke (1898 - 1962) succeeded Sir Creasy from 11th August 1949 to 6th March 
1957. He quelled the ‘positive action’ revolt by imprisoning Nkrumah for his part in the unrest but released 




5.2 Colonialism - the inroad to capitalist exploitation and underdevelopment in Ghana 
Colonialism was the integration of Ghana into a global capitalist economy that defined her 
underdevelopment but restricted her potential for economic growth and development 
(Rodney, 1972). It survived on the back of a dependency model of development designed by 
the colonial establishment to exploit colonies with comparatively disadvantageous terms of 
trade12. The dependency model encouraged the exportation of primary products such as 
cocoa, gold, bauxite and timber from Ghana to European markets at relatively lower prices  – 
as determined by European capitalists and colonial administration – and importation of 
household manufactured products such as alcohol, candles, textile, tobacco, sugar, corned 
beef, Quaker oats, Cadbury chocolate products, and canned fish at relatively higher prices. 
The implications of the dependency model was that it facilitated colonial exploitation and 
denied the Gold Coasters the opportunity to learn through ‘trial and error’ the scientific and 
technological skills necessary for industrialization and economic development at 
independence (Rodney, 1972). Indeed, while we do not know and perhaps may never be able 
to know the actual extent of colonial exploitation, for reasons of inaccurate statistical data 
(GNA,Adm.5/3/63)13, what we know is that the imperial trade was very beneficial to resolve 
economic problems in Great Britain (HL, 5th Series, LXXV, Col. 173). Although the 
colonies were essential to Great Britain for her pre- and post-war economic recoveries the 
colonist acceded to the decolonisation of Ghana in the full knowledge that so long as Ghana 
 
12 Terms of trade is a measure of a country’s export prices in relation to its import prices, in other words the 
amount of imported commodities an economy can purchase per unit of export commodities. 
13 Watson Commission Report, S.28. The administrative machine was weak for the purpose of modern 
economic planning with an almost complete lack of the statistical essential to the intelligent formulation of 
development schemes or the essential administration of a complex social organization. 
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was tied to the British sterling and heavily indebted, the former colony was not economically 
sovereign from British influence.  
In the 1950s, the CO contemplated on her future trade relations with emerging sovereign 
states for its own political and economic interest. Lessons drawn from archival sources about 
the development trajectory in British colonies, suggest that Africa’s development reflects the 
socio-economic and political conditions in the developed states. The implications of the Cold 
War (1947 to 1991) were not limited to the warring factions in the Western and Eastern 
blocs, but extended into politicisation of development in Africa in general, and Ghana in 
particular during the period.  
The greatest concern to Britain in her relations with the colonies was the spread of 
communist propaganda in Africa during the immediate post-war era and its implications to 
the Empire trade. Given this, the colonial government made astute concessions to the 
colonies in a series of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts to maintain influence over the 
colonies. However, these developments failed to meet local expectations and engendered 
nationalists’ agitation for political autonomy. Leaders of cocoa farmers associations, 
intelligentsia groups consisting of lawyers and teachers, traditional chiefs, African merchants 
and ex-servicemen were all drawn into grass root politics to increase political pressure on the 
colonial government to grant independence to the people.  
Additionally, the political implications of the swollen shoot disease, the ex-servicemen 
resettlement, political oppression, economic exploitation and trade discrimination against 
African merchants added momentum to nationalist sentiments for self-government (Ghana 
National Archives, Adm. /5/3/63.). Weaknesses identified consisted of fall in prices of 
export, rise in prices of imports, high interest rates on borrowing, unemployment, poor public 
services, discriminatory trading practices, political oppression, and the overall philosophy of 
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dependency development. The inroad to colonial exploitation and underdevelopment in 
Ghana were built upon British economic and colonial hegemony. It was under these 
conditions that Western capitalists lobbied the British government for discriminatory 
economic policies with threats of sanctions – economic sabotage and regime change – to 
emerging states that resented British interest. Ghana was a peripheral nation with economic 
value for the home economy and was therefore introduced to new markets of exports and 
imports that restrained its potential to industrialize. The grand plan of colonial system was 
aimed at exerting political, economic and social control over the Gold Coast to preserve 
British interest in production and trade. In this sense, colonialism was a well-orchestrated 
ideology of immeasurable success to exploit the colony through the imposition of economic 
policies that reinforced ‘oligopolization of commerce’ (transport, banking, and insurance) 
owned by foreign capitalists (Rodney, 1972). These practices contributed to the 
underdevelopment of the economy of Ghana because foreign investors took advantage of the 
might of their government over the peripheral nation and indulged in trading practices that 
contributed to underdevelopment in Ghana. Some of these practices consisted of ethnocentric 
issuance of import licences to favour Europeans, high investment capital requirements, huge 
collaterals for investment loans to alienate local investors, unfair tariffs on preferential goods, 
and exclusive right of membership to Europeans on ‘influential’ boards of trade such as the 
Chamber of Commerce.    
5.3 Nationalists reactions to Colonialism 
The Ghanaian example resonates with Marxian exposition of class conflicts in the capitalist 
production process and demonstrates that after a protracted period of colonial exploitation 
and underdevelopment, the people were able to form a strong opposition to colonialism and 
pressured the colonial administration to succumb to their demand for self-government to 
advance a new paradigm of development – industrialisation. However, the path to self-
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government and industrialisation was fraught with the travails of power struggle, 
mismanagement of the economy, neo-colonial interferences and related lessons. It is 
important to recap the reactions of the nationalists in the late 1940s because the response 
from the colonial authorities in the early 1950s reshaped Ghanaian politics and development. 
On the advice of Ebenezer Ako-Adjei14, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947, 
invited Kwame Nkrumah to join the party as its General Secretary to help organize the people 
in preparation for ‘self-government in the shortest possible time’. Nkrumah had favoured 
‘self-government now’ but accepted the position with reservation. Although he was 
concerned about how he would reconcile his vision for African unity with the rather 
conservative and ‘parochial’ interest of the UGCC, he accepted the position as a means to an 
end. He stated “… the time had come to come to grips with imperialism on the soil of Africa, 
and by working for the UGCC I would at least be actively engaged in the national liberation 
struggle to end colonial rule. I knew, however, that it might not be long before the basic 
differences between our long term objectives might make it impossible for me to continue to 
work for them” (Nkrumah, 1973: 51). Nkrumah was well-known to Pan-Africanists in the 
diaspora for his role in organising anti-colonial activities during his days in the United States 
and Britain, but in doing so he became a person of interest to Western intelligence agencies - 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and M16 (Biney, 2009). Nevertheless, Nkrumah was 
relentless and focused on his beliefs in African unity and development. In an introductory 
letter, C.L.R. Jones15 wrote of Nkrumah to George Padmore, "This young man is coming to 
 
14 Dr Ebenezer Ako-Adjei (17 June 1916 - 14 January 2002) was a founding member of the UGCC and later 
joined the CPP. He was trained as a legal practitioner at the University of Pennsylvania where he and Nkrumah 
became friends. Ako-Adjei recommended Nkrumah to the UGCC leadership for the position of General 
Secretary but was later imprisoned by Nkrumah and released in 1966. 
15 Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901 – 1989) was an Afro-Trinidadian journalist, scholar, politician and sportsman. 
He devoted his socio-political works to Pan-Africanism and argued for a socialist approach to emancipate the 
African continent from the shackles of colonial rule. 
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you. He is not very bright, but nevertheless do what you can for him because he's determined 
to throw Europeans out of Africa" (Sheerwood,1996: p.114). Nkrumah’s vision for a United 
States of Africa was disfavoured by the West at a time when Victor Hugo’s16 vision for a 
federal Europe was vigorously pursued by Europeans because Nkrumah’s idea threatened 
Western interest. Unlike Nkrumah’s dream of African unity, Europe on 25th March, 1957 (a 
few days after Ghana’s independence) signed the Treaty of Rome to establish the European 
Economic Community that metamorphosed into present-day European Union. 
5.4 The Gold Coast Disturbances and Cocoa Politics 
The Gold Coast disturbances consisted of a series of political resistance against the colonial 
establishment to demonstrate societal opposition to the manner in which colonial exploitation 
and oppression engendered underdevelopment in the colony. The disturbances were 
significant interface of a chained reaction against colonial economic exploitation and political 
oppression. Of all the economic resistances against the colonial establishment in the Gold 
Coast, the solicitation by Nii Kwabena Bonne II (a traditional chief of the Ga tribe in the 
Greater Accra) in January 1948 to boycott all European imports to protest against inflationary 
prices was key. Although the boycott was originally intended for economic purposes – to 
pressure the colonial government and expatriate businesses to reduce prices of imported 
goods – it gained political prominence following the Christainborg Castle shootings.  
In March 1948 the Secretary of State for Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, assured the British 
parliament of setting up a Commission of Inquiry “to inquire into and report on the recent 
disturbances in the Gold Coast and their underlying causes; and to make recommendations on 
any matter arising from their inquiry to investigate the causes of the political unrest and make 
 
16 Victor Hugo - a famous French novelist and legislator who presided over the International Peace Congress in 
Paris (1849) and introduced the concept of a United States of Europe. He is also remembered for his 
contributions to the arts especially for les Miserable and Notre-Dame de Paris. 
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recommendations” (Ghana National Archives, Adm./5/3/63). The membership of the 
commission consisted of Andrew Aiken Watson17 as chairman, with Andrew Dalgleish and 
K. A. H. Murray as members. It commenced work in April 1948 and presented its findings 
and recommendations on 9th May 1948. The report revealed important evidences of conflicts 
between the material productive forces of society and existing relations of production at that 
time, but it did not go far enough to indict the colonial administration for its failure to bring 
development to the people. The key issues that captured the Commission’s interests are 
categorised under economic, political and social. 
On the economic level were five main issues: (i) the colonial government’s response to the 
Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease (CSSVD)18; (ii) the unfair distribution of imports; (iii) 
nepotistic appropriation of import license; (iv) ethnocentric trade discrimination, and the 
unfulfilled gratuities to ex-servicemen. In 1911, Ghana was the world’s leading producer of 
raw cocoa to Western chocolate companies for decades (currently second place to Cote 
d’Ivoire) and with this her reliance on revenue from cocoa for development (Howard 1976; 
Hymer 1969)19. Economic policies related to agriculture in general and cocoa in particular 
had always come with implications to the legitimacy of the government. With an annual 
export revenue of about £5.3 million representing 98 percent of agricultural exports and 63 
percent of overall total exports in the five-year period preceding the Second World War 
(Watson Report 1948), cocoa was undoubtedly the ‘pole-de-croissance’ and centre of gravity 
 
17 Andrew Aiken Watson (KC) was a legal practitioner. Andrew Dagleish, and Dr. K.A.H was the Rector of 
Lincoln College, Oxford. 
18 CSSVD- is a viral disease that affects trees with notable symptoms of swollen stems, nodes, shoot tip, 
blotches on leaves, smaller pods and red vein banding. It is not pollen transmittable to seeds. 
19 In 1911 the Gold Coast exported 41,000 metric tons, and by the early 20th century productivity was 




of the Gold Coast economy (Hymer, 1969: 9). Paragraph (259) of the Watson Report 
suggests that, “… the prosperity today of the Gold Coast depends on cocoa. The menace to 
that prosperity is the ‘Swollen Shoot’. Upon cocoa, so far as yet seen, depend the plans for a 
better country – better education, better medical attention, better housing and all those things 
which spell social improvement and which the people long for” (Ghana National Archive, 
5/3/63).  
The CSSVD, first known in the Eastern Region of Ghana in 1936 (Steven, 1936; Postnette, 
1940) had by August 1945 affected about 1,450 trees (Watson Report, 1948), and contributed 
to a decline in cocoa production from its highest of 300,000 tons in 1936/37 to about an 
average of 200,000 tons after the war (Beeton Report, 1948)20. Given the decline in 
productive capacity of about 70 percent and reduction in the life span of affected trees to 
between two and three years, the scientific evidence at that time had favoured the obliteration 
of the infected trees through the cutting out method to control the spread of the CSSVD 
(Muller 2008). However, failures of the colonial government to adequately compensate the 
cocoa farmers created space for negative political propaganda by nationalists against the 
colonial administration. 
Next, the use of traditional chiefs as stooges in trade negotiations was rejected by the 
indigenous intelligentsia. The colonial government deployed this strategy to enter into 
binding contracts and trade to their advantage. In his evidence before the Watson 
Commission of Enquiry (1948), George Grant21 bemoaned the practice of ‘ethnocentric 
 
20 W.H. Beeton, C.M.G. - Chief Regional Officer of Ashanti, Department of Agriculture, under the Governorship 
of Sir Charles N. Arden-Clarke, G.C.M.G. 
21 George Alfred Grant (Paa Grant and founder of Gold Coast politics) - was a founding member and President 
of the UGCC. He was an educated nationalist and wealthy timber merchant. Died on 30th October 1956, five 
months before independence. 
129 
 
nepotism’ in trade and the exclusion of native intelligentsias in policy making in his remark, 
“… we were not being treated right, we were not getting licences for import of goods, and 
also we were not pleased with the way our Legislative Council handled matters, because we 
do not have the right people there” (Ghana National Archives, Adm./5/3/63).  
Furthermore, the nationalists were concerned that the problems of inflation, under-
representation of cocoa farmers on the Cocoa Marketing Board and the measures imposed by 
the colonial government to limit farmers’ access to financial reserves from cocoa exports 
seemed to have gone unnoticed by the authorities. The state had alienated cocoa farmers to 
the arbitrariness of merchant loans at high interest rates with hardly any surplus left for the 
farmer to accumulate capital. The cocoa industry though developed through local investment, 
technology and enterprise contributed more to government revenue than the colonial 
government’s contribution to the cocoa industry (Hymer, 1969: 9).  
Moreover, the social stratification of occupation during the immediate period to self-
government depicts an ethnocentric bias in employability. Europeans occupied top positions 
in the colonial administration and owned businesses that were more profitable. Examples are 
Elder Dempster Shipping Company, F. and A. Swanzy, Patterson and Zochonis, W. 
Bartholomew, John Holt, United African Company, Messrs G.B. Ollivant, Cadbury Brothers 
and many more. The indigenous capitalists in the Gold Coast of mainly farmers competed in 
economic ventures with minimum outcomes because many were illiterates and with limited 
capital could hardly take advantage of market conditions as their European counterpart were 
able to do. Africans who worked in public administrations were denied top positions either 
for reasons of racial prejudice or fear of being undercover employees on the payrolls of 
nationalist movements.  
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On the political causes, the Watson Report identified six factors related to the unrest. These 
consisted of: (i) the grievance of the African soldiers; (ii) frustration among the educated 
Africans; (iii) spread of liberal ideas and wane of chieftaincy: (iv) suspicion of wilful 
impediments to Africanisation; (v) suspicion of the colonial government’s intentions; and (vi) 
resentment at increased concentration of lucrative trade to foreign merchants.  
By the early 1950s increased political sensitization about the detriments of colonial 
development and international pressures for the recognition of the sovereignty of colonies 
reinvigorated the tenacity of Gold Coast nationalists to advance for self-government. The 
desire for the introduction of constitutional democracy in Ghana was with the belief that 
development flourishes under freedom (Nkrumah, 1957). However, in reality democracy is 
not necessarily a guarantee for economic development but that it is the least destructive 
among other forms of government. The power struggle and conflicts of interest within the 
UGCC leadership affected their strength to withstand the enormous powers vested in the 
colonial administration. The Governor had powers to subvert parliamentary decisions in 
consultation with the Secretary for the Colonies; veto decisions of the Executive Council; and 
exercise the Governor’s Emergency Powers. Moreover, as head of the Executive Council he 
had powers to restrict access to development funds, indirectly appoint and dismiss members 
to the Joint Provisional Council and Executive Council. Such arbitrary powers conferred on 
the Colonial Governor and for that matter the colonial system the trappings of despotic 
democracy.  
On social causes, the setbacks to social development in the Gold Coast during the colonial 
period drew interest among the Gold Coasters but the outcome of the Report came as little 
consolation and of no surprise to the people. The commission’s recommendations for urgent 
improvements in public services (health, social housing, education), land reforms, legal 
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powers to restrict speech designed to incite violence, and deal with bribery and corruption 
were linked to the identified problems but their implementation was a challenge (GNA Adm. 
/5/3/63). Ghana was ill-prepared to adapt the archetypal Weberian bureaucracy for three main 
reasons: (i) lack of essential human capacity; (ii) system of government; and (iii) working 
culture necessary for the Weberian system. This current study discovers that although the 
policies of the Colonial Office deprived British colonies from acquiring industrial science and 
technology for fear of secession, the issue of tribalism was in line with the traditions of the 
people and any adaptation would have required the will of the people. Moreover, the people 
were aggrieved because they realised that the Colonial Development Acts although purported 
to improve living conditions in the colonies had been successfully used as an economic 
weapon by the British government to legitimise colonial exploitation in so far as it served 
imperial objectives (Ghana National Archives, Adm./5/3/63). But among its feat, the Korle-
Bu Teaching Hospital (founded in 1923 by the Governor, Sir Guggisberg) continued to serve 
as the premier health facility in the West African sub-region with good outcomes.  
In the end, the Watson commission found the UGCC complacent of Nkrumah’s socialist 
convictions because the UGCC benefited from Nkrumah’s socialist activities in organising 
the people against the colonial administration. However, the commission’s findings of Ako 
Adjei’s connivance with Nkrumah and alleged foreknowledge of Nkrumah’s vision for a 
Union of Socialist African Republics was more circumstantial than evidential because the 
two had only known each other during their studies abroad. That apart, the findings misled 
the British Parliament to believe that the disturbances were primarily politically motivated 
but without economic causations. In 1952, Lord Rennel referred to these findings during 
parliamentary debate to disprove the notion that the disturbances were primarily caused by 
the difficult economic condition and underdevelopment in the Gold Coast. He stated that, on 
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the other hand, “but it is quite clear that The Watson Commission considered that the riots 
were not a spontaneous expression of dissatisfaction at economic conditions” (HL Deb 31 
July 1952). On the other hand the commission made important recommendation as set out in 
paragraph (122) for the urgent establishment of a representative committee to decide on the 
modalities for constitutional and political developments. However, the report was 
circumspect to fault the colonial administration on crucial issues such as colonial 
exploitation, apathy towards industrialisation of the colony, high unemployment of Africans 
and Afro-scepticism of the colonial establishment. In effect the social recommendations did 
not go far enough to restore trust and economic development. On balance, it was another 
interface in a series of imperialist strategy to calm social unrest and prepare the trajectory for 
another phase of exploitation.  
On the ethical level, Paragraph (17) of Watson’s Report suggests that the most serious 
problem faced by the colonial administration was the mind-set of suspicion that surrounded 
government activities of all sorts and the challenges of restoring healthy relations between 
government and the governed (Ghana National Archives, Adm. 5/3/63). By the dusk of 
colonization the Gold Coasters realised with great disappointment and mistrust that the 
‘trickle down’ theory of the capitalist system was ineffective in the redistribution of surplus 
values from production. The theory holds that as the rich expend their ‘super normal’ profits 
on consumer goods it causes ‘trickle down’ economic benefits to society by means of an 
invisible ‘multiplier’ effect. The Gold Coasters viewed the whole idea of colonial 
development as a deception to superintend the exploitation of colonial resources to develop 
Britain with disproportionate benefit to the very society from where resources were extracted. 
This sentiment was strong with the people and did influence the disturbances. 
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Furthermore, this study discovers that the psychological manipulation of Africans as an 
inferior race negatively affected the way Africans projected themselves in the competitive 
world. The colonial authorities made great efforts to subvert the culture of the people through 
Westernization with the hope that it would mitigate revolt against the colonial rule but they 
were wrong.  The Colonial Office discreetly placed obstacles to programmes in education, 
science and technology, Africanisation and democratization that could have contributed to the 
intellectual development of ‘backward’ nations (Rodney, 1972). And even though the local 
people contributed immensely to production of raw materials to European industries, they 
were hardly commended for their achievements to diminish their sense of importance. For 
instance in his address to the Legislative Council in the Gold Coast, the then Chief Justice 
Willliam Brandford Griffith22  commended European merchants for the manner in which they 
conducted trade but ignored the immense contributions of the local farmers. He stated “… 
thanks to the European traders that we now have this flourishing Colony ….what would the 
Colony have been without the traders to depot and to ship its produce” (Gold Coast 
Legislative Council Debate, 1908). Yet the sad truth was that the colony would have 
developed had the colonial administrators been genuinely committed to its development. The 
unrest was therefore an expression of the people’s will to emancipate themselves from the 
psychological oppression and redefine their future. The Report itself tactically shielded the 
colonial administration from recrimination and was discourteous to the people whom it 
described in paragraphs (39), (43) and (44) as group of gangs, lawbreakers, and evilly 
disposed persons (Watson Report, 1948). These remarks delineate the extent of psychological 
prejudice and negativity of mind-set held against the colonised people and militated against 
 
22 Sir William Brandford Griffith, CBE was a British legal writer and Chief Justice of the Gold Coast (1895-1911). 
He was the eldest son of William Brandford Griffith, KCMG, and former Governor of the Gold Coast (1880-1881 
and 1885 - 1895). 
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uncovering the whole truth behind the disturbances. In spite of the limitations, the 
Commission’s Report unravelled important economic, political and social causes related to 
the disturbances and contributed to the formulation of the 1951 Constitution. 
5.5 The Constitutional Reforms of 1949 and the 1951 Constitution of Ghana 
Following the submission of Watson’s report in May 1948, a Committee on Constitutional 
Reform was established in December 1948 in accordance with paragraph 122 of the report. 
As the campaign for independence spread across the colony, Sir Creasy on the advice of the 
CO in early 1949 made an unprecedented proposal to the Legislative Council for the 
formation of a representative committee to discuss the need for Constitutional Reforms. And 
it was by this reform that the Nkrumah government was initiated into office in March 1952. 
The Coussey Committee was chaired by Justice James Coussey23 with wide terms of 
reference to examine proposals for constitutional and political reforms with regards to the 
views expressed on them by His Majesty’s government, and to consider the extent to which 
they can be accepted, and the manner in which they should be implemented (Watson Report, 
1948). The introduction of multiparty democracy and increase of African representatives in 
the new Legislative Assembly were its most remarkable achievements. The reform was a 
landmark improvement to the 1925 and 1946 constitutions because it recognised in particular 
the role of chiefs in economic development. In Ghana, the chieftaincy institution is de jure 
and de facto recognised. Given this Judge Coussey wrote in his Report, “Contrary to the view 
expressed in the Watson Report we believe that there is still a place for the Chief in a new 
constitutional set-up. Indeed, in 1946, the Gold Coast made in constitutional law the most 
important advance that a Crown Colony can make before it reaches the frontiers of 
responsible government” (Colonial Office, 1949; HL 24 July 1952). However, the 
 




committee’s composition, its wide terms of reference and exclusion of Nkrumah for his 
dissenting views undermined the principles of representative democracy. Despite the 
challenges, the Coussey Report sets out the constitutional provisions for the new state. These 
provisions consisted of governmental powers, functions, safeguards, and composition as 
under Section 2 Parts (IV, V, VI) – The Legislature, Executive, and Governor’s Reserve 
Power respectively. Moreover, in Paragraph (364) the working modalities – the composition 
of, qualifications for, tenure of, and powers of office - of the legislature, executive and 
governor - were clearly delineated. 
5.6 Legislature 
On the advice of the Committee, a bi-cameral Legislative Assembly similar to the Anglo-
American system was introduced to replace the Legislative Council. However, the Assembly 
was not sovereign from European influence by means of its composition and powers. In 
paragraph (373) of the submitted Report in 1949 a recommendation for a 78 member 
assembly was increased to 84 members in 1951 to accommodate European trade 
representatives for British interest. Out of the 84 members of the Gold Coast Legislative 
Assembly in 1951, 38 were directly elected; 37 were indirectly elected to represent the 
territorial councils, 6 European officials represented commercial interests and 3 ex-officio 
Europeans were appointed by the Governor. A quick glance at the composition suggests an 
African majority but the overriding powers of the Governor undermined the sovereignty of 
parliament. Of the 37 senators, 9 were elected by each of the 4 regions - Colony, Northern 
Protectorate, Ashanti and Trans-Volta Togoland – with no less than one-third of the 9 elected 
members being chiefs. However, the implications were that even though the composition 
drew traditional chiefs into frontline politics the chiefs lacked the expertise needed for 
comprehensive trade negotiations and formulation of public policies at that time. The 
traditional chiefs were familiar with law-making and governance but their participation in the 
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legislative assembly exposed them to the challenges inherent in the democratization process 
in Ghana.  
5.7 The Executive 
After the electoral victory of the CPP in 1951 (which won 34 out of the 38 contested seats), 
the colonial government invited Nkrumah from prison to form a government and conferred 
on him the portfolio of Leader of Government Business in 1951 and subsequently Prime 
Minister in 1952. Yet, the constitutional arrangements did not confer autonomy on the new 
government because the British monarchy continued to function as the ceremonial head of 
state until 1st of July 1960 when Ghana became a republic. Nkrumah used the transitional 
period to negotiate with the British government on self-government, trade and development 
but his proposition for social development conflicted with the capitalist development of the 
colonial government.  
The transitional executive was a hybrid of elected and unelected officials. It consisted of an 
unelected Governor as chairman, the leader of the House of Assembly as its elected leader, 
three European officials – Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Legal Secretary – a 
minimum of 5 legislators with ministerial portfolios and 2 non-ministerial senators. The 
Chief Secretary retained monopoly on matters of external relations and defence whilst the 
British Secretary of State for Colonies in collaboration with the Governor and Chief 
Secretary exercised enormous influence on international trade and development. Moreover, 
the replacement of the old Executive Council (with governmental responsibilities conferred 
on the Governor) with the new Executive Council (with governmental responsibilities 
conferred on the legislative assembly) did little to transfer power to the elected officials 
because of the governor’s overriding powers. For instance, contrary to the assertion in 
paragraph (401) of the executive amendment being ‘the most important change’, the study 
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notes that the countervailing provisions in paragraphs (385, 393 and 394) of powers to 
prorogue the House, assent to bill, and disallowance of bills by an ‘unelected’ Governor and 
Secretary of State for Colonies respectively defeat the idea to transfer power to the elected as 
in western democracy. Thus the unelected executive council retained their constitutional 
power to derogate decisions of the democratically elected representatives of the people.  
5.8 Governor’s Reserve Powers 
The governor was the representation of the British monarchy in the Gold Coast. His reserve 
powers had the trappings of a democratic despot because he had powers to derogate the will 
of an elected government. In accordance to section (6) (2) of the Watson Report, the 
Governor continued to exercise all the powers reserved by the 1946 constitution including the 
powers of Certification and Veto. By this, the Governor was beyond reproach in so far as he 
had the approval of the Secretary of State for colonies (in non-emergencies) and permitted to 
act unilaterally in emergencies. For instance, Arthur Creech Jones24 justified the Governor’s 
decision to use tear gas against peaceful demonstrators in the Gold Coast in 1948. He 
defended the action as “one of the most effective and humane weapons available against 
rioting crowd is tear smoke” (CO/537/2712). Meanwhile, the use of tear gas on humans was 
prohibited and thus never used in Britain until the late 1960s. Even before it was first 
introduced in Britain in 1965, Sir Edward Dodd (the Chief Inspector of Constabularies) 
reassured the British public that tear gas would not be used for crowd control but only 
‘against armed criminals and dangerous individuals’. In effect, Creech Jones justified the 
 
24 Arthur Creech Jones (1891-1964) was a British trade unionist who served time in prison for his objection to 
conscription into the army during the First World War. He later became a Labour Member of Parliament for 
Shipley and Secretary of State for Colonies (1946- 1950). Creech Jones is a Fabian known to W.A. Lewis. 
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decision of Gerald Creasy25 to use excessive force on peaceful demonstrators in the Gold 
Coast as though the demonstrators were in retrospect armed criminals and dangerous 
individuals two decades before Britain sanctioned such use of force in the homeland.  
It is therefore unsurprising that the unarmed demonstrators were described by the Watson 
Commission as ‘gangs’, ‘body of evilly disposed persons’ and ‘law breakers’ (Colonial 
Office,1948). A critical examination of the constitutional reforms reveals that although it was 
an advancement of its immediate predecessors of 1925 and 1946, it did not go far enough to 
transfer power to the elected representatives until several years later. The political 
achievements of Watson and Coussey therefore consisted of the promulgation of the Gold 
Coast Constitution by an Order in Council No. 2094 of 1950, the creation of prime 
ministerial office, increased African representation in parliament and the enlargement of 
administrative powers to local authorities (Ghana National Archives, Adm./5/3/69). 
5.9 The role of the ‘vampire’ State in the development of Ghana 
It is comprehensible that at Ghana’s independence on 6th March 1957, the nascent state was 
seen as a beacon of hope by many Ghanaians, and indeed Africans, with high prospects to 
achieve rapid industrialisation, better education and healthcare, full employment, higher 
income and welfare because it was the first colony in SSA to attain independence from 
British colonial rule with a relatively large number of educated persons and educational 
institutions (Aryeetey and Kanbur, 2017: 3). This expectation resonates with the personal 
ideas of Nkrumah in 1949, when he said “if we get self-government we’ll transform the Gold 
Coast into paradise in ten years”, and in 1957 “The independence of Ghana is meaningless 
unless it is linked-up with the total liberation of the African Continent” (Nkrumah, 1968). 
 
25 Gerald Hallen Creasy (1897 – 1983) was the Governor of the Gold Coast (January 1948 – February 1949). He 
was also known  as ‘crazy Creasy’ by the Gold Coasters for his role in the Christainborg cross-road shooting 
that killed many, including unarmed ex-servicemen who had marched to present a petition for resettlement. 
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Central to Nkrumah’s plan was the construction of the Volta River Project (Akosombo dam) 
to produce enough electricity for a state-led import substitution industrialisation development 
that would transform Ghana into a modern industrialised state, improve standards of living 
and catalyse the decolonization process in Africa at that time. However, what Nkrumah did 
not anticipate was that the purpose of the dam placed his development ambitions in direct 
conflict with the objectives of neo-colonialism in a way that he could not control (Biney, 
2007: 81-100). 
Nkrumah believed that colonialism and capitalism were the main nemesis to socio-economic 
development in Africa hence political power was necessary to advance centrally-planned 
socio-economic development. During his 15 years in office as head of government (1951-52), 
prime minister (1952-1960), and president of the first republic (1960-66) Nkrumah initiated 
three major development programmes. These consisted of the First Development Plan (1951-
57); Consolidated (1957-59); and the Second Development Plans (1959-64), aimed at 
modernization through high capital intensity industries of rapid industrialisation and the 
diversification and modernisation of agriculture. There were also some ad-hoc programmes 
for specific development goals. Nkrumah touted the ideas of national identity, patriotism, 
pan-Africanism and ‘big push’ development. However, he was not infallible to errors of 
judgements in his social relations with the West and local opposition, as well as his 
underestimation of macroeconomic implications of his development policies. Nkrumah 
publicly criticised Western foreign policies during international conferences (Organisation of 
African Unity summit in Addis Ababa and UN General Assembly in New York) for holding 
back the economic development and political freedom of Africa. Nkrumah’s open 
declarations about his antipathy against colonization and western capitalism placed him in a 
difficult position to attract development loans. His famous declaration on the eve of Ghana’s 
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independence in which he said “our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with 
the total liberation of the African continent” was a clarion call for the rapid decolonisation of 
Africa and formation of an eco-political union of free states to harness African resources for 
the benefit of Africans. This line of thinking threatened western interest and with it their 
determination to deter other colonies from seeking independence by frustrating Ghana’s 
attempt to become a modern industrialised state and beacon of development in Africa. That 
apart, Nkrumah had challenges at home in forming the much needed embedded autonomy 
with the opposition and private enterprise to advance national development. Consequently, 
the lack of cohesiveness between the ruling CPP and the UGCC, contributed to subversive 
attempts and incarcerations of J.B. Danquah and other members of the opposition. In 
addition, Nkrumah personalised the modernisation of Ghana and therefore ignored expert 
advice that challenged his dream. For instance in 1965, Frimpong-Ansah, then working as a 
deputy governor of the Bank of Ghana, advised Nkrumah about Ghana’s limited reserves of 
only £0.5 million to suggest a need to balance the pace of development with the country’s 
ability to fund, but this advice was ignored.  
5.10 The Ghana industrial revolution - 1951 to 1966  
The historical and political events of the late 1940s and early 1950s engendered political 
reforms for Ghana’s first industrial revolution of import substitution. Arthur Lewis’s (1955) 
formulation of industrial revolution is that “all the countries which are now relatively 
developed have at some time in the past gone through a period of acceleration, in the course 
of which their annual rate of investment has moved from 5 percent or more to 12 percent or 
more” (Lewis, 1955: 208). Yet, the secret to industrialisation was within the rapid and 
systematic growth of agriculture with priority to food agriculture to ease migration of excess 
labour from agriculture to industries and attract capital investment (Lewis, 1953: 8). 
According to declassified archival documents, Ghana’s foreign exchange reserves as at 
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independence in 1957 was well over £200 million (FCO 65/128). However, the experience of 
Ghana was such that the projected accelerated development was constrained by a hybrid 
system of capital intensive mining sector and peasant agriculture that could not advance with 
investment capital from within existing resources or borrowing (Lewis, 1953). This posed a 
serious challenge to Nkrumah because his source of finance - private investment, taxation, 
external reserves and borrowing could not match his development ambitions. Available 
evidence suggests that Ghana’s industrial revolution was primarily financed by export taxes 
and external reserves for obvious reasons with less efforts to attract private investment and 
borrowing (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). Nkrumah believed that economic surpluses from 
projects financed through taxation and state reserves were retainable by the state for 
development, but those financed through private investment and borrowing accrued to private 
individuals. Given this development thinking, the objectives of the industrial revolution were 
set against cocoa tax revenue which accounted for 62 percent of total export earnings and 
revenues from mining and imports (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 88). However, the 
implementation of this development thinking was fraught with many problems and dissent 
particularly in relation to the proportion of the tax burden on cocoa producers, the extent of 
direct state investment, fall in private investment and anti-capitalist policies. 
In 1951, Dudley Seers26 and Claud Richard Ross arrived in the Gold Coast at the invitation of 
the Colonial Office to study and advice on the organisation and cost of building resources 
needed for development (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). The following year, Seers and Ross (1952) 
submitted their ‘Report on financial and physical problems of development in the Gold 
Coast’ with 3 key recommendations to the Colonial Office, specifically on the trajectory to 
 
26 Dudley Seers was a British Development Economist and a critic of the neoclassical approach to social 
development during the early post war period. He lectured at Oxford University, served in many capacities in 
the UN and was the Director of Institute of Development Studies, Sussex.   
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economic growth and development at the eve of decolonization. The report highlighted the 
challenges posed by (i) rising prices and inflation; (ii) lack of capital formation; (iii) and 
technological improvements, migration of labour from agriculture to industries (Seers and 
Ross, 1952). The CO and Nkrumah agreed on the overall findings of the report but also had 
their differences. The CO criticized the Report for its focus on pro-Keynesian ‘anti-austerity’ 
development models because it favoured spending to stimulate economic growth, but the 
office agreed for restrictions on cocoa producer prices to mitigate inflation. On the other hand 
Nkrumah disagreed with the report for being inadequate to his vision of accelerated economic 
development but favoured the idea for mobilisation of development capital through the 
implementation of cocoa producer price controls. In the period leading to independence, 
Nkrumah adopted a model of development similar to William Arthur Lewis27 idea that had 
been previously rejected by Colonial Office except for its rapidity, anti-privatization and 
capital constraints. Nkrumah advanced these ideas in anticipation of a sustainable cocoa tax 
revenue and foreign capital investment. However, the government’s economic policies 
generated resentment from foreign investors and cocoa producers.  
The analysis suggests that cocoa producer prices were restrained to the rate of price increases 
of imported commodities to mitigate inflationary trend for economic stability during periods 
of accelerated economic development. Given the lessons of the cocoa boom in 1948-49, 
Seers and Ross argued that as Ghana’s agro-based economy was fragile and prone to 
inflation, cocoa prices must be bridled to stabilize development efforts. This economic 
management was rational to avert inflation however, the depth and rapidity of its 
implementation was inappropriate because by over expropriating from the cocoa industry - 
 
27 Professor Arthur Lewis was a West Indian expert in Development Economics. He obtained his doctorate at 
the London School of Economics and a Fabian. He lectured at the LSE and University of Manchester. After 
Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah appointed Lewis as Ghana’s first economic advisor to help draw up the first 
Five-Year Development Plan. 
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the main economic sector - Nkrumah’s government missed the opportunity to establish the 
‘embedded market’ necessary enough for a developmental state. At the peak of this 
vampirism, cocoa farmers lost about 60 percent of their revenue to the state as export duties 
increased by 10 folds compared to 1950 figures. According to a state-owned newspaper (The 
Daily Graphic published on 2nd April 1951: 1) under the caption “1951 Budget, no increase 
in taxation”, the government planned to generate 80 percent of its estimated £20 million 
revenue from import duties, export duties and income tax. This high reliance on cocoa taxes 
for government revenue militated against the expansion of agriculture because it reduced the 
profit margins of the peasant farmers and made it difficult for them to accumulate surpluses 
for capital formation and reinvestment. Rodney (1972: 27) suggests that taxes per se do not 
provide for national wealth and development but the needed wealth for development has to be 
produced out of natural resources – agriculture, mining, exploration of energy and conversion 
of raw materials into finished products for human consumption. In his attempt to convince 
the farmers, Nkrumah argued that “we had to think of the general public as well as the cocoa 
farmers’, ‘the funds that accrued to the government would be used on expanding the 
economy of the country as a whole with special reference to agriculture” (Nkrumah, 1957: 
179). Although this appeal did not find favour with the cocoa farmers particularly in the 
Ashanti region, it did so with those in the Brong and Ahafo region who by tradition owed 
allegiance to the Asantehene (paramount chief of the Ashanti kingdom). To supress Ashanti 
resistance, Nkrumah introduced the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill 
in 1954 after only three days of deliberation in parliament. The bill imposed a five-year 
producer price ceiling of 72 shillings per 60 pounds load of cocoa. This infuriated the 
Ashantehene who led by his chief spokesperson, Bafuor Osei Akoto, demanded for a 
devolved administration for his jurisdiction. As tensions escalated, Nkrumah sought the 
support of the people of Brong and Ahafo to publicly support the bill. In return for their 
144 
 
loyalty Nkrumah assisted the people of Brong Ahafo to secede from the Ashanti hegemony 
by creating for them a new political region. The Ashantis retaliated by lending support to the 
National Liberation Movement (popularly known as ‘mati mihu’ translated from Akan 
language as ‘I have alienated myself’) consisted of members of the UGCC, defectors from 
the CPP and majority of Ashantis. The NLM opposed centralised authority and lent support 
to the coup that overthrew Nkrumah’s government about a decade later.  
Available evidence suggests that given the resistance by cocoa producers Nkrumah focused 
on withdrawals from Ghana’s external reserves instead of promotion of private investment. 
However, there are several inconsistencies in published figures on the financial standing of 
the Gold Coast (Killick, 1978: 102). According to the Daily Graphic (28th June,1951: 4-6) 
the Gold Coast’s balance sheet as prepared by the Bank of British West Africa acting as the 
Central Bank for the period ending 31st March, 1951 stood at a cash holding of £5,223,419; 
Money at call of £25,600,000; and an Overall balance of £65,595,347. But from 1956 to 1961 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated a net loss in reserves of US $ 176.5 million 
which when compared to Killick’s estimates of loss in external liquidity amounted to US $ 
109.5 million in 1961 (Killick, 1978: 102).  
Factors accounting for this financial standing consisted of huge expenditures on development 
projects, a £10 million Pan-African solidarity gesture to Guinea; and a £5.5 million 
government acquisition of British-owned gold companies on the London Stock Market. 
Given the financial standing of the Gold Coast, Nkrumah sought to attract foreign loans to 
mitigate the over-reliance on cocoa tax revenue but his relatively socialist political 
convictions was a setback to his efforts. Although the Russians and Chinese provided 
assistance it could not march that from the West. Foreign investors were alarmed about 
nationalisation of capitalist’s investments in socialist states following Lewis’s Report (1953) 
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on British sensitivities to possibilities for nationalisation of a large British – French 
shareholdings (the Suez Canal Company) by the Egyptian government of Abdel Nasser28 
which eventually occurred in 1956. 
Nkrumah made other initiatives to secure foreign assistance for development including a 
meeting with George McGhee29 in June 1951 to discuss possibility of financing the Volta 
hydro-electrification project but the visit ended without any concrete agreement. Everywhere 
Nkrumah went he was asked including, Trygve Lie30 to give reassurance that the CPP was 
free from communist influence. For instance, while introducing Nkrumah to Constantine 
Zichanko31 at the UN in 1951, Lie remarked humorously to Nkrumah “I expect he is the first 
Moscow agent you have ever met”, Nkrumah replied, “the suggestion was an imperialist 
bogey” (Daily Graphic, 8th June, 1951). Nkrumah was well known to the British and 
American intelligent agencies for his socialist disposition (Biney, 2009) and undoubtedly this 
guided the business advice given to potential investors at the high commissions and 
consulates. Moreover, under the 1951 Treaty of Paris, European states in alliance with the 
United States proscribed development assistance to nations with political connections to the 
East. Given this, the attitude and ambitions of Ghanaian leadership and its relations with 
other states were crucial to the success of the state-led economic programmes. 
 
28 Gamel Abdel Nasser was the president of Egypt and a Pan-African. As a socialist, he advocated for Arab unity 
and social justice. Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal and fought in the Arab-Israeli war. He served as the 
chairperson of the Organisation of African Unity (succeeded by Nkrumah), and Secretary General of the Non-
Aligned Movement. 
29 George McGhee was the American Assistant Secretary of State for African and Near Eastern Affairs in 
Washington in 1951. 
30 Trygve Halvdan Lie was a Norwegian politician, author diplomat and socialist. He joined the Norwegian 
Labour party and served as its foreign minister whilst in exile in London. He helped in drafting the provisions of 
the UN Security Council and was elected as the first United Nations Secretary-General (1946 - 1952). 
31 Constantine Zichanko was the Russian Assistant Secretary-General to the United Nations in 1951. 
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This was evident when Nkrumah proposed a five-year development programme (1951-1956) 
to modernize agriculture and set up local agro-based industries to process agricultural 
products for value added exports. Furthermore, the government’s efforts to establish state-led 
commercial ventures to compete with expatriate firms to accumulate economic surplus to the 
state rather than foreign capitalists did not appeal to the latter and their respective 
governments. Notable among the state’s initiatives were the Ghana Gold Mining Corporation, 
State Insurance Corporation and Ghana National Trading Corporation to compete alongside 
foreign companies. The effect was that although the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
expanded into various regions of the country for mass political support, the expatriate 
companies were more efficient (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). This idea caused anxiety to the 
colonial administration who had all along harboured the premonition that Nkrumah would 
one day nationalise foreign businesses to curtail the accumulation and repatriation of 
economic surpluses abroad. Objectively, it was impossible for Ghana to ‘eat her cake and 
have it’ because even though foreign investment ends up in the repatriation of economic 
surpluses to mother nations, it is indispensable to the development of Ghana and hence 
Nkrumah could have reconsidered how Ghana accommodated investors’ interests to those of 
Ghanaians. With the benefit of hindsight, Nkrumah’s capitulation to the idea of a mixed 
economy in negotiations with western investors for the Volta River hydroelectric project was 
to reassure foreign investors of his willingness to partner with the West in development but 
his innate antipathy towards western policies was too evident for the West to ignore. 
With large deposits of bauxite in Ghana, the British government in the 1920s thought of a 
scheme to construct the Akosombo dam to boost the Empire’s aluminium supplies. Albert 
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Kitson32 first conceived the idea of the dam to smelt bauxite deposits from the Kwahu plateau 
in the Eastern region for export. In 1951, Nkrumah revived this idea to the British but 
concealed his comprehensive economic plan about the dam. According to Kojo Botsio,33  
Nkrumah had for some time kept his real convictions about the dam from the British 
government because he feared that the British would sabotage the project to undermine the 
decolonization process. Sadly, the opposition party criticised the project as a dangerous trap 
by the British, over-ambitious and extravagant. The UGCC lobbied the British government to 
abandon the scheme and discourage the Americans from giving assistance. In a British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) documentary interview entitled ‘Black Power’, Kwesi 
Lamptey (UGCC member of parliament) summed up his party’s argument on the Volta 
Project when he stated with reference to the Akosombo dam, “as a long term scheme it is 
excellent but as a short term scheme, Mr Speaker it is suicidal, I would say no nation which is 
beginning to free itself puts its neck in a position in which it will find itself in economic 
slavery”. Nkrumah was indignant about the UGCC’s attitude towards the project and in 
defence remarked “we are not boys, do you think I am a fool to enter into a project like this 
blindly? I am not so damn silly to put my nose into something that is detrimental to this 
country”. In the end, the British government abandoned the project in 1956 citing financial 
constraints but it was clear the Volta project was politicised by Britain because its feat was 
deleterious to the Empire trade.  
In March 1952 Nkrumah invited Professor Arthur Lewis to the Gold Coast to assist in the 
formulation of an accelerated industrialisation programme that reflected the aspirations of the 
 
32 Sir Albert Ernest Kitson KBE, CMG (21 March 1868 – 8 March 1937) was a British - Australian geologist of 
world-wide repute. He was the first to recommend the Volta River Dam to the British government in 1915. 
33 Kojo Botsio (1916-2001) was a Pan-Africanist, diplomat, politician, and a confidant of Nkrumah. He served as 
the treasure of the West African National Secretariat and studied in Britain. On his return to the Gold Coast he 
served in many ministerial offices throughout Nkrumah’s administration. 
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CPP. The ‘Report on Industrialisation of the Gold Coast’ suggests an intensive agricultural 
programme aimed at adequate food production and capital for industrialisation, improvement 
of skills in the public services, and removal of inflationary bottlenecks (Lewis, 1955). In this 
report Lewis’s idea a decade earlier for a simultaneous stimulus of agriculture and 
industrialization was watered down to an agricultural programme that would act as the 
catalyst to industrialisation. The Report nevertheless supported the idea for improvements in 
road infrastructure to reduce transportation cost of agricultural products and make agriculture 
more profitable. Lewis’s theory holds that the expansion of a productive sector of the 
economy (agriculture) provides resources for industrialisation until equilibrium is attained to 
make agriculture as efficient and lucrative as related industries. However, Nkrumah’s vision 
for the ‘Big Push’ development had required perhaps his own theory of development, one 
that is distinct from the expert advice of Ross, Seers and Lewis. 
5.11 Colonial Dependency to Import Substitution Industrialization Development 
(1957-1966) 
On 6th March 1957 Ghana attained independence from British colonial administration and 
adopted import substitution industrialisation (ISI) development strategy to transform her 
economy into a modern industrialised state. The period of the post-independence Nkrumanist 
state is 1957-1966. It consisted of a quasi-independent state (1957-1960), republican state 
(1960-1964) and one-party state (1964-1966) with each delineating the powers vested in 
Nkrumah and its implication to development. Under the quasi-independent state the governor 
represented Her Majesty the Queen of England as the ceremonial head of state with Nkrumah 
as Prime Minister. On 27th April 1960, Ghanaians voted for a presidential executive 
alongside a referendum to abolish the monarchy system. The CPP won almost 90 percent in 
the elections. On 1st July 1960 Ghana became a republic by a new constitution. After a series 
of opposition to his ideas and assassination attempts on his life, Nkrumah sought for a 
149 
 
constitutional amendment to introduce a one-party state in 1964 and won a disputable 99 
percent to become an authoritarian president. 
Under the leadership of Nkrumah the government introduced a series of integrated but 
overlapping development programmes. The primary objectives of the Consolidated 
Development Plan (1957/58-1958/59); Second development plan (1959-1964) and the Seven 
- year Development Plan for National Reconstruction (1963/64-1969/70) were to eliminate (i) 
imports of consumer goods; (ii) support import substitution industries; and (iii) shift control 
of the economy from private expatriate to state-directed control. These objectives were to be 
achieved through (i) Quantitative Import Restrictions; (ii) Import Tariffs and (iii) Domestic 
Price Controls policies. However, these models were unsavoury to British interest because a 
successful outcome would have served as precedent for emerging states to replicate and 
reinvigorate their travail for independence. Nkrumah was relatively socialist and emerging 
sovereign states suspected of communist inclinations were unattractive to foreign capitalists 
for fear of nationalisation and expansion of communist ideology (CO/554/202). Therefore to 
tame emerging states, Europe deeply politicised and held back development through neo-
colonial policies.  
On 31st January, 1957, the House in Committee of the British Parliament chaired by the 10th 
Earl of Drogheda34 debated the Ghana Independence Bill and made consequential 
modifications to Clause (3) without consulting the Ghana government. The amendment 
proscribed newly independent states from having access to colonial development assistance. 
Paragraph (3) (1) : states that “No scheme shall be made on or after the appointed day under 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, 1940 to 1955, wholly or partly for the benefit of 
 
34 Henry Charles Ponsonby Moore, 10th Earl of Drogheda was an Anglo-Irish official of the Foreign Office, 
London. He served as Speaker of the House of Lords (1946 -1957) among other distinguished capacities. 
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Ghana”. Furthermore, amendments to the Ghana Independence Bill paragraph (3) (2) directed 
that “Any scheme in force under the said Acts immediately before the appointed day which 
was made solely for the benefit of Ghana or any part thereof shall cease to have effect on that 
day without prejudice to the making of payments in pursuance of that scheme on or after that 
day in respect of any period falling before that day; ....” (HL Deb 31 January 1957). 
However, Lord Ogmore bemoaned the parochial attitude of the British government towards 
Ghana with the proverbial narrative of a Victorian father’s farewell to his son that states, 
"Well, my boy, you are twenty-one. Here is £50 and a gold watch. Just take yourself off and 
make your own way in the world" (HL Deb 31 January 1957).  The researcher alludes that 
the urgency to curtail development assistance to newly independent states such as Ghana 
rendered communist states and ideologies attractive to nascent states in SSA. The sensitivities 
of Nkrumah about politicisation of development was vindicated. In particular, the rejection of 
an application made by Kojo Botsio (Minister of Trade) to the Colonial Development 
Corporation (hereafter abbreviated as CDC) for a cement clinker factory in partnership with a 
well-known British cement company caused indignation in parliament. In response to the 
CDC’s action, the representative of the cement company expressed in parliament, “We are 
amazed at your news that you have been instructed not to proceed with any new Gold Coast 
scheme during the period of six months preceding independence. It is galling that the Gold 
Coast authorities and the others concerned in this scheme can justly feel that they have been 
let down because of the close association of the British Government with your Company” 
(HL Deb 31 January 1957). In his effort to depoliticise development assistance to Ghana, 
Lord Ogmore asked the British parliament "Why not leave this matter to the Colonial 
Development Corporation?" (HL Deb 05 February 1957). Being astute but hypocritical, the 
British government replaced the CDC with the Commonwealth Development Finance 
Company Limited to insulate itself from criticism and to put in place stricter directives by 
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which the company could provide development finance to private enterprise. Geoffrey De 
Freitas35 suggests that since independence Ghana had only received £2.25 million 
Commonwealth Assistance Loans for the Black Star Line and £5 million Assistance Loan for 
the Volta River Project (De Freitas, 1963). 
Given the position of the British government, Nkrumah approached the United States and 
reached a deal with Kaiser Aluminium, a major American aluminium company for the 
construction of the Akosombo hydro-electric dam. Under the agreement the Volta 
Aluminium Company (VALCO), a subsidiary of Kaiser would use electricity from the dam to 
smelt its aluminium and Ghana would have the rest of generated hydro-electricity. Burke 
Knapp36 suggests that electricity was a necessary condition for development in Ghana and in 
June, 1960 the World Bank approved a £30 million loan but cautioned against the low tariff 
rate Kaiser paid to Ghana as inadequate for the proposed take-off. Nkrumah wanted the dam 
for industrialisation and Kaiser was the means to build the dam because with Kaiser’s letter 
of intention the IMF would advance the loan for the project (a win-win scenario). This 
researcher finds out that Kaiser and Nkrumah had concealed their individual intentions to 
outwit each other in the negotiations. Nkrumah had anticipated that subsequent to the deal 
VALCO would rely on Ghanaian bauxite to generate additional revenue for the government. 
However, according to Ron Sullivan and Lloyd Cutler (Kaiser’s solicitors for the Volta 
Project) Kaiser had been very concerned that Nkrumah could easily nationalise VALCO if 
the company became profitable out of using local-based bauxite hence their decision to 
import bauxite for its aluminium production (Pandora Box, BBC documentary).  
 
35 Geoffrey De Freitas (1913-1982) was the Labour MP for Nottingham Central (1945-50). He was trained as a 
barrister and served in the army before entering into the diplomatic service and served as the British High 
Commissioner to Ghana (1961-1964). 
36 Joseph Burke Knapp Senior was the Vice President of the World Bank (1956-78) and a career economist. He 
graduated from Stanford and Oxford Universities. 
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5.12 The Decline of the Vampire State  
The four main factors related to the economic decline in the 1960s consisted of (i) bad 
macroeconomic management policies; (ii) fall in cocoa prices; (iii) the attitude of Nkrumah; 
and (iv) external sabotage. First, as part of the ISI development the government introduced a 
series of policies to discourage imports and encourage exports. Import licencing, trade 
legislations, competition and nationalisation were to mention a few introduced by the 
Nkrumah government. Imports were subjected to licencing requirements but the restriction 
was ineffective because public officials were corrupted by capitalist merchants to engage in 
public procurements of inferior goods at under costs. In addition, the strong demand for 
foreign goods in the absence of homemade quality products resulted in demand-pull 
inflationary scenarios. While attempts to nationalise foreign industries were populist-
motivated, they were unsuccessful because the extractive, banking, insurance, civil engineer, 
and construction sectors, as well as petroleum imports from BP and Shell all required 
intensive capital investments that were unfeasible for the Ghana Government to unilaterally 
handle (De Freitas, 1963). In 1962, the government legislated restrictions to limit the area 
size of extractive concessions with special powers to the Minister of Justice to summon 
violators to appear before a tribunal. However, with lack of proper legal safeguards for 
foreign investment, Ghana became unattractive to foreign capital. To restore confidence in 
the economy the government legislated the Capital Investment Act in 1963 to set out and 
legitimise the criteria for, protection of, and incentives for investors. This Act was a model 
effort by a developing state to open up opportunities for private investment and development. 
In the estimation of De Freitas (1963), “it meets every test that I have ever discussed for 
protection for investors from the developed countries in the developing counties” (De Freitas, 
1963: 293). Ghana needed foreign investment to save her economy from decline and develop 
because there was hardly real possibility of transforming the economy of Ghana from its 
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peasant state to an industrialized one without the existence of foreign capital resources 
generated out of savings or loans (Lewis, 1953). 
Second, the fall in cocoa prices was not anticipated during the 1960s. On 29th May 1963, a 
state-owned newspaper in a glimpse of hope published that the IMF was optimistic of 
Ghana’s economic recovery to reduce its trade deficit from £23 million in 1962 to £4million 
in 1963 (The Times, 1963). However, in 1964 the world market prices of cocoa fell whilst the 
Akosombo dam was still under construction and other programmes were suspended to 
provide funds to complete the dam. The price fall caused the export ratio of cocoa to gross 
domestic product almost to half from its 1957 level of 13.8 percent to 7.7 percent in 1966, 
and the net reserve to GDP for the same period to decrease from 25.9 percent to -1.8 percent 
(Frimpong-Ansah,1992). It would be recalled that during a cabinet meeting with senior 
officials of the Bank of Ghana in 1965, Frimpong-Ansah, then Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of Ghana, personally informed Nkrumah that Ghana’s reserve was at its lowest with only 
£0.5million, to draw the president’s attention to the capital constraint to the accelerated 
development ambitions. 
Third, Nkrumah was a person of interest to western intelligence agencies for his relatively 
socialist stance and anti-capitalistic sentiments. In the events of the cold war, Nkrumah 
resented British expectation for political support from her colonies with his famous rhetoric 
“we face neither east nor west, we face forward”. Yet, being non-aligned implied the 
substitution of Western contacts with Eastern ones consequently had economic implications 
(De Freitas, 1963) but this did not happen because aid from the East were not sustainable at 
that time. Indeed the political dictum of Nkrumah reignited western sensitivities about his 
admiration of socialist leaders hence the economic and political retributions against his 
government. However, Lewis, et al, (1951: 28-29) had urged the British government to 
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demonstrate real understanding to the main problems of Africa, and distinguish African 
nationalism from Communism, as failure to do this effectively compounded the problems. 
This was the case in many African colonies where nationalist movements were mistaken for 
communist sympathizers. By 1965, Nkrumah’s relations with western governments took a 
turn for the worse. A US $35 million aid package was cancelled for the publication of his 
book ‘Neo-colonialism the last stage of imperialism’ in 1965 (Nkrumah, 1965; Sherwood, 
1999; Biney, 2009). This was followed by complicity of America, British and French 
governments in the assassination attempts in 1964 and the February 1966 coup. In a BBC 
archival documentary, ‘Black Power – Pandora Box’, Bill Mahoney (US Ambassador to 
Ghana, 1962-65) narrated how Nkrumah had wept while asking him why the Americans were 
doing this (sponsorship assassination attempts, cancellation of aid, and support for the 
opposition) to him (Nkrumah). In addition, John Stockwell (CIA officer in West Africa, 
1966) asserts that Howard Banes (CIA Station Chief in Accra, 1966) was recalled to 
Washington and promoted for engineering the overthrow of the Nkrumah government 
(Stockwell, 1984). According to John Stockwell – the former head of CIA, Angola Task 
Force, the position of US foreign policy in Africa during the late 1960s was aimed to 
sabotage activities of African liberation movements because the movement’s success 
reverberated in another parts of the colonies (Stockwell, 1978: 285). Nkrumah was not 
exempted from this policy as declassified CIA information confirms how the United States, 
British and French intelligence agencies provided support to senior officers of the Ghana 
Army and Police to stage the coup that overthrew Nkrumah. June Milne, the executrix of 
Nkrumah, who provided unmediated narratives of the political and personal life of Nkrumah 
(from his days of exile in Conakry to his death in Bucharest on 27th April, 1972) confirms 
the complacence of the West (Biney, 2009: 84). 
155 
 
Basically, no state can make claim to its sovereignty when other states control its industries, 
trade and social relations with other states. The 5-Year Development Plan (1959-1964) aimed 
at infrastructural development and agricultural modernisation while the 7-Year Development 
(1964 – 1970) also referred to as ‘Work and Happiness’ aimed to develop Ghana into a self-
reliant modern industrialised state in which everyone would have sufficient for their needs 
but these were politicised. At the heart of this programme was the Akosombo hydroelectric 
dam project inaugurated in January 1966 just a month before Nkrumah’s overthrow. This 
ended the industrialisation ambitions and reverted Ghana into a global capitalist system of 
trade and underdevelopment. Killick (1978) suggests that while the Volta Project proved 
economically viable, many state owned ventures were run on political rather than economic 
importance. 
In summary, the historiopolitical events of the late 1940s was in response to the economic 
crisis brought into being by a protracted period of colonial underdevelopment. Nkrumah had 
the best opportunity to transform Ghana into a modern industrialised state and was genuinely 
committed to this but failed to properly place the interest of capitalists alongside the interest 
of the people of Ghana for socioeconomic development. In so doing, Ghana missed her 
greatest opportunity so far to become a model developmental state for Africa. Nevertheless, 
the experiences of the ‘vampire state’ provide important lessons for African opinion leaders, 
politicians, development enthusiasts, policy makers, development actors and donors in the 








Chapter Six – Developments in the immediate post Nkrumah era of 1966 to 1972 
Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of 
foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid. – 
H.J. Morgenthau, 1960 (foreword to G. Liska). 
6.1 Introduction 
It is conspicuous from the previous chapter on Ghana’s development that while the motive 
and passion of Nkrumah for development were authentic, the final outcome of his policies 
and economic strategies deepened the economic problems that was inherited. In furthering 
the development ambitions of Nkrumah’s government it exhausted Ghana’s foreign reserves 
of about £200m (as at independence) and incurred external debts of about £400m as at 1966 
(FCO 65/130). The contributory factors to the financial situation consisted of: (i) the rapid 
industrialisation programme of the early 1960s; and (ii) sharp decrease of the world cocoa 
market price (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). Given the economic conditions that followed, 
successive governments became reliant on the UK Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
literally called AID, as supplementary to government revenue for development and with it 
came the opportunity for the conceptual Western influence to government policies and 
control Ghana’s resources from abroad. The aid discourse is broad, in-depth and beyond the 
scope of this chapter. It concerns the concepts, definitions, types, ideologies, myths, critics, 
contradictions, realities, goals, motives, benefits, harms, ownership, control, formulation, 
implementation, responsibilities and series of unanswered questions (Bauer, 1981; Bauer, 
2004; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009; and Foreman, 2012). The relevance of aid in this chapter 
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is limited to as far as it helps to understand the political economy of decline and development 
in Ghana from 1966 to 1972. 
In critically examining the economic development of Ghana during the immediate post-
Nkrumah era, it is natural to expect the British government to have led in mobilising aid, 
grants and technical assistance from the industrialised states known to have benefitted from 
the imperial trade system. Such initiatives could have mitigated the effects of colonial 
exploitation and assisted Ghana’s economy to take-off in expanding industries and promoting 
good governance. However, this was not the case because the development thinking of 
London and Accra were at opposing ends.  
This chapter focuses on a critical examination of the development efforts and challenges of 
the National Liberation Council (NLC) and Progress Party (PP) governments. I argue that 
although Ghana attained political freedom on 6th March 1957, it was not economically 
independent from the control and influence of the West. The development thinking and 
purpose of aid donors guide the formulation of public policies funded by foreign loans and by 
this reshapes the implementation of development in Ghana. This resonates with the 
suggestion of David Dacko37 at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 that 
Africans must recognise that the colonial power has not departed from Africa and would 
deploy every means to influence policies in Africa because it had not left willingly 
(www.nepad.org). I put forward that aid in its various forms are used as economic tools by 
developed states to influence the economy and politics of underdeveloped African states 
balkanised by Anglo and Franco prefixes. Accordingly, the chapter is structured into three 
main sections. The first section takes a constructive look at the aid and development 
 
37 David Dacko - the First President of the Central African Republic (14 August 1960 – 1 January 1966) and third 
President (21 September 1979 to 1 September 1981). 
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discourse with particular reference to underdeveloped states. The second and final sections 
provide critical examinations of the economic and political developments under the NLC 
military-police regime (1966-1969); and the PP constitutional government of the Second 
Republic (1969-1972) respectively. The politics of aid is relevant to the development of 
Ghana during 1966 and 1972 because by and large, all heads of governments in Ghana 
(except Rawlings) travelled to the UK and allies for development aid within the first few 
months of assuming office. 
The post-Nkrumah period commenced with the overthrow of Nkrumah’s government in a 
military coup by the NLC on February 24th 1966. The coup, the first of its kind in sub-
Saharan Africa was executed with the complicity of the British, American and French 
governments who at that time were very concerned about Nkrumah’s affiliation with the 
Eastern bloc and the possibilities of the spread of communism in Africa (Biney, 2009). 
Although many scholars consider the politics of aid as a novel phenomenon (Morgenthau, 
1962; McKinley and Little, 1977), it has been used centuries ago, especially by rival states to 
reward or punish allies and defectors respectively. The timing of the coup (barely a month 
after Nkrumah had commissioned the Akosombo hydroelectric dam, the hub of his 
industrialisation programme) supports the argument about Western determination to maintain 
control of Ghana’s resources and punish governments that cause obstacle to imperialist 
objectives. It could be argued that given the economic prospects of China and East Asian 
states (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) Ghana would have adapted the East 
Asian development model and transform into a developmental state had her sovereignty been 
respected by the regime changers.  
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6.2 Perspectives on Official Development Assistance in Ghana 
By the mid-1960s the development thinking of many Ghanaians had shifted from dependency 
to modernisation idea of import substitute industrialisation. However, the industrialisation 
dream was stalled by lack of domestic capital due to fall in the prices of the main exports and 
the government’s inability to raise enough income taxes for development. Granted this, 
foreign aid (loans, debt rearrangements, technical assistance) became indispensable for 
development, and with it was the control of Ghana’s economic resources and internal politics 
by creditor states - donors. As a former British colony, Ghana received much of her aid from 
the UK. This was organised through the Oversea Development Administration, currently 
Department for International Development (DfID) under the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO). 
Basically, the politics of the ODA is grounded in three main competing schools of thought 
beginning with those who argue that: (i) aid is beneficial to the development of 
underdeveloped states; (ii) to aid is destructive to development; and (iii) finally the need for 
alternative ways to make aid more effective and beneficial to donors and beneficiaries. First, 
the Development Economist, Jeffrey Sachs (2005), in his book; ‘The End of Poverty: How 
can we make it happen in our lifetime’ argues as many African leaders would do, for a 
redoubling of aid efforts to help developing states out of underdeveloped conditions. Sachs 
believes that economic development requires investment capital and given the economic 
conditions in many developing states, it is nearly impossible for developing states to achieve 
economic growth without initial assistance from developed states. Granted that Sach’s 
proposition is accepted, one could argue that the politicisation of foreign aid by donors 
negatively affected Ghana’s development in the immediate post-Nkrumah period. However, 
the pro-Sach idea is challenged for its implication to poverty and imperialist control. Thus as 
the underdeveloped states become dependent on aid, donor states seize the opportunity to 
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control the latter’s resources and internal politics in subtle ways. The second perspective, as 
authored in William Easterly’s (2006) ‘The White Man’s Burden: why the West’s efforts to 
aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good’; suggests that aid is part of the economic 
problems of developing states because it has proved ineffective. Recipient states remain in 
poverty in spite of the many initiatives taken to address the problems of underdeveloped 
states. Easterly argues for policy makers and development planners to revisit the subject to 
mitigate the protracted problem of poverty. The third perspective as in Moyo (2009), argues 
for alternative means of financing economic development and growth without overreliance 
on aid. Moyo suggests that the absence of stronger and appropriate safeguards within the aid 
industry, has submitted aid to corruption, conflicts and protracted poverty. Similarly, Riddell 
(2007) recognises the benefits of aid but argues for reforms in relation to the way aid is 
delivered to make it more effective. While Sach and Easterly seem to share the same object 
of reducing poverty in underdeveloped states their ideas and approaches are converse to each 
other. The last group, the centrists, to use the proverbial saying avoid throwing away the baby 
with the dirty water, argue for aid to genuinely focus on development in underdeveloped 
states. In spite of their distinct but related ideas the trilogy of ideas have not provided us with 
straight answers to the dilemma that confront development planners, policy makers, donors 
and recipients in decision-making and implementation of aid and development. 
The philosophy, goals and purpose of aid, help in shaping aid policy and its implementation 
(Van Der Veen, 2011). For instance, development aid influences government decisions to 
improve standards of living whilst educational grants and humanitarian aid are assigned to 
improve knowledge and provide relief respectively. On the other hand, aid can engender 
conflicts of interest in cases where the donor’s objectives are different from the interest of the 
beneficiary. In addition, aid contributes to conditions of economic dependency, external 
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indebtedness, societal conflicts, corruption, political instability, poverty and expansionism. 
Moyo (2009) suggests that “Aid has been, and continues to be, an unmitigated political, 
economic and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the developing world”. While this is 
true in some cases, aid has also provided short-term relief in many developing states. 
Therefore, the aid discourse needs not be confined to whether aid works or not, but rather 
about the circumstance and reforms needed to make aid more effective for developing states 
such as Ghana. As an important economic tool of political influence, foreign aid has reshaped 
the political economy of Ghana in many ways.  
Contrary to the notion that aid represents a benevolent act by one state to the other, in reality 
aid is a form of loan. Aid consists of debt renegotiation/reschedule/relief, technical 
assistance, and trade concessions. Its forms and roles are relevant to the understanding of the 
political economy and development trends because it determines the state’s capacity to 
perform its roles effectively. As Busia rightly stated at the 24th session of the UN General 
Assembly, “It seems clear to us that the international strategy for development, which is 
being so carefully worked out for the coming decade, should be backed by firm undertakings 
in the area of international cooperation in trade and finance.…The multilateral organisation 
and co-ordination of aid had established its merits beyond doubt and it is our hope that it will 
be reflected in the aid policies of the donor countries” (FCO 65/129). The three main types of 
aid are: the humanitarian or emergency (mobilised and distributed through the state and 
recognised bodies to mitigate the effects of disasters and human suffering); charity (sourced 
and disbursed mainly by non-governmental organisations to help underprivileged individuals 
and groups); and systematic aid - payments made to the recipient state from donor states or 
supra-states such as the World Bank (Moyo, 2009). While aid represents the aggregate of 
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concessional loans and grant, the latter does not attract repayment of capital or interest 
because it is ‘free money’. 
Through an in-depth content examination of official correspondences and declassified 
documents on foreign aid to Ghana, this study discovers that all the regimes in Ghana have 
depended on foreign aid from the West for development and legitimacy since independence. 
This undermines the sovereignty of Ghana as donors use subtle ways to interfere in local 
politics and control resources to their advantage within the context of neo-colonialism 
(Nkrumah, 1965). Sovereignty, according to John Stuart Mills (1865) requires ‘non-
interventionist’ relations among states that allows free states the liberty to initiate their own 
change without external ‘unsolicited’ interference. He wrote, “In fact, of course, not every 
independent state is free, but the recognition of sovereignty is the only way we have of 
establishing an arena … As with individuals, so with sovereign states: there are things that we 
cannot do to them, even for their own ostensible good” (Mill, as paraphrased in Walzer, 
1977: 89). Thus sovereign state must have the right to self-determination based on their own 
political structure, culture, social and development. However, since ‘absolute’ sovereignty is 
an abstraction rather than actual, there is the need to balance the competing interests of 
donors and recipients in the spirit of Karl Polanyi’s treatise ‘The Great Transformation’ 
(1957).  
This study recognises the challenges of this approach because while it is difficult for the West 
to shift from the dependency idea there is the need for donors and recipient states to 
politically engage as equal partners in addressing the problems of underdeveloped states. Aid 
to Ghana was owned and controlled by donor states. Johnson (2005) suggests that the 
ownership and control of aid relate to a particular state’s right to choose the policies to 
implement; and acceptance to take responsibility for its implementation. Against this 
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background, Whitley (2008: 27-44) defines ‘ownership’ as “the degree of control recipient 
governments are able to secure over implemented outcomes”. By this, the three dimensions 
of deciding aid and assuming ownership and control are structured into aid decided by 
recipient state without donor interest; aid decided in collaboration with donors; and aid 
prescribed by donors for recipients. Despite the contesting perspectives (Whitfield, 2009; 
Van der Veen, 2011), it is important not to be detained here by the puzzles of aid politics but 
to take a brief view of aid in Ghana.  
6.3 The first military government of Ghana under the NLC - 1966 to 1969 
On 24th February 1966 some senior officers of the Ghana Armed Forces and Police Service 
cited the economic setbacks to the Nkrumah government as reasonable excuse to overthrow 
the CPP government. The coup was plotted by two comprador bourgeoisies - Lieutenant 
General (then Colonel) E. K. Kotoka38 and Brigadier (then Major) A. A. Afrifa39- and carried 
out by a small section of the army and police with the full knowledge of Western intelligence 
agencies. Thereafter, Afrifa and Kotoka invited Lieutenant General J. A. Ankrah to head the 
NLC. Membership of the NLC was limited to four senior military officers and four senior 
police officers40. By 1965, a few senior military and police officers were under investigation 
 
38 Lieutenant General Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka hails from the Ewe tribe of the Volta region. He served in the 
army from 1947–1967 and was the Commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade (now Northern Command) in 
Kumasi, Ashanti Region. Kotoka and Afrifa were the main architects of the 1966 military coup nicknamed 
‘operation cold chop’ meaning an easy operation. In April 1967 Kotoka was killed by Lt. Moses Yeboah at the 
forecourt of the Kotoka International Airport (KIA) in an abortive coup attempt possibly to re-instate Nkrumah.    
39 Brigadier Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa, aka ‘okatakyie’ the Akan version of ‘hero’ – a royal title awarded to him 
by the Asantehene for his bravery in the military coup. Afrifa served as the Staff Officer in charge of Training 
and Operations of the 2nd Infantry Brigade under Colonel Kotoka; member of the NLC and the third head of 
state (2 April 1969 – 7 August 1970). He was executed on 26th June 1979 by firing squad in the June 4th 
uprising on charges of corruption, and suspicion of inciting a countercoup. 
40 NLC membership - Lt. Gen. Joseph Arthur Ankrah - Chairman of the NLC and Head of State (February 24, 
1966 – April 2, 1969). Mr. John Willie Kofi Harlley (Inspector General of Police) - Vice Chairman of the NLC. 
Brigadier Afrifa - Chairman of the NLC and Head of State (April 3, 1969 – October 1, 1969).Lt. Gen. Emmanuel 
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for corruption. Yet, the integrity of the aforementioned officers and their true motives for the 
coup need not detain us here. 
6.4 Political freedom without Economic independence 
After the overthrow of the CPP, Ghanaians revisited the discourse about the sequence and 
substance of political independence and economic sovereignty. While some question the 
benefits and implications of political freedom without economic independence, others argue 
that the political is an imperative antecedent to the economic. For instance, in May 1963, 
Nkrumah made a public pronouncement to the effect that “African unity is, above all, a 
political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic 
development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way round” 
(www.nefad.org). The independence of Ghana, like other former colonies, was a shift from 
the colonial to the neo-colonial project and by this the control over African resources and 
development policies changed hands from being under the direct control of the conceptual 
West to its proxy establishments. Through the Bretton Woods establishments – International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, also known as the World Bank), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Trade Organization (ITO) powerful 
states have accorded unto themselves the ‘divine’ obligation to interfere in the affairs of 
underdeveloped independent states and influence policies to control resources. Whether by 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts or the activities of Bretton Wood 
establishments, the British government have acted as though Ghana is under her tutelage. 
From the Bretton Woods institution agenda of the 1940s; to the Marshall Plan of the 1950s 
for Western Europe and Japan reindustrialisation effort; the industrialization decade in the 
 
Kwasi Kotoka (February 24, 1966 – April 17, 1967). Mr. Bawa Andani Yakubu (Deputy Commissioner of Police). 
Lieutenant General Albert Kwesi Ocran. Mr. Anthony K. Deku (Commissioner of Police, Criminal Investigations 
Department). Mr. J.E.O. Nunoo (Commissioner of Police, Administration). 
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1960s; to the aid-poverty dictum of the 1970s; to the economic recovery and stabilization 
through structural adjustment program of the 1980s; to democratization and good governance 
of the 1990s, the World Bank, IMF and ITO have maintained control of the economy and 
politics of underdeveloped states through aid, trade policies, and debt management (Moyo, 
2009). Though the actual roles of the World Bank and IMF were to facilitate capital 
investment for reconstruction and management of the global financial system respectively, 
they have come to occupy centre-stage in the development of African states in general, and 
Ghana in particular. That the political independence of Ghana was not attained in its true 
sense is the logical claim of this chapter because the stability of every post-colonial 
government in Ghana has depended on its subservience to former colonialist and proxy 
establishments.  
With an average economic growth rate of 6 percent and a foreign reserve of about £200 
million as at independence, Ghana was in a better position for economic prosperity. But by 
1966, the growth rate of GDP had fallen from its 1960 level of 8.8 percent through to 1.4 
percent in 1965 to zero in 1966 (Attafua, 1972; Aryeetey and Kanbur, 2007). Given this, 
external debts increased and eroded investors’ confidence. This was as the result of a 
combination of economic factors – fall in world price of cocoa, corruption of public officials, 
overreliance on suppliers’ credits and mismanagement – during the early 1960s that almost 
grounded the economy to a halt. By 1965, national debt was estimated at £400 million, with 
the balance of payment deficit well above £80 million (Aluko, 1975). 
Following the February 1966 coup the NLC attempted but failed to repudiate contracts 
entered into by the Nkrumah government. It may be recalled that Nkrumah’s administration 
accumulated huge debts out of unscrupulous contracts characterised by invoice padding 
systems and shoddy products. For instance in 1964, the Government of Ghana under 
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Nkrumah entered into contract with a Glasgow firm (Yarrow and Company) for the 
construction of ten frigates at a total cost of £4.l million (revised to £4.75m in 1968). Of this 
amount the Ghana government was required to pay ten percent deposit while the UK 
government provided a ten year loan for the remaining ninety percent (FCO 65/128). When 
the NLC government attempted to repudiate the contract in 1966, the British government 
cautioned the NLC of the consequences thereof - including a £3million cancellation fee 
(almost 75% of total cost). The subject of repudiation nearly evoked diplomatic tension 
between the two governments in 1966 though the construction was projected to complete in 
June 1968. This thesis discovers that the vessels were of substandard quality because Yarrow 
and Co. informed the Ghana Government few months before completion that it would cost 
over £50,000 initially plus annual charges to remedy deterioration and maintenance of the 
vessels. In spite of this, Yarrow and Co. relied on the British government to enforce a 
contract that was not value for money.  
On realising the consequences of repudiation, the NLC government made political and 
economic shifts to attract foreign investment from the West. In doing so, the NLC suspended 
the 1960 constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, proscribed the CPP and affiliate 
organisations, severed diplomatic relations with the East, shutdown uneconomic state-owned 
commercial and industrial ventures, promoted private enterprises, liberalised the external 
sector, implemented monetary policies as directed by the IMF, devalued the Ghanaian cedi to 
promote trade and attract foreign investment, and introduced a Two Year Development Plan 
in 1968 primarily to reverse the Nkrumah legacy (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). 
In response, the UK government influenced creditor states to restore trade relations, raise 
world cocoa price, offer food aid, and approved the 1966 and 1968 debt rescheduled 
agreements to give a buffer to the economic crisis. For instance on 22nd October 1966,  
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David Williams, a correspondent of The Times (a Ghanaian newspaper), reported that there 
was no doubt the NLC government was assisted in its development programme by the 
average increase in world cocoa prices of more than £200 per ton. Furthermore, the rise in 
cocoa prices in the immediate years that followed reached well above £400 per ton, as 
compared to £120-£130 in the 1965-66 Nkrumah period. Cocoa fob price in cedis per tonne 
rose from £262 in 1965 to £818 in 1969 (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 184). However, these 
fortunes and the strategies adopted by the NLC did not go far enough to improve foreign 
capital investment for development, create adequate jobs or stabilise inflation. Hence the 
enthusiasm with which the NLC was welcomed withered. Developed states have enormous 
influence in determining the prices of imports and exports of developing state, the economy 
and politics in furtherance of imperialism. The notion that trade is an economic weapon that 
is relied upon by dominant states to control and influence the policies of less dominant states 
renders underdeveloped states vulnerable to neo-colonialism.  
6.5 Industrial relations and legitimacy of the NLC government 
The NLC regime attempted to address the external debt issue at home by resetting its 
relations with organised labour to increase production but their authoritarian approach 
suffered a setback. After the overthrow of Nkrumah, the NLC reversed the existing industrial 
relations between the state and unionised bodies. The regime incarcerated some leaders of the 
Trade Union Congress because of their close relations with the CPP. In doing so, the 
leadership of the TUC and its activities were placed under surveillance and fear. To further 
assert its authority over the working class, the NLC appointed its favoured candidate, 
Benjamin A. Bentum, as the Secretary-General of the TUC and tasked him with the 
reorganisation of unionised labour. Bentum superintended over all workers union and ensured 
that changes were made to their constitutions and bye-laws to put pressure of national unions 
in taking key decisions such as amendments of their constitutions to favour government 
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policies (Arthiabah and Mbiah, 1995). Within some of these constitutions, union leaders were 
prevented from engaging in partisan politics. In 1967, the TUC was further weakened by the 
annulment of the Civil Services Act of 1960 that hitherto conferred automatic membership of 
the TUC on all civil servants. The restrictions reduced their membership and source of 
funding their activities. Meanwhile, the conditions of the external debt rearrangement implied 
that the NLC commit workers to austerity programmes even though it negatively impacted on 
its embeddedness with the working class. The implications of the austerity were that many 
middle and working class employees of state-owned enterprises set up during the Nkrumah 
era were retrenched, external trade was liberalised, and employees bargaining power 
diminished because of the high unemployment exacerbated by decrease in government 
recurrent and capital expenditures. The austerity resulted in physical tensions and ideological 
deadlocks between the NLC and unionised workers to the extent that lives were lost through 
clashes between industrial workers and law enforcement agencies. For instance, an 
antagonistic industrial relations between the NLC and unionised labour during 1966 and 1969 
led to a record number of 158 strikes involving about 94,741 employees (Arthiabah and 
Mbiah, 1995). While some of these strike proved fatal - three (3) miners were killed during 
industrial strike action involving some 6,500 miners in March 1969 – others resulted in 
severe trauma, decreased productivity and loss of confidence in the state’s ability to engage 
constructively with the unionised labour. With this trend, the TUC formed the opinion that 
unlike the CPP government, the NLC was focused on serving the interest of the IMF at the 
detriment of the working class. But more importantly was the fact that the NLC did little to 
create jobs for the people. 
In February 1966 the CPP government left behind 47 non-agriculture state owned ventures 
and four large private-public joint ventures in the production of cement, textile and tobacco 
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(Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). Of this number, the NLC sold off the commercial interest of the 
state in a few but retreated from the blanket privatisation trajectory because of resentment 
from the universities and other pressure groups mainly in the urban areas. Consequently, the 
NLC watered down its ambitions and established four state-owned economic ventures in the 
areas of produce, marketing and exports. The liberal market initiatives of the NLC aimed at 
the liberalisation and stabilisation of the economy rather left behind series of economic 
burdens that had to be resolved by the Busia administration. In doing so the NLC could not 
reverse the big-push theory of the Nkrumah government and populist dream. This resonates 
with the rapid industrialisation aspiration of the people to make up for the protracted period 
of colonial underdevelopment. In 1967, Afrifa alluded to this truism when he wrote with 
hindsight that “the irony of the present situation in Ghana is that it is quite possible that 
President Nkrumah and the CPP would command the support of a majority of the electorate 
… in genuinely free elections” (Afrifa,1967: 124).This present study puts forward that the 
development plans of the NLC government did not necessarily result in the realisation of its 
economic objectives because the economic development of Ghana is intrinsically linked to, 
and determined by western economies. Nevertheless, the NLC with the connivance of the 
British, American and French governments succeeded in ending Nkrumah’s political career 
but not his dreams of economic development. 
6.6 Political and Constitutional trajectories towards the 2nd Republic of Ghana 
In November 1966 the Ankrah-led NLC military government appointed a 17 member 
Constitutional Commission41 under the chairmanship of Justice Edward Akufo-Addo42 
 
41 The other members were: High court judge Adumua-Bossman; Dr Hilla Limann; Dr EVC de Graft-Johnson; 
Adam Amandi; A.S.Y.Andoh, M.K.Apaloo; Nene Azzu Mate Kole; Barrister WEA Ofori-Atta; Barrister Saki Sheck; 
Barrister Akua Asabea Ayisi, B.A.Bentum; J.A.Briamah; A.Karbo; Dr F.K.Fiawo; B.D.G. Forson; and D.J.Buahin; 
42 Edward Akufo-Addo - Father of the current President of the Republic of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-
Addo. Edward married Adeline Y. Akufo-Addo (née Nana Yeboakua Ofori-Atta), daughter of Nana Sir Ofori-
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(Twumasi, 1968: 44) to prepare a draft constitution that reflects 3 main democratic concepts 
– (i) views of the public; (ii) separation of powers of the arms of government; and (iii) 
inalienable rights of the individual. In submitting the draft in January 1968, the commission 
recommended for a National Assembly of 140 parliamentarians and a ceremonial president. 
In November 1968, the NLC set up a 150 member Constituent Assembly. Of this 
membership, 140 were either elected or nominated from 49 administrative districts and 
identifiable organisations such as the Ghana Bar Association. This was because direct 
election was not feasible at that time due to the heavy expense and lack of reliable logistics. It 
is the position of this study to recognise the good intent of the initiators of the constitution 
although the assembly was not fully representational. However, this study contests the 
neutrality of the NLC in its role during the transition to civilian rule because the hierarchy of 
the NLC pressured the Constituent Assembly to include a constitutional provisions for the 
establishment of the Presidential Commission to consist of Afrifa as Chairman with Harley 
and Ocran as members. The parochial object of the NLC compromised the democratically 
elected government and put pressure on the latter to operate under the shadows of a military-
police presidential commission. 
In January 1969 the Assembly convened and endorsed the recommendations put forward by 
the Constitutional Commission except for a controversial clause in Article 71 that barred 
anyone found guilty by a Commission of Enquiry on the grounds of abusing office, illegal 
acquisition of wealth or defrauding the state. However, investigations conducted by this 
researcher leads to an incontrovertible conclusion that the real motive of this clause was an 
orchestrated attempt by the PP with the complicity of the NLC to disqualify Gbedemah of the 
 
Atta, niece of Dr J.B. Danquah, and mother of Ghana’s current president. Edward was a founding father of the 
UGCC and one of the Big Six. He was trained as a lawyer and became the Chief Justice, 1966-1970; ceremonial 
president, 31 August 1970 - 13 January 1972. 
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NAL party. Sensing the detrimental implications of this ploy to good governance, the UK 
government impressed upon Busia to refrain from such politics. In a confidential letter from 
John Wilson of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), West African Division to 
Horatio K. Matthews, the British High Commissioner in Accra, Wilson submitted updates of 
political developments in Ghana that he had obtained through his informant, Bill Peters43. 
Bill had gathered this information during a conversation between Arnold Smith44 and Busia 
at the Commonwealth Secretariat in London on 30th October 1969. In this conversation, 
Busia reassured Smith that he (Busia) hoped to find a way round the present difficulties to 
“let Gbedemah off the hook” (FCO 65/130; The Times, 1969). The outcome of the 1969 
general election was obvious given the restrictions imposed on CPP functionaries and 
uncertainty of Gbedemah’s political career.  
At the general elections on 29th August 1969, the PP won 105 out of 140 seats to form a 
majority government of wholly Akans. The NAL won 29 seats to form the official opposition 
of wholly Ewes. After the elections Busia, appealed for national unity in his address to the 
nation. He stated “Let us build a brotherhood that transcends the boundaries of tribe, creed or 
political party …” (Williams, 1969). However, he acted in contrast by choosing ministers of 
state on ethnic lines. One major limitation of the 1969 Constitution was that, it permitted the 
Prime Minister to choose ministers of state from outside the National Assembly without anti-
ethno safeguards to guard against discrimination on ethnic, religious or gender orientation. In 
spite of its shortcomings, this study credits the NLC for its role in the formulation of the 1969 
 
43William ‘Bill’ Peters was a British diplomat. He studied at the London School of Economics, and School of 
Oriental and African Studies. Peters served as Head of Central Africa Department, F.C.O., 1968 -1969. Peter 
worked for the Colonial Government in the transition to Ghana’s independence and was well-known to many 
Ghanaian politicians and by this he had access to high-level gatherings.   
44 Arnold Cantwell Smith was a distinguished diplomat and 1st Secretary General of the Commonwealth of 
Nations (1965 – 1975). 
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Second Republican Constitution and transfer of power to the democratically elected PP 
government of Prime Minister Busia in September 1969, though Busia remained restrained 
by the de facto power and influence of the presidential commission.  
6.7 Formation of the Progress Party and problems of ethnocentrism to development 
Though the history of the PP draws us back in time, it is relevant to the understanding of the 
thinking and structure of Busia’s administration. The leaders of the Progress Party owe their 
political thinking and formation to the Danquah-Dombo traditions of the UGCC. Following 
the dissolution of the UGCC by its leaders for its poor performance in the 1951 general 
elections, the conservative members of the party and dissatisfied members of the CPP 
reorganised in 1952 to form the Ghana Congress Party (GCP) led by Busia. The GCP was an 
elite party that represented the interests of the intelligentsia and conservative traditional 
chiefs, and therefore died its natural death after it won only 1 out of the 104 seats in the 1954 
general elections. Thereafter, Danquah and Baffour Akoto, the linguist of the Ashanti king 
who had earlier on led a group of cocoa farmers to resist Nkrumah’s Cocoa Duty and 
Development Funds Amendment Bill (1954), mobilised disaffected Ashantis and CPP 
defectors to form the National Liberation Movement.  
The NLM was led by Danquah and later joined by Busia. The NLM pioneered the formation 
of a federal system of government that allowed for the devolution of administrative powers to 
traditional leaders. This parochial idea favoured the Akan traditionalists but placed the 
overall national interest at risk. It must be noted that before the discovery of oil in Ghana in 
the 1970s, the bulk of Ghana’s main exports – cocoa, gold, timber – were strategically 
endowed in the Ashanti region and akan dominated areas. Therefore a federal system would 
have favoured the Akan dominated landlocked areas to the neglect of other regions. This 
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would have caused tribal and political tensions because the exports and imports would 
require access through the southern areas.  
After winning 12 seats in the 1956 general elections, the NLM merged with the second 
largest party, the Northern People’s Party led by Dombo, the traditional chief of Duori in the 
Upper region, to form a coalition opposition. However, shortly after independence both 
parties were outlawed by the promulgation of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (1957). 
The Act banned all political parties that gave cause to ethnic, racial or religious prejudice and 
called for national unity. Given this, all the ethnic and religiously oriented opposition parties 
such as the Muslim Association Party, National Liberation Movement, Northern People’s 
Party, Ga Shifimokpee (GS), Anlo Youth Organisation (AYO) and Togoland Congress (TG) 
merged to form the United Party (UP) in 1957 under the leadership of Busia. Their main 
object was to oppose and possibly oust the CPP and the Nkrumah ideology. However, in 
1964 the ruling CPP by another Act of parliament banned all oppositions and ushered Ghana 
into a one party system. After Nkrumah’s overthrow by the military in 1966, the NLC 
maintained the status quo until 1969 when it lifted the ban to allow for the formation of 
political parties except the CPP and all its functionaries. Having been the main opposition 
from independence in 1957 to 1964, the PP became the base to source the pro-UGCC Akan 
intelligentsia. In collaboration with his colleagues from the UP, Busia - moderate politician 
and reformist by Ghanaian standards - led the Progress Party and won the 1969 general 
elections.  
However, in sharp contrast to the demographic structure of the CPP and NLC, the Busia 
administration did not bear the characteristics of national identity as it predecessors. 
According to the FCO, Harley favoured Gbedemah and the Ewe dominated NAL, while 
Afrifa, on the other hand, was an ally of the Akan dominated Progress Party of Busia. 
174 
 
Reasons for the ethnic and ideological polarization lies in the formation and historical 
traditions of the PP. It is of interest to note that although the origin of the Ewe and Ashanti 
rivalry dates before independence, the aetiology was deepened during the Nkrumah era. In 
1956, Nkrumah supported the Ewes to acquire part of the Trans Volta Togoland (the 
relinquished German territory in post-war era) to expand the Volta region, but legislated for 
the people of Brong and Ahafo to secede from the Ashanti kingdom in 1959 as a subtle 
retribution to the Ashanti opposition to the Cocoa Duty bill. In addition, the Akan dominated 
PP despised the CPP for Nkrumah’s apathy to the inhumane treatment and death of a leading 
member of the UGCC, J.B. Danquah in the Nsawan Medium Security prisons. Consequently, 
in the 1969 general elections all PP parliamentarians were Akans whilst all NAL 
parliamentarians were Ewes.  
The Second Republic came into existence on the basis of the 1969 Constitution. The supreme 
law of the land made an unusual provision in the creation of the executive arm of 
government. The executive consisted of a president and prime minister aside the presidential 
commission chaired by Brigadier Afrifa (FCO 65/126). However, the essence of a veracious 
transition of power from the NLC military government to the democratically elected PP 
government was undermined by the installation of Afrifa as head of state from 3rd September 
1969 to 7th August 1970. Thereafter, Nii Amaa Ollennu45 succeeded Afrifa for a rather brief 
period and handed over to Edward Akufo-Addo who served as interim-president from 31st 
August 1970 to 13 January 1972. Busia served as the Prime Minister of the Second Republic 
under the shadows of the NLC top echelons (FCO 65/126; FCO 65/130; Frimpong-Ansah, 
 
45 Raphael Nii Amaa Ollennu was born on 21 May 1906 at La in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. Ollennu 
became a Supreme Court judge and served in many distinguished roles such as the Acting President of Ghana 
(7th – 31st August 1970) and Speaker of Parliament. Ollennu was a member of the UGCC and a political ally of 
Busia. Ollennu was the brother-in-law of PM Busia - he married Busia’s sister, Nana Afua Frema (Queen 
mother of Wenchi, the hometown of Busia). 
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1992). It is unsurprising that after almost three years of military rule the NLC bequeathed to 
the Busia administration more debts than it had inherited from the past administration. With 
his overwhelming majority in parliament, Busia focused on renegotiation of Ghana’s internal 
trade and external debt rearrangements to facilitate foreign aid for development. However, 
there was ideological tension between the Busia government and the UK government on the 
appropriate strategies for development in Ghana. 
6.8 The development thinking of Busia and the United Kingdom government 
Busia believed that the IMF stabilization programme implemented by the NLC government 
had excessively contracted the economy and therefore the need to revisit Keynesian 
economics to invest for expansionary and developmental effects (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). 
Meanwhile, there were concerns about the ‘low credit’ standing and ‘fragility’ of the Ghana 
economy to withstand the effects of huge capital investment. With about 37 percent of 
Ghana’s external debts owed to the UK, the latter was key in any attempt to resolve Ghana’s 
external debts situation. Therefore Busia decided that his best option to development was to 
convince the UK government to take a lead in renegotiating Ghana’s external debt. However, 
the UK government had already committed to two debt reschedule agreements with the NLC 
government in 1966 and 1968 and was therefore not impressed to initiate a third without 
allowing time to assess the prospects of the two earlier agreements. The UK government 
explained that all parties involved in the 1968 debt re-arrangement understood that the 
agreement represented a final settlement because it was designed to fit into Ghana’s capacity 
to pay. Therefore, it was premature to reconsider a further debt arrangement when there has 
been no material changes to the 1968 position and with more than two and half years still to 
run. Busia argued that the implications of external indebtedness and economic decline on 
development necessitated a kind of debt reschedule agreement that corrects the balance of 
payment deficit and allows for development budgeting to promote democracy and prevent 
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military interventions. While the Ghanaians were convinced that the debt problem was short 
term and resolvable by short-term loans and debt rearrangements, the UK government 
thought of the debt as long term problem that required austerity fiscal management. This line 
of thinking would suggest that the key obstacle to development that needed attention under 
the Busia administration was how to overcome Ghana’s debt to attract foreign investment for 
development. The Ghanaians were wrong because capitalists’ states do not extend systematic 
aid out of benevolence but on the basis of rational choice of maximising interest.  
6.9 Ghana’s debt problem 
In a confidential supplementary dated on 11th November from John Wilson46 to the question 
by Mr Hornby47 for answer on 17th November 1969, the IMF put the total indebtedness of 
Ghana world-wide (principal and interest) up to 1969 at about £350 million. The historical 
background of Ghana’s external debt suggests that, of this amount the creditors granted a 
total medium-term debt relief of £108 million to Ghana in accordance with the re-scheduling 
agreements of 1966 and 1968 (FCO 65/130). Out of which the UK, the largest creditor and 
trading partner of Ghana, agreed on a debt reschedule of £37 million with a repayment 
schedule of less than £3 million per year (£2.4 million in 1969/70). This was in addition to a 
Capital Aid of £4 million in 1967/68; £4.8 million in 1968/69; and £5 million in 1969/70 
financial year repayable over 25 years with a 5-year grace period (those from 1969 were 
interest free). Moreover, in line with the modernisation development trajectory at that time, 
the agreement granted a Technical Assistance of just over £1 million per year in addition to 
 
46 John Wilson worked with FCO, West African Department and wrote on behalf of the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.  
 




Export Credit Guarantee (ECG) facility. However, the two debt agreements settled by the 
NLC did not go far enough to make Ghana credit worthy to attract foreign investment for 
production, trade and development.  
Shortly after assuming office on 3rd September 1969, Prime Minister Busia embarked on a 
series of foreign visits to the United States of America, the UK, France, Canada and West 
Germany with the central object to convince the donor states to agree to further debt 
reschedule. Given Ghana’s external indebtedness of about £350 million as at 1969, Busia 
believed that the most effective way to sustain Ghana’s democracy was through socio-
economic development preceded by further debt reschedule. At the 24th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in the United States, Busia put forward his submissions. Busia 
cited the risk to liberal democracy in the event of continued economic stagnation and huge 
debt servicing obligations. In his keynote address to the UN General Assembly on 17th 
October 1969, Busia set out the case for further debt rearrangement as one of the most viable 
trajectory to economic development and democratic governance. According to a state-run 
media, The Times dated 22nd October 1969, under the caption ‘Ghana, Freedom and Justice’, 
Busia drew on the conceptual connections between the economic and political that “… Ghana 
will be carrying into the next decade a load of debts the servicing of which will constitute a 
grave impediment to our prospects of national development. … We cannot bear it unless we 
are prepared to deny essential commodities to our people … These are conditions which a 
democratically elected government cannot afford to accept. National Development in Ghana 
has been virtually at a standstill for about five years now” (FCO 65/128).  
A critical examination of Busia’s narrative suggests that he was genuinely concerned about 
the challenges to development and democracy in the event that creditor states rejected 
Ghana’s request for further debt rearrangements. Busia further argued that “It seems that 
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under the existing practices our Government, which has been expressly elected by the people 
of Ghana to end these economic difficulties, might be required to continue servicing these 
past debts and to forsake our mandate. I hope our creditors … cooperate in arrangements for 
debt repayment which make it possible for our new government to respond to their needs” 
(The Times, 22nd October, 1969).  
The logical extension of Busia’s analytical formulation was that Ghana’s debt burden 
hindered her prospects of becoming a democratic-developmental state. And that the 
development of Ghana must begin on a level playing field that had been hitherto unparalleled 
by colonial exploitation and mismanagements by indigenous governments. Moreover, Busia 
lamented about the unfair trade practice of the neo-colonial project that has reduced the 
efforts of Ghana to piecemeal rewards. He stated that “In the case of cocoa, which is of vital 
interest to Ghana, we have had many resolutions expressing support of the principle and 
declaring the intention to cooperate in working out an international agreement”. However, 
“After more than ten years of negotiation there is still no international cocoa agreement” (The 
Time, 22nd October, 1969). Without such trade agreements it is difficult for cocoa producer 
states such as Ghana to improve her export earnings to plan and implement the much needed 
development.  
With cocoa’s domination in the agricultural economy of Ghana, the concerns of cocoa 
farmers were politically sensitive. For instance in 1971, the Akan dominated cocoa farmers 
who brought Busia to power did not shield him from criticism when the PP government 
halved cocoa producer prices from its 1969 level of $1,217 per ton to $548 per ton in 
1971(Le Vine, 1987). The reduction in cocoa producer prices was a chained reaction to the 
trend in the world market price of cocoa. Its impact was felt locally by loss in revenue, jobs, 
hindered development and threated the legitimacy of the government. There is a general 
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feeling among developing states that developed states are not enthused to enter into 
international economic cooperation agreements that give developing states access to fair trade 
in order to help the developing states to help themselves. This study recognises the 
implications of the politics and economics of the cocoa industry in particular and agricultural 
industrialisation in general to any efforts of development and democracy in Ghana. Busia’s 
appeal for action on the cocoa agreement could not have been timelier to the outcome of 
Bateman’s study on the prospects of the cocoa industry in Ghana. According to Merrill J. 
Bateman, given the existing conditions “the guaranteed producer prices of eight cedis per 
load over the next five years will not stimulate the country’s long run productive capacity” 
(Bateman 1971: 1-5). The contributions of cocoa to government revenue and employability 
was compelling enough for the developed states to have reconsidered Busia’s position on 
international cocoa agreements if Ghana was truly earmarked to free herself from the 
shackles of external indebtedness to develop. After the UN session, the Ghanaian delegation 
headed to the UK to engage in bilateral diplomacy to secure debt renegotiations. 
The outcome of the official visit to the United Kingdom from 22nd to 28th and 30th to 31st 
October, 1969 was what sealed Busia’s fate. The feedback from the visits to France (28th -
30th October 1969), Canada and Germany were relevant to the extent of the UK outcome. 
Basically, the decision of the UK government determined the overall outcome. Busia 
appealed for sympathetic response to Ghana’s debt problem. Evidences from confidential 
documents of correspondence (letters, telegrams, personal messages and meetings) between 
Prime Ministers Harold Wilson48 and Busia suggest that among other things, the UK 
 
48 Right Honourable James Harold Wilson (11 March 1916 – 24 May 1995) also known as Baron Wilson of 
Rievaulx was a social democrat and Prime Minister (1964-70 and 1974-76). He had served as the Secretary for 
Overseas Trade Secretary (1947); Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer (1955-61). Wilson had taught Busia at 




government considered Ghana as an important player in seeking peace in Nigeria to facilitate 
UK’s oil interests, hence Ghana used the Nigerian case as a leverage to discuss the debt 
problem (FCO 65/128; FCO 65/130). But more importantly, Busia had thought that since 
majority of Ghana’s debt was owed to the United Kingdom, other donors were likely to 
pursue the British position to resolve the debt crisis but he was wrong. In a confidential letter 
from the Office of the Prime Minister dated 13th November 1969, Busia had made a 
passionate appeal to his former tutor, Harold Wilson, to assist on the debt problem facing 
Ghana at that time. Busia wrote, “the debt problem in Ghana is a very serious one, and I am 
counting on you to take personal interest in this matter, and do all you can to ensure that I get 
a meeting with the creditors to arrange terms that will enable us to meet the repayments, as 
well as tackle the very serious problems of unemployment and high cost of living that we 
have to cope with here” (FCO 65/130). In reply, Wilson wrote in a confidential telegram 
(number 527) dated 2nd December 1969, “We will look at this sympathetically and as we 
have agreed we shall contact our fellow creditors with a view to a meeting in the middle of 
1970” (FCO 65/130). However, Roy Jenkins49, said “he could not guarantee any particular 
outcome and the Ghanaians should not be too optimistic” (FCO 65/130). Although Wilson 
seemed to have good intentions and sympathy for Ghana he was restrained by the timing and 
uncertainty of the UK general elections in 1970 of which the predictions seemed to be in 
favour of Edward Heath50. True to the election predictions, the Conservatives won and with 
this the hope of flexible debt repayment evaporated. 
 
49 Sir Michael Roy H. Jenkins was a British intelligence officer, politician, and diplomat. As Home Secretary 
(1965 to 1967) was instrumental in the extradition attempt of Nkrumah but stalled the extradition of Kwesi 
Armah (Ghana’s High Commissioner to the UK) who later became the private eye of the British authorities in 
the 1970s. As Chancellor of the Exchequer (1967 -1970). 
50 Right Honourable Edward Richard George Heath was the Prime Minister (Conservative, 1970-1974). Heath 
shifted from austerity management after the 1970 strikes and later became a critic of Thatcher. He is 
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6.10 The Lost Hope 
The outcome of the official visits was a sign of giving away the hope and trust that the Ghana 
government had in her relations with the United Kingdom. Prior to his visit to the U.K., Busia 
had the premonition that a successful unilateral loan agreement with the U.K. was feasible. 
Instead, the U.K. government managed to convince Busia to accept a multilateral 
arrangement. Busia agreed, thinking that the U.K. government would keep to its commitment 
by taking the lead to convince the other creditor states, but he was wrong. The two countries 
agreed on a proposed meeting by which Ghana was to set out her case in a document for 
consideration at the multilateral conference in June 1970. Under the arrangement, the U.K. 
government was expected to consult other creditor states and hold further discussion with 
Ghana’s Finance Minister, J. H. Mensah51 in April/May 1970. This arrangement was to 
enable the Ghana government to use the outcome of the conference to prepare the 1970/71 
budget scheduled for presentation to parliament of Ghana in July 1970. On return to Ghana, 
Busia expressed optimism to the media but his personal convictions about the UK 
government changed. Busia knew by the contents and attitude of the UK officials that the 
multilateral approach was a subtle way of alienating his development idea and therefore his 
political career.  
Primary evidences gathered to critically examine the position of the U.K. on the external debt 
issue points to a stark truth. That the U.K. government was unwilling to take the lead in 
convincing the other creditor states but was reticent about this. While the French expressed 
 
remembered for the Industrial relations Act 1971 (repealed 1974); controversial legislation to curb union 
power; and peace in Northern Ireland. 
51 Joseph Henry Mensah served as the Executive head of the Planning Commission of Nkrumah’s Seven Year 
Development Plan; Chief Economist and Principal Secretary (1961-65); Commissioner for Finance (1966-69), 
Minister for Finance and Economic Planning (1969-71), MP for Sunyani East (1997 to 2007), and as member of 




willingness to participate in further negotiations, the United States and Canada were 
sympathetic to Ghana. The new German government gave strong indications to follow the 
path of the UK government but the latter was less enthusiastic. In a confidential official 
correspondence from W.J. Watts52 to Roy Jenkins the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Watts 
contested Busia’s assertion that the United States government had given positive indication to 
assist Ghana. In this document, Watts circled “and the Americans” in the last paragraph 
accompanied by a handwritten footnote that read “Dr Busia said so, but since then the US has 
denied that they discussed it!” (FCO 65/130). However, in a publication by the Guardian, a 
London-based newspaper, under the caption ‘Ghana Premier arrives for talks on £500 million 
debt’ dated 24th October 1969, Patrick Keatley, the Commonwealth Correspondent weighed 
in on the hypocrisy of the UK government. Keatley corroborated Busia’s fear that the great 
burden imposed on Ghana and the difficulty of servicing the huge national debt inherited 
from the Nkrumah government made it unfeasible to develop and sustain democracy without 
resolving the debt problem (FCO 65/128).  
In response, the FCO contested Keatley’s assertion and argued that the 1966 and 1968 debt 
arrangements were favourably set to suit Ghana’s balance of payment prospects based on the 
projections by the creditor states. On 3rd November 1969, Keatley wrote, “Ironically the 
penny seems to have dropped in Ottawa, Washington and Paris. … . In all three cases there 
was a straight, unhesitating commitment to the idea of convening a round-table conference of 
Ghana’s main creditors – the thing that was first done in 1966 after the fall of Nkrumah and 
repeated in 1968.  
 
52 W. John Watts served in the West Africa Division of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 
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Only in London was there fuzziness, elusiveness and prevarication” (FCO 65/130). On 4th 
November 1969, the West African Division of the FCO contested Busia’s claim that the 
French had offered £2.5m and the United States had expressed her willingness to participate 
to discuss the debt re-scheduling if the UK gave her approval. In a further publication dated 
5th November 1969, Keatley described Busia’s visit to the United Kingdom as yielding 
“precious little in their political luggage to show for that visit” but the FCO further refuted 
Keatley’s assertion in a letter dated 14th November 1969 (FCO 65/130). 
From the forgoing, it is clear that even though all the creditor states expressed intent to adapt 
a flexible position to Ghana’s intractable debt problem, the UK government had other 
thoughts because it was owed a greater proportion. Thus to free Ghana from the shackles of 
indebtedness was a risk too colossal to adventure under the neo-colonial project. This is 
because a state that has no plan to overcome its indebtedness is enslaved to the influence and 
dominance by her creditors and this is relevant in the grand strategy of imperialism. 
However, as the former colonialist and major trading partner, one would have expected that 
the UK should have been more sympathetic because “… to whom much is given, from him 
much is expected” (Luke 12:48).  
Many Ghanaians had thought that the strained relations between the conceptual west and 
Nkrumah had been due to his socialist-style approach, and that the era of Busia was a 
restoration of good relations. This was a mistaking belief because in capitalism maximising 
self-interest is a rational choice. Busia felt let down in his attempt to develop the Ghanaian 
economy to sustain democracy because all the other creditor states followed the position of 
the UK government. With his fate in the balance, Busia took an audacious but politically 
perilous initiative to implement the IMF and ODA strategies that consequently led to his 
political demise. The implementation of the neoliberal economic strategies of austerity, 
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deregulation, devaluation, trade liberalisation, privatization, tax reforms, and reduction in 
government spending were a stark shift from the social development ideas of the initial 
1970/71 budget. But with the austerity, came further extractions from the economy that 
resonate with the vampire state thesis. 
6.11 Strategies adopted to resolve Ghana’s debt problem 
The causes of Ghana’s indebtedness have been undertaken in some detail but the solution is 
uncommon to derive. Among the options - repudiation, refinancing, rearrangement and 
austerity - advanced to deal with the external debt problem the Ghana government had argued 
for the first three but had to implement the fourth. In considering their options it is important 
to take a quick look at the reasons for the choices made.  
6.12 The threat of repudiation 
On 1st November 1969, the Economist newspaper quoted E. Omaboe, former Ghana’s 
Economic Affairs Commissioner, to suggest that about £400m of Ghana’s debt to suppliers’ 
credit were incurred during Nkrumah’s era. Like their predecessor, the PP government 
thought of repudiation to reset the balance of payment deficit. Having cited a series of 
superfluous government expenditures to formulate a case against the creditors, no action was 
pursued because of the consequences of unilateral repudiation. It would be recalled that the 
outstanding debts in respect of the procurement of a £4.7m naval vessel from a Yugoslavian 
company; 800 tractors from Germany, Britain and Soviet Union; a £4million prestigious 
airport in the northern region; Ilyushin aircrafts later resold to Russia; 33 state factories of 
which only 2 became profitable; and the £4.75m Frigate scandal were considered for 
repudiation but the idea was shelved because of threats from creditors supported by their 
governments (Guardian, 3rd November 1969).  
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On 17th October 1969, Her Majesty’s Treasury compiled for the attention of the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer on ways to respond to questions from the Ghanaian delegation. In this 
confidential document the UK government presented a convincing case to support the 
consequences of debt repudiation. The government emphasized that Ghana was solely 
responsible for the size of her debts and its serviceability. Therefore a breach of contractual 
rights and obligations would attract serious response from creditors. The UK government 
further emphasised that any attempt by Ghana to unilaterally repudiate her external debts 
would attract the revocation of ECGD services and export insurance that could affect about 
80 percent of Ghana’s import from Britain. Under such conditions, UK exporters would 
demand cash payments to trade with Ghana. The exporters would receive advice to accept 
only irrevocable letters of credit from London which the banks would be reluctant to issue. 
Moreover, with inadequate foreign reserves Ghana would be unable to finance her essential 
imports as she had done before with ECGD arrangements of £33m in 1968 and £35m in 
1969. Given this, repudiation could cause significant harm to Ghana’s credit worthiness, 
jeopardise her political and diplomatic relations, discourage bilateral and multilateral aid 
donors, prejudice continuation of loans from international organisations, and weaken support 
from the IMF. In addition, the confidential documents suggest that the NLC government had 
wilfully signed the bilateral debt negotiations under the terms agreed at the multilateral 
conference and therefore, Ghana should not “claim that the rate of moratorium interest 
applied by the UK during the bilateral debt negotiation – averaging just under 6 percent – was 
savage and beyond their capacity to pay” (FCO 65/130). In any case, Busia was convinced 
that repudiation was riskier but was more concerned about the growing public pressure on the 
government for economic development and employment.  
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6.13 Short-term development strategies 
On return from the donor nations visits, Busia came under intense public pressure to address 
the economic problems facing Ghana. In response, J. H. Mensah proposed a deficit budget in 
the 1970/71 financial year to implement a one-year development plan in the hope that the US 
government would assist in securing short-term loans from American banks (Frimpong-
Ansah, 1992). The main objective of the 1-Year Plan was to consolidate development in the 
rural areas and extend economic activity in the urban areas to mobilise electoral support. In 
defending the budget, Busia argued that it was impossible to improve agriculture, create jobs, 
expand amenities and increase food production under the level of indebtedness. However, the 
initiatives, including letters to President Nixon and William Rogers – Secretary of State, were 
futile because the Americans refused to provide the loans with the simple reason that they did 
not want to undermine the austerity management suggested by the UK government. But 
resolving Ghana’s debt problem through the austerity management idea was socio-
economically more complex and politically unsavoury. By the IMF austerity measures 13 
percent of export earnings must be set aside to service debt under conditions of only 1 percent 
annual economic growth rate matched by 2.6 percent population growth rate. Meanwhile, the 
change of government from Labour to the Conservatives in the 1970 general elections, few 
days before the proposed multilateral debt renegotiations, did not change the determination of 
the Busia government.  
In negotiating with the creditors, Busia proposed a 50 percent cut in debt repayments and 
extension of the repayment period to between 30 and 50 years, to enable the government to 
honour all debt obligations by previous regimes irrespective of errors in accepting 
responsibility. So where did Busia’s government go wrong? The strategies for economic 
development and of democratic governance are highly relevant to this question because they 
focus on the economic problems and the three main strategies adopted to revive the economy 
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from decline. The strategies consisted of a reversion of state industrialisation to correct the 
imbalances between agriculture and local industries; implementation of fiscal policies to 
accelerate development; and finally a neoliberal economic management approach of the 
external sector to correct balance of payment53 deficit to attract foreign investment. In doing 
so this study offers political economy interpretation to the policies and strategies that the PP 
government advanced to attract public support and foreign investment. 
As public expectation mounted against the PP government, Busia knew that he had to assert 
his legitimacy through economic development to avert a return to military dictatorship. The 
government had hoped that given his advocacy for democratic governance, the West would 
have supported Busia’s economic development ideas to consolidate democracy in the former 
British colony, but he was wrong. Faced with the stark reality of public opinion against 
austerity, the PP government retracted its previous criticism against state-led rapid 
industrialisation programme of the CPP and took three decisions. First, the Minister of 
Finance and Economic Planning, J. H. Mensah, a pro-industrialist had served as the 
Executive Head of the Planning Commission in the CPP government, and as Commissioner 
for Finance under the NLC. In all the development plans that had received his contributions – 
Seven Year Plan (1963/64-1969/70) under the CPP; Two Year Plan (1968) under the NLC; 
and One Year Plan (1970) under the PP government, the distinguished minister of state and a 
Keynesian Economist never concealed his attachment to the idea of rapid industrialisation. In 
doing so he revived the idea to increase the role of the state in economic development 
through the promotion of state owned commercial ventures and public-private business 
partnerships (PPBPs) to ameliorate the economic conditions. The establishment of the Ghana 
 
53 A statistical statement that summarises the periodic economic activities of residents and non-residents of a 
nation. It consists of the goods and services accounts, primary and secondary incomes accounts, and capital 
and financial accounts. Though the statement provides a framework for a range of economies, it recognises 
that some items may be irrelevant in some analysis (IMF). 
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Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC) to coordinate activities of state ventures, and a 
Special Task Force for the effective distribution of foodstuff are a few examples of direct 
state interventions in the business sector during the Busia era. These, together with the 
construction of feeder roads mitigated the fragmentations between rural-urban markets to 
increase food productivity and strengthened the agriculture-industry connectivity, however, 
the increase in industrial productivity was assigned to fiscal expansion and trade 
liberalisation. By June 1971, the Busia administration had increased Ghana’s short-term debts 
by $65.1m (excluding trade debts not yet matured) and was apprehensive about the 
expansionary effects of the 1971/72 budget.  
Second, in introducing the 1971/72 budget, J.H. Mensah favoured a Keynesian-style 
economic growth idea. He argued that “... after so many years of economic stagnation, the 
government should not, even in the face of considerable difficulties, take any action which 
would kill the trend towards economic expansion that has begun to emerge in Ghana in the 
past two years. We have many years of neglect to make up” (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 103). 
However, Busia who was more aware of the politics embedded in debt problem drew the 
attention of his finance minister to the importance of narrowing the revenue-expenditure gap 
to address the deficit problem. Busia’s concern was justified because by adopting the 
expansionary method his government was getting on a similar trajectory as the CPP 
government that led to economic decline and overthrow. The increase in government 
expenditure from ₵468m to an estimated ₵543m for 1970 and 1972 respectively as against 
decrease in government revenue from ₵437m to an estimated ₵420m for the same period, 
supports Busia’s concern (IMF, 1988). With this evidence Mensah’s proposition for deficit 
budget was unsustainable without aid. The Busia government put forward cogent arguments 
to justify increased capital expenditures for feeder roads extensions to ameliorate the 
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fragmentations in the rural-urban marketing of agricultural outputs. However, the fragility of 
the economy to respond to foreign capital investment within the structural constrains of the 
industrial sectors was underestimated. Busia was in dilemma as to who to please, the 
conceptual west or the electorates.  
The third strategy was supposed to be in keeping with basic economic management approach 
of correcting balance of payment deficits, restructure of external debts and improvement of 
exchange rate to revive the external sector. The conventional approach to correct such deficits 
suggests that the fiscal budget must demonstrate feasible attempts to restrict government 
expenditure while improving government revenue through increased production, 
diversification of exports and widening of the domestic revenue tax net. However, the PP 
government argued that the conditions of the Ghanaian economy made it impossible to 
develop on a surplus budget in the short-term. In what became a rhetoric of resentment to 
austerity, ‘kafu-mpo-didi’ (an Akan translation of suggesting that ‘even the debtor eats’), was 
well received by the people but placed the Busia government in a difficult position with the 
creditor states. The creditors disagreed with the government’s line of thinking and suggested 
immediate fiscal strategies to keep the deficit within manageable proportions. Busia had 
hoped that his personal relations with President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath, and the 
threats of the economic difficulties to liberal democracy would persuade western leaders to 
be more lenient, again he was wrong. With the $65.1m increase in national debts, Busia made 
unsuccessful attempts to secure a $45m loan from American commercial banks and a long-
term concessional loan of $360m to set aside $100m for short-term debt management and 
invest the remaining (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). But the British government responded 
negatively to the idea of unilateral funding and counselled Busia about the impossibilities of 
unilateral financing of development. The creditors likewise opted for a multilateral approach 
190 
 
under the auspices of the United Nations subsidiaries to ensure that loans advanced to the 
Ghana government attracted enforceable conditions. Busia had to consider internal corrective 
measures rather than external benevolence to manage the debt situation. By the same token as 
Nkrumah, Busia’s ambition for accelerated development through external sector finance was 
dented and the consequences of repudiation was enough to deter Ghana from taking that 
course of action.  
6.14 Medium-term development strategies 
In mid-1971, the Ghana government succumbed to the IMF and ODA recommendations to 
finance the Medium Term Development Plan. In his inaugural address to the sector 
committees for the medium-term plan on 2nd September 1971, Busia remarked that 
development and democracy were not only a matter of economics but also politics. The 
government needed to focus on external borrowing as a short term measure to stimulate 
economic growth and promote development. The shift in policy of the Busia government was 
guided by new trends in its negotiations with the UK government a month earlier. 
On 26th August 1971, Peter Moon54 forwarded to N.B.J. Huijsman55 a copy of a document 
entitled “Background Paper for the Medium Term Plan”, which Busia had presented to Prime 
Minister Edward Heath for the latter’s comments and advice. In this document Busia outlined 
Ghana’s major economic challenges, their effects and draft strategies. The document 
prepared almost entirely by the Harvard Advisory Group within the Development Planning 
 
54 Peter James Scott Moon was a British diplomat. Moon served as Private Secretary to Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, 1963–65; First Secretary, UK Mission to UN, New York, 1965–69; Counsellor, FCO, 
1969–70. 
55 Nicolaas Basil Jacques Huijsman was a retired British army personnel and diplomat, of Dutch ancestry. He 
served in the Colonial Office, 1948–62; Principal Private Secretary to Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations and Colonies, 1962–64; Assistant Secretary, Minister of Overseas Development, 1964–70, and 1974–
75, Overseas Development Administrator of the FCO, 1970–74. 
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Secretariat outlined five major economic problems that required foreign financial assistance. 
The problems consisted of (i) the effects of the economic stagnation in the 1960s; (ii) balance 
of payment constraints; (iii) relatively large and escalating share of resources for 
infrastructural and welfare services; (iv) high unemployment in a rapidly ever growing 
population; (v) and inequitable distribution of income between the rural and urban 
populations (OD 30/393).  
A critical content analysis of archival documents suggests that the main object of the 
background document was to propose strategies and solicit for advice from the UK 
government on ways to address the economic problems. By this, it would have proved the 
submission of the Ghana government to the formulation of the UK government to encourage 
capital inflow to Ghana.  This present study puts forward that in subtle ways the political 
freedom of an underdeveloped sovereign state is undermined by her economic dependence on 
developed creditor states. For instance in the second paragraph of Huijsman’s letter to Mr 
Deare in September 1971, Huijsman wrote “… the Prime Minister would wish to be brief in 
his comments and would prefer not to be drawn into a position in which HMG were 
suggesting to the Ghanaian Government what detailed policy decision they should take” (OD 
30/393). Yet, in the letter from J.C.H. Morris (Official Development Assistance, F.C.O.) to 
Huijsman, Morris made it clear that the British government would only consider funding of 
Ghana’s medium-term plan and urge other donors to do likewise if Busia’s government 
adhered to the choices suggested by the Official Development Assistance (ODA).  
The seven point recommendation by the ODA consisted of the need for a rapid shift in 
resource allocation to economic services; the control of government consumption to a 4 
percent growth rate per annum; improvement in the efficiency of new investments; increase 
in non-cocoa exports; increase in domestic savings; provision of detailed policy to improve 
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balance of payment through increase in import prices and review of tariffs; and creation of 
jobs. Furthermore, in the sixth paragraph, Morris wrote that “If Ghana were to make the 
choices indicated above and to devise a medium-term plan based on these policies then she 
should be a good candidate for additional aid. Also, that we would endeavour to press the 
other donors to do likewise … but that given current policies Ghana would not be eligible” 
(OD 30/393). Morris noted that while he was in broad agreement with the problems identified 
by Busia, he would have included as a major concern, the continued increase in government 
spending as a percentage of GDP from 10.4 percent in 1960 to 18.9 percent in 1969 (OD 
30/393). In doing so, Morris indicated his conditional optimism of aid to Ghana subject to 
adherence of the ODA advice. Much as the recommendations might appear on the face value 
to address the debt problem, they did not. For instance, increase in import prices, downward 
review of tariffs and the percentage of debt servicing to GDP were not in the interest of 
Ghana. First and foremost, a reduction in export tariff does not necessarily guarantee a 
proportionate increase in export revenue unless the export commodities prices are guaranteed. 
Additionally, the reduction in export tariff could only yield a proportionately higher export 
revenue if the price elasticities were conducive such that the reduction in the cost (price) of 
the exports to the foreign state would yield more that proportionate increase in quantity 
demanded of the exports. The impracticality of the ODA’s conditions were evident in the 
pessimism expressed by Morris in his concluding paragraph even before the project was to 
begin. He stated that “This ‘background’ Paper seems to present not background but 
uncertainty. Is the government going to control recurrent expenditure? Are exports to be 
further encouraged and import prices to be raised together with a review of the tariff 
structure?” (OD 30/393). Moreover, Huijsman’s caution to the FCO to refrain from 
discussing the value of the cedi raises a lot of questions if indeed there was a genuine 
commitment to assist in finding solution to the debt problem. After all, with a falling cedi, it 
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was cheaper for developed states to import from Ghana and profitable to export to Ghana (the 
reverse is true). This makes it impossible for Ghana to escape from the cyclical trend of 
deficit balance of trade whereby her import expenditures exceeded export revenues, with 
implications of over dependency on aid. The logical extension of Huijsman’s point is that 
since in international trade, nations stand to benefit from a fall in the exchange rate of their 
trading partner’s currency, it was prudent to avoid arousing interest about the falling cedi 
because the depreciation of the cedi was to the advantage of the UK and other foreign donors.  
Meanwhile, in almost all the engagements that transpired between the two countries on the 
debt issue, the UK government took an astute view of Busia’s proposal for the debt 
reschedule but cautioned his inevitable predisposition. According to Huijsman, a shift in the 
UK government’s position for further debt reschedule could only materialise if Busia took 
“some unpalatable but necessary Government action” (OD 30/393). Busia was disappointed 
but not despair because he had all along hoped that the long-standing cordial relations 
between the United Kingdom and Ghana would have persuaded the donor states to assist in 
nurturing Ghana’s democracy through a more sympathetic economic assistance. Although the 
economic development management proposals of Busia had better prospects of bringing into 
fruitfulness the benefits of Ghana’s Medium Term Development Plan its implementation 
depended on the outcome of the debt refinancing initiative. A favourable outcome would 
have redirect the economy towards the trajectory of developmental state, but for obvious 
reasons the initiatives were stalled. Even though Busia was apprehensive that the 
implementation of the ODA economic management proposal could result in political 
instability, he took his chances by concordance with the donor’s idea.  Busia’s ambitions to 
advance development and nurture democracy simultaneously was evidently unsustainable, 
hence he yielded for difficult options.  
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Le Vine56 (1987: 174) suggests that given the constraints, Busia took an audacious decision 
in December 1971 to correct the deficit in fulfilment of the conditions by the ODA, but in 
doing so, that risked his political career. It is inconceivable that after several years of 
studying the economies of Ghana the IMF and U.K. government would have thought that the 
devaluation of the cedi57 by over forty percent could have corrected the balance of payment 
deficit without arousing political instability. Nevertheless, Busia adhered to the donors plan 
to devalue the cedi but also increased cocoa producer prices by 20 percent; raised the 
minimum wage; proscribed import surcharges to obscure the effects of the austerity measure 
and insulate the government from political censure. Yet, the 42 percent devaluation of the 
cedi was the primary reason that accounted for Busia’s overthrow because it reduced real 
incomes and deepened the economic hardship. In classical economics devaluation is 
presumed to decrease export prices and increases import prices, with all other things being 
equal. However, the propensity to increase aggregate revenue as a result of manipulation in 
the prices of exports and imports is dependent on the respective price elasticity of demand 
and supply58 of the commodity in question. This in effect relates to aggregate export revenue 
and import expenditures of the state. Therefore, the price elasticities of a country’s exports 
and imports require careful consideration in the planning and implementation of trade 
policies to keep government revenues and expenditures at desired levels.  
 
56 Professor Emeritus Victor Theodore Le Vine was a German political science professor and a Fulbright 
lecturer. He was the Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana (1969-71, during 
the Busia era). He revisited Ghana in 1992 as part of the election monitoring team that ushered in the 4th 
Republic.  
57  Cedi has been the unit of currency in Ghana since 1965 when it replaced the British Pound at a rate of ₵2.40 
to £1. It was renamed from ‘New Cedi’ to cedi (1967) and further to Ghanaian cedi (2007). Its tremendous lost 
in value since 1965, has attracted debate on Nkrumah’s decision to leave the British pound system that many 
believe could have rescued the cedi from depreciation. 
58 Price elasticity of demand and supply refers to the proportionate changes in quantity demanded and 
supplied as a result of price variations. 
195 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, the elasticities of demand and supply of Ghana’s main exports 
and imports should have been central to determine the effects of the devaluation. The use of 
the devaluation policy to rectify Ghana’s trade deficit would have been effective if the price 
elasticity of demand for Ghana’s exports and imports were elastic enough to increase 
aggregate export revenue and decrease import expenditures. By this, a reduction in the value 
of exchange rate (prices) of Ghana’s exports could have resulted in a more than proportionate 
increase in quantity demanded to yield increased aggregate export revenue, whilst with 
increase in import prices consumers with weak habits were more likely to switch to 
alternatives products to mitigate aggregate import expenditures.  
On the other hand, the devaluation policy could have been effective if the price elasticity of 
supply for Ghana’s exports and imports were elastic. By this, home industries could easily 
shift factors of production to more profitable sectors of the economy within the shortest 
possible time in response to a decrease or increase in the prices of particular commodities to 
maximise aggregate export revenue, whilst importers would be able to supply more as price 
increased to avoid demand-pull inflation. It is however true that in the real world it is difficult 
for policy makers to determine with utmost certainty the price elasticity of a nation’s imports 
and exports but it was obvious that the Ghanaian case was bound to engender political unrest. 
In the 1970 to 1972 budget period cocoa revenue decreased as total cocoa sale fell from 
₵343million in 1970 to ₵279million in 1971, and finally to ₵328million in 1972. During the 
same periods the public revenue from cocoa reflected a similar trend from ₵201 to ₵118 and 
₵146 (Stryker, 1988).The decrease in real producer price resulted in more than proportionate 
decrease in quantity supplied and therefore government revenue from cocoa tax fell.  
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6.15 End of the Busia era 
The implications of implementing the ODA/IMF austerity strategies were that the cocoa 
farmers, military, and trade unions were aggrieved about the economic contractions. First and 
foremost, the decrease in the real incomes of cocoa farmers caused Ashanti cocoa farmers in 
particular to withdraw their support for the PP government; the military and police lost their 
occupational privileges, trade unions and universities went on protests. Against this 
background, Harlley (former IGP), accused Busia of ruthlessness and abuse of his positions, 
while others accused him of failing to provide tough leadership and accepting bribes from the 
French via the former Ivorian President Felix Houphouet Boigny. Moreover, the withdrawal 
of fringe benefits and allowances to the military infuriated the rank and file of the army. 
Strikes organised by Trade Union Congress added to the chaos. Besides, Busia did a great 
disservice to himself by the manner in which he handled politically sensitive issues such as 
the ill-health of Edward Akufo-Addo; reproach and indictments of senior military officers; 
Alien Registration Compliance Order; the 10 Soviet Trawlers sold by the NLC; the Purge of 
568 civil servants in 1970; and the weak leadership over the ineptitude in public 
administration. Although there were, admittedly other aspects of the Busia administration, 
such as tensions with the TUC and university students, which this study has not dealt with, it 
is evident that Busia was genuinely committed to democracy and economic development in 
Ghana. But by the end of the Busia administration it became apparent that the opposing 
ideological orientations of the TUC and PP government contributed to unhealthy 
confrontations. Consequentially, the PP government dissolved the TUC in 1971 by the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 383. The following day the TUC head office in Accra 
was raided by the police and official documents of the TUC were confiscated. The national 
unions forming the TUC were required to change their constitutions and to re-register within 
six months (Asamoah, 2012). It is clear that the effects of the devaluation of the cedi fed into 
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the egocentrism of the military to give cause to the General (then Colonel) I.K. Acheampong-
led military coup on 13th January 1972. Indeed, the military takeover was well anticipated 
and therefore did not attract the attention with which the 1966 coup received. 
Analysis of the development initiatives during the NLC and Busia periods have been 
undertaken to critically examine the economic and political challenges faced by each 
government and the effectiveness of their respective development strategies in the immediate 
aftermath of the Nkrumah era. It came out from the results of the development efforts that the 
IMF’s neoliberal economic management policies had been oblivious to the destabilising 
effects of economic developments in Ghana. First of all, it must be understood that after the 
protracted period of economic exploitation and political oppression, Ghanaians were not in 
the mind set to appreciate austerity development. The intractable economic problems were 
not mutational to the IMF neoliberal strategies. In essence, austerity policies were extensions 
of economic hardship at a time when political liberation was associated with economic 
development. Moreover, the IMF-supported monetary reforms, liberalization of the external 
sector, devaluation of the currency, and other fiscal discipline measures implemented by the 
NLC resulted in contractions of the economy that the Busia government aimed to reverse. 
Second, it seemed to be the case that given the financial constraints on internal resources, the 
success of the Busia government was more dependent on development assistance from 
external donors than internal sources. Granted this, Busia would have needed the patience of 
Ghanaians and commitment of the UK government to realise his developmental state 





Chapter 7: Developments by the Military and Limann Governments (1972 to 
1981) 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter unpacks the development attempts of the regimes that followed in the immediate 
post-Busia era of 1972 to 1981. It aims to investigate, unravel and critically analyse the 
economic and political impulses that collectively gave birth to the 31st December Revolution 
at the end of 1981. In the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberalism dominated and reshaped 
development thinking in underdeveloped states. The idea, popularly referred as the 
Washington Consensus was initiated by the World Bank, IMF, and the United States 
Treasury as an economic policy for economic reforms and structural adjustment in 
underdeveloped states.  
The ten-point ‘prescriptive’ economic policy formed a paradigm shift from state-led to 
market-driven conceptualisation of development, measured in terms of economic growth and 
good governance (Hobden, 2008). In pursuit of this idea, debtor states were required by their 
creditors, mainly from the conceptual west to adopt austerity, privatization, trade 
liberalisation, deregulation, reduction in government expenditures and market-based ideas to 
qualify for development loans. Policies based on these ideas favoured creditors and did not 
promote fair and reciprocal trade to help debtors out of their indebtedness.  
The cause and effect of neoliberalism was that it contributed to the indebtedness and 
underdevelopment of Ghana, to the extent that development became highly dependent on 
foreign aid. The dependency on foreign aid for development in underdeveloped states is an 
extension of the neo-colonial project of exploitation and inequality (Kothari 2006). 
Inequalities exacerbate existing economic decay and causes military interventions and 
political instability. Much as the UK prides herself as the head of the Commonwealth and 
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major trading/development partner of Ghana, archival documents suggest that the UK stands 
to, and indeed benefited more in periods of economic crisis in Ghana. Thus under UK - 
Ghana aid agreements, Ghana was required to purchase UK products and sell her exports at 
prices that it had little or no control over. This revelation questions the authenticity of 
commitment to the economic and political development of Ghana, and partly explains the 
recurrence of military interventions in the decade of January 1972 to December 1981.  
7.2 Background 
The political economy of Ghana in the immediate decade following the overthrow of the 
Busia government was dominated by military interventions, economic anarchy and 
suppression of democracy. During the first seven years (13th January 1972 to 24th September 
1979), the military having suspended the constitution of the second republic governed by 
decrees. The remaining three years was made up of a short-term government of the third 
republic, interrupted by another military intervention.  
The economic excuses cited for military interventions in Ghana were similar but their 
political motivations were distinct. On 13th January 1972, the Acheampong-led National 
Redemption Council (NRC) cited the burden of servicing of external debts incurred by his 
predecessors - the Convention People’s Party (CPP), National Liberation Council (NLC) and 
Peoples Party (PP) governments - and their ramifications on Ghana’s economic decline as the 
main rationale for the military intervention. While the NLC inherited external debts of about 
£400 million from the CPP government, it could not service the debts but agreed with the 
external creditors to postpone repayments under the 1966 and 1968 debt payment re-
arrangements. However, this present study discovers that under the re-arrangement deal, 
Ghana’s original debt increased by about £35 to £40 million (FCO 65/130). In addition, the 
Ghana government was by the re-arrangement obliged to implement the austerity policies of 
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neoliberalism by the IMF with implications of economic contractions (Bennett, 1973; 
Frimpong-Ansah, 1992).  
The Busia government exacerbated the debt problem by raising Ghana’s internal debts made 
up of treasury bills, central bank loans, cocoa marketing board (CMB) loans, and national 
development bonds to N₵626.2m. Additionally, short-term loans of commercial credits and 
arears of dividends to foreign investors rose to N₵200m in 1970/71 (United Nations 
Economic Commission on Africa, cited in Bennett, 1973). During the same period, Ghana’s 
external debt was valued at almost N₵80million less than her internal debt (at 1969 exchange 
rate of N₵2.4=£1). In acknowledging the inability of Ghana to service her debts to attract 
further credits, Busia proposed to the creditors a composite refinancing plan to extend the 
repayment period to 50 years and reduce the moratorium to 2 percent, but the creditors 
rejected this proposal and opted for the IMF neoliberal economic development policy of 
austerity.  
Given, the decline in the world cocoa market price, the government could not simultaneously 
(i) repay the debts; (ii) correct the balance of payment deficit; (iii) undertake economic 
development investments; (iv) liberalise trade; (v) create jobs; (vi) balance the budget; and 
(vii) undertake social development investments. It had to make difficult and unpopular 
choices that satisfied the creditors but carried the risk of legitimising military intervention. 
With little space to manoeuvre, the Busia government accepted the IMF/ODA plan of 
austerity management to correct the balance of payment deficit. This consisted of the removal 
of subsidies on agricultural inputs, ban on importations of autos, televisions, cigarettes, fruits, 
poultry, aluminium sheets, crude rubber and soda. In addition, the government proscribed 
vehicle maintenance allowances for civil servants and the military, increased petrol duty, 
enforced the national development levy, and introduced cuts in government expenditures 
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including the defence budget which was resented by the public. Although neoliberalism 
seemed to be the conventional trajectory in some developed states, the same needed not be 
prescribed for underdeveloped states where the economic and political conditions were not 
ready to withhold the effects of austerity. For instance, after it assumed power in 1969, the PP 
government consistently introduced cuts in military expenditure from N₵49.1m in the 
1969/70 to N₵45m in 1970/71 and finally to N₵40.4m in 1971/72 budgets. Such financial 
discipline was in fulfilment to the demands of the external creditors but rather gave the 
military the motivation to intervene in the face of its own slashed budgets. Bennett (1973) 
suggests that while there is no clear relation between political decay and military 
interventions, there is strong connection between economic decay and military interventions 
to the extent that forms of government are relevant to development. However, this does not 
suggest that there is no linkage whatsoever between political decay and military intervention 
but rather highlights the likelihood of military intervention given the two situations of 
political decay and economic decay.  
While the role of the state under military authoritarianism or civilian democracy is being 
debated in the search for developmental state model for Africa (Routley, 2014), the external 
powers that remotely control the development of underdeveloped states need not be ignored. 
In some instances, however, short-term military interventions have been positive for 
development. Samuel Finer suggests that though societies express concern about how much 
separation is necessary between the civil and military, an efficient civil government should be 
capable of maintaining good relations to keep military interventionism to its barest minimum 
(Finer, 1962).  
 This chapter argues that fluctuations in the world market price of cocoa, Ghana’s number 
one export at that time, had direct impact on government’s internal revenue generation, 
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indebtedness, ability to develop, legitimacy, and political stability. At the UN General 
Assembly, Busia stated that “In the case of cocoa, which is of vital interest to Ghana, we have 
had many resolutions expressing support of the principle and declaring the intention to 
cooperate in working out an international agreement”. However, “after more than ten years of 
negotiation there is still no international cocoa agreement” (The Time, 22nd October, 1969: 
9-10). In essence, the absence of an effective international cocoa trade agreement rendered 
increase in cocoa production to the vagaries of the price mechanism and inequality in the 
distribution of income. This therefore made it difficult for Ghana to improve her external 
revenue for development as cocoa production increased but falling prices wiped off the 
benefit of increased production. For example, as a result of increased cocoa production to 
567,000 tonnes in the 1964-65 period, world cocoa prices dropped from its 1958 price of 
$840 to $204 per tonne in July 1965 (Bennett, 1973). Similar fluctuations in world cocoa 
market price and the five-year gestation period of cocoa cultivation made international cocoa 
agreement even more relevant to efforts at economic development in Ghana.  
Given cocoa outputs of 414,300 tons in 1969; 396,200 tons in 1970; and 404,000 tons in 
1971, prices fluctuated from $790 in 1970; $470 in 1971; to $360 in 1972. It is suggested that 
the price fluctuations and distortions could have been ameliorated through exchange rate 
adjustment to provide fiscal resources for higher real producer prices (Frimpong-Ansah, 
1992: 113). However, the effectiveness of this approach raises questions because devaluation 
has been tried several times in Ghana’s history. On the other hand, the absence of an effective 
international cocoa trade agreement enabled the buyers, mainly from the developed creditor 
states, to manipulate the price mechanism. And as a result of this, influenced the export 
revenues to Ghana, her economic development and political sovereignty. In essence, while 
underdeveloped states lack control over the prices of their primary exports, it is proper to 
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adhere to the development ideas of Polanyi (1957) by maintaining a fair balance between the 
interests of investors and the labour force. In this respect the state plays a pivotal role by 
engaging producers and buyers for fair price and profitability respectively. In Ghana, Busia 
maintained cocoa producer prices at N₵8 per load but his shift towards the interests of the 
creditors led to military intervention. Politicisation of the main exports of Ghana by her 
creditors has political and economic ramifications.  
The chapter takes a lead from Frimpong-Ansah’s ‘vampire state’ and sets up the ideological 
foundations for the ‘zombie state’ in the next chapter. It is thus structured under four 
historical junctures consisting of (i) the National Redemption Council (NRC); (ii) Supreme 
Military Council One (SMC I) de facto government of General I. K. Acheampong59 (1972-
78); (iii) SMC II military government of Lieutenant General F.W.K. Akuffo (1978-1979); 
(iv) the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) of Flight Lieutenant Rawlings (1979); 
and (v) the People’s National Party of President Hilla Limann (1979-1981).  
The period began with the overthrow of Prime Minister Busia’s Progress Party government 
by General Acheampong and ended with the ousting of President Limann’s PNP government 
by the Rawlings-led Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) military junta. A 
comparative analysis of historiopolitical information on the second and third republican 
governments of Busia and Limann respectively demonstrate at least six commonalities: (i) 
both democratically elected governments were forced out of office by the military only after 
two years and three months in power; (ii) operated under the shadows of the military that 
handed over power to them; (iii) cited for economic mismanagement and ineptitude; (iv) 
 
59 General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong was an Ashanti - Head of State (13 January 1972 – 5 July 1978). He 
overthrew the Progress Party government of Busia and was overthrown by Lt.Gen. Akuffo. Acheampong was 
executed with other senior military officers by firing squad in June 1979. Acheampong is remembered for the 
reforms from imperial to the metric system, "Operation Keep Right" - change from left-hand to right-hand 
road driving, "Operation Feed Yourself" and institutional corruption. 
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political demise were followed by suspensions of the constitutions and partisan politics; (v) 
pursuance of IMF neoliberal market-led development created space for military intervention; 
and (vi) Ghana ended up being more indebted than before.  
 On 13th January 1972, General (then Colonel) Acheampong overthrew Busia and accused 
his predecessor for being too soft towards the creditors - the IMF and ODA. Acheampong 
reversed Busia’s economic management policies and issued a statement to repudiated 
Ghana’s external debts. However, ramifications of the repudiation, fluctuations in world 
cocoa market prices, and mismanagement shifted public opinion against the government. In 
October 1975, Acheampong metamorphosed the NRC to SMC I but on 5th July 1978, 
Lieutenant General Akuffo, a ranking member of the SMC 1 and Chief of Defence Staff, led 
a bloodless military coup to overthrow Acheampong and established the SMC II. The new 
regime had much in common with its immediate predecessor in terms of development 
thinking but departed on its reliance on western aid. On 4th June 1979, junior officers of the 
Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) led by Flight Lieutenant Rawlings ousted Akuffo in a bloody 
coup. On 24th September 1979, Rawlings handed over political power to President Hilla 
Limann but remained in the background of politics. On 31st December 1981, Rawlings 
capitalised on the public’s impatience with economic development; delays in restructuring 
the state bureaucracy and engaging the people for development; as well as weak intelligence 
network to oust Limann’s and placed the president under house arrest.  
7.3 Perspectives on Military Interventionism and Praetorianism 
It is important to take a quick look at the main factors that account for military interventions 
because it offers insight into how (nature) and why (motivations) the interruptions occur. The 
military is a distinct independent political force highly organised with technical ability in 
defence and use of force but inhibited from governance due to its sense of professionalism 
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and problems with legitimacy (Finer, 1962). The reasons for military interventionism in 
underdeveloped states are polarised between those who believe that such actions are 
motivated by the parochial interest of the military and those who argue that it is in the general 
interest of the public (Bennett, 1963). While the motives may consist of radical attempts by 
the military to obliterate conservative establishment; reaction to societal conflict; or support 
of particular regime, the nature may be bloody or bloodless, and by commissioned or non-
commissioned officers. From the foregoing, military interventions in underdeveloped states 
are only a tip of the iceberg of a wider societal problem. Samuel Huttington suggest that 
“Military explanations do not explain military interventions … military interventions are only 
one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon … In underdeveloped societies the 
military are concerned not only with pay and promotions … but also with the distribution of 
power and status throughout the political system”(Huttington, 1968). These scholars argue 
that disruptions to democratic governance, such as in Ghana, arose from system crises; high 
participation-low institutionalisation; political structure; party origins; autocracy and 
corruption; ethnic and class monopolization; military praetorianism; and economic crises 
(Kraus, 1970).  In addition to the internal causes, external powers - developed states and 
global financial institutions - interfere in the internal affairs of underdeveloped states to 
promote democracy and development, but also change regimes that they perceive as threat to 
their interests.   
7.4 The NRC and SMC 1: 1972 to 1978 
Within three weeks of devaluing the cedi by 44 percent, Acheampong and a group of junior 
military officers overthrew the Busia government and introduced a new government - the 
NRC, renamed as SMC I in 1975. With virtually no military resistance, it was not surprising 
that Acheampong and his small group of military officers succeeded with the coup because 
the economic crisis at that time gave initial political legitimacy for the military intervention. 
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The four dominant narratives put forward by the NRC to justify the takeover were: the 
reduction in real incomes caused by the devaluation of the cedi in the 1971/72 budget; 
Busia’s acceptance of the austerity policy of the IMF/ODA aid packages in Ghana’s Two-
Year Medium-Term Development; Busia’s complacence in the external debt repayment 
issue; and the linguistic/ethnic conflicts within the PP government (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). 
Yet, many suggest that the military had intervened for its parochial interest because the 
overall economic crisis was not serious enough to have merited the military takeover (Kraus, 
1970; Bennett, 1963; Frimpong Ansah, 1992). Acheampong ignored the warnings of the 
ODA/IMF that Ghana’s travails with economic development was unsustainable without 
international aid. Frimpong-Ansah (1992: 108) was right in suggesting that Acheampong 
should have rather appreciated Busia’s recognition of the debt problem and his initiatives to 
address the inherited weakness of the economy. However, the initial economic success of the 
Acheampong regime somewhat discounted this assertion and opens up the debate of whether 
military ‘authoritarian’ interventionism has a place in the economic development of Ghana.  
Shortly after taking power on 13th January 1972, the NRC decreed to suspend the 1969 
Constitution and banned all multi-party activities. Although, the NRC/SMC I was less 
tolerant than its military predecessor, the NLC, it opposed the restoration of democratically-
elected civilian government. However, unlike its immediate predecessor (NRC) the SMC I 
established cordial relations with the TUC and introduced the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Decree of 1972 to repeal the Industrial Relations Amendment Act of 1971 
(383) that led to the dissolution of the TUC under the Busia administration. The NRC/SMC 1 
restrained itself from interfering in the running of the TUC except where its assistance was 
solicited by the union. The reinstatement of 400 maritime workers who had been sacked by 
the Busia administration; an amnesty for expelled seamen who were involved in a general 
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strike declared by the National Union of Seamen under the previous administration; and 
procurement of buses for the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) on hire-
purchase basis restored good relations between the state and unionised labour (Arthiabah and 
Mbiah, 1995). Moreover, the Acheampong government introduced occupational policies for 
improvement in working conditions and job security. Revival of state-owned ventures to 
reduce unemployment, abolition of development levy on workers, increments of wages and 
social security benefits illustrate this point.  
The NRC/SMC I government adopted a socialist-styled system of ‘autarky’ development 
somewhat similar to the CPP’s. In doing so, the NRC gained support from the rank and file of 
the CPP elements who had it not been for the death of Nkrumah on 27th April 1972 could 
have revived the CPP This is because by the end of 1971, Ghanaians had become convinced 
that the personal relations between Busia and the UK had failed to bring the development that 
was touted by the Busia-led government when it was in opposition. To fulfil the promises 
made at the takeover, Acheampong increased the remuneration of public servants and 
military personnel to counter the effects of the devaluation on real incomes and repudiated 
Ghana’s debts. The unilateral repudiation appeased the local population but incurred the 
wrath of the creditors. Acheampong’s popular resistance to the debt crisis is well summarised 
in his famous Akan rhetoric of “yentua”60. However, the growing fear of retaliation in trade 
and fiscal measures by the creditor states was contained at least from 1972 to 1974 when 
Ghana recorded a trade surplus from cocoa exports. The performance of the economy at that 
time contradicted mainstream economic analysis because the rise in the world cocoa market 
 
60 Yentua in Akan dialect translates as ‘we will not pay’. This radical slogan of resistance was an extension of 
Busia’s ‘kafu mpo didi’ which also translates as ‘even the debtor eats’. These words of defiance were directed 
at Western creditors to protest against the unbearable burden of debt servicing on the development of Ghana. 
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price were sustained for almost three years to consequently buffer the effects of the 
devaluation. 
7.5 The Ghanaian economy and prospects of development under the NRC /SMC 1 
In the first three years of the Acheampong administration, the Ghanaian economy showed 
signs of relief towards economic prosperity as cocoa price increased to ameliorate Ghana’s 
external reserves. Given the unprecedented trade surpluses recorded between 1972 and 1974, 
both the gross and net external reserves were at historical levels above the Busia’s era 
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). The actual government revenue and expenditure for 1972 to 1974 
increased from ₵ 420 million to ₵584 million, and ₵543 million to ₵754 million respectively 
but the ratios of imports to GDP fell from 19.3 percent to 16.2 percent and 14.9 percent to 
12.5 percent for the same periods (IMF, 1988).  
The Acheampong government shifted focus from market reforms to state-owned agriculture 
for food and raw material production of self-reliance/sufficiency with less interest in cocoa 
production. Until 1975, the Acheampong government enjoyed unexpected increases in cocoa 
export revenue and was credited for attempts at economic revival (Chazan, 1983; Boahen, 
1988). In addition, the unilateral reprieve of the debt during the periods of increased export 
revenue enabled Acheampong to set forward his development ideas of ‘Operation Feed 
Yourself and ‘Self-reliance’61. Acheampong was aware that the consequences of the 
repudiation meant that imports would have to be paid for in advance or the banks would have 
to accumulate large reserves to negotiate for shipper’s credits. Given this, the central bank 
was to accumulate enough reserves for this purpose and divert its attention from external 
capital cash flows. In doing so, Ghana was to rely on domestic savings and investments rather 
 
61 Self-reliance was a strategy negotiated by the Bank of Ghana with the Acheampong regime that allowed the 
central bank freedom to manage trade and exchange in the external sectors with a view to mitigate 
unacceptable trade deficits.   
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than foreign capital inflow and industrial imports for economic development. However, on 
the advice of the Bank of Ghana about the consequences of unilateral repudiation, 
Acheampong agreed to allow the central bank to initiate autarkic management of the external 
sector to avoid intolerable deficits. By the Self-Reliance agreement the Bank of Ghana 
revalued the cedi towards the pre-devaluation rate but the nominal exchange rate remained 
stronger than under Busia. However, Acheampong’s model of defiance in the repudiation 
saga began to wither when the restrictions of consumer imports (medicine, agricultural 
inputs, technical assistance, industrial hardware and automobile spare parts) and foreign 
capital investment began to take its toll on economic development. By 1973, Ghana entered 
into silent negotiations with her major creditors in Rome to ease the consequences of 
unilateral repudiation as oil prices increased. The negotiations coincided with the retirement 
of the governor of the central bank, Frimpong-Ansah62, and replacement of the self-reliance 
pact with a more amenable relations. In 1974 the effects of the oil price hikes were almost 
absorbed by the increase in the world cocoa market price giving reassurance of economic 
steadfastness. However, an initial assessment of the cocoa boom seemed to have created a 
false sense of economic security for the Acheampong administration to encourage increased 
government expenditures even though by his reversal of Busia’s fiscal policies, government 
revenue was technically lost. In 1975, the economic crisis instigated internal power struggle 
within the high-ranking officials of the military.  
To reassert his authority as the commander-in-chief of the GAF and appease his colleagues, 
Acheampong metamorphosed the NRC into SMC 1, promoted himself to the rank of a 
 
62 Dr Jonathan H Frimpong-Ansah was a renowned Ghanaian economist and only governor ranked official 
(deputy-governor and governor) who progressively served four consecutive governments of different political 
leanings – CPP, NLC, PP, and NRC. He studied Statistics at the London School of Economics, Monetary 
Economics at the IMF, and Economics of Development at the University of Salford in 1983. He was awarded 
the John Hearne Prize for the best Ph.D. thesis in 1989. This led to the publication of his best-seller, The 
Vampire State in Africa. Frimpong served in many distinguished positions at home and abroad. 
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General and departed from conventional administrative practices by appointing senior 
military officers to head public institutions. The military extended favours to close relatives 
and small scale commercial intermediaries of ‘Makola’ market women, some of whom 
became powerful because of their intimate relations with senior military personnel. The 
increased chains of distribution with abnormal profiteering increased prices drastically and 
reduced real incomes of public servants and lower rank military personnel to conditions 
similar to that cited by Acheampong during the takeover in 1972. In June 1978, the UK 
government offered ECGD commercial credit worth £10 million however, it could not 
improve conditions to satisfactory levels. Acheampong created his own nemesis by defying 
Weberian bureaucratic principles and engaged in nepotism, corruption, mismanagement and 
bad government policies. These eroded confidence in the value of the cedi and real incomes 
of labour, engendered university strikes and labour unrests, as well as criticisms from the 
Association of Recognised Professional Bodies (ARPB), Catholic Church, People’s 
Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ), and other pressure groups.  
7.6 Demise of the SMC 1 
It is uncomplicated to deduce from the foregoing analysis that beside the usual external 
influence, Acheampong’s demise was the product of his own seed of destruction. By ignoring 
the statecraft and diplomacy needed to revive the economy, the Acheampong government 
added to the decline of the economy. The rejection of the IMF/ODA medium-term 
development plan, though with good intentions, had ramifications for trade and development. 
Others, such as the mis-management of cocoa revenues and fusion of the military with state 
bureaucracy were inexcusable. Acheampong made gains in his first three years in office but 




Ghana lost about a fifth of her cocoa production and foreign exchange earnings through 
smuggling by farmers to neighbouring Ivory Coast (now Côte d'Ivoire). This was in response 
to the heavy taxes imposed by the Acheampong administration whilst his conglomerates 
filled their personal accounts with state resources. The fall in cocoa export revenue, systemic 
corruption and black marketing exacerbated the scarcity of foreign exchange needed for 
essential imports to local industries that were operating at about 20 percent capacity. Given 
the scarcity of industrial and domestic products as against increased demand it is plausible 
that inflation rose to 150 percent. In essence, the high inflation reduced the real incomes of 
workers and de-legitimised the Acheampong government. In an official letter from James 
Mellon63 to David Owen64 dated 29th December 1978, the author stated “I was appalled by 
Acheampong’s complacency and self-satisfaction; he had no inkling of what he was doing. 
He must rank as the McGonagail of economic management” (PREM 16/2060). 
In February 1978, Acheampong presided over police brutality against demonstrating students 
and jailed dozens of political activists without trial. As a diversionary from the economic 
problems, Acheampong touted the idea of a non-partisan union government of traditional 
chiefs and bureaucrats. The 54 percent approval ratings of the ‘UNIGOV’ referendum held 
on 30 March 1978 was generally believed to have been rigged. Oquaye65 (1980: 67-110) 
suggests that Acheampong’s final attempts to insulate himself from public reproach by 
introducing a union government failed to rescue him. On 5th July 1978, a group of middle-
 
63 Sir James Mellon is a Scottish diplomat. He served as Chancellor and Head of Chancery, UK Delegation to 
European Communities, 1970 – 1973; Head of Science and Technology Department Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) 1973 – 1975;  Head of Trade Relations and Export Department, FCO 1976 – 1978; 
High Commissioner to Ghana and Ambassador to Togo, 1978 – 1983.  
64 Lord David Anthony Llewellyn Owen is a British politician and non-practicing medical practitioner. Owen 
joined the Labour Party and Fabian Society, but resigned in 1972 in protest at Labour’s opposition to the EEC. 
He returned in 1974. Owen served as Minister of State (FCO) 1976 -1977; Foreign Secretary 1977 - 1979.  
65 Professor Aaron Mike Oquaye of the New Patriotic Party is the current Speaker of Parliament in Ghana.    
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rank soldiers led by the then Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Akuffo, with the 
support of the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies (ARPB)66 forced General 
Acheampong to resign and was placed under house arrest. However, the economic crisis and 
mismanagement that led to Acheampong’s removal did not depart with him.  
7.7 The SMC 2: 1978 to 1979 
The principal reason cited by Akuffo for the takeover on 5th July, 1978 was that 
Acheampong had been “running a one man show” (PREM 16/2060). However, in a 
confidential letter signed by James Mellon to David Owen, the author puts forward that 
Akuffo ousted Acheampong “not because of his (Acheampong’s) economic or political 
management, but the interest of the officer corps were under attack” (PREM 16/2060). 
Shortly after taking office, Akuffo sent his debut personal letter to the British Prime Minister 
James Callaghan on 25th August, 1978 to seek for financial assistance to revitalise the ailing 
economy and to enable a return to constitutional governance. While waiting for an outcome 
of his letter, a series of labour unrests threatened law and order, and economic activities.  
There were strikes at the Tema Oil Refinery and other power installations. Electricity-
dependent economic and domestic services grounded to a halt in the Accra and Tema 
environs. Strikes organised by the civil service including Customs and Immigration Services 
led to the summons of the Secretary General of the TUC to an emergency meeting with the 
Executive. Realising its weak legitimacy, the SMC II government assumed emergency 
powers on 6th November 1978. In a televised broadcast to the nation, Akuffo declared that 
the main objectives of the 1978/79 budget would not be compromised and urged Ghanaians 
not to extend the budgetary deficit (₵800 m or £150 m) beyond its limits. To demonstrate his 
 
66 Association of Recognised Professional Bodies (ARPB) consisted of members of the Ghana Bar Association, 
medical professionals, engineers, pharmacists, surveyor and accountants associations who share common 
interests and held governments accountable through its representations on public boards and strikes. 
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commitment to IMF/ODA £20m aid programme, the Akuffo government devalued the cedi 
by 62 percent. However, by adopting a more flexible exchange rate to attract foreign 
investment, the effect of the devaluation led to further decrease in the value of the cedi from 
₵1.15=$1 to ₵2.75=$1, without resolving the balance of payment deficit (FCO 65/2187). The 
Akuffo military government issued a public warning that any attempt to sabotage the 
objectives of the budget would be met with prompt and severe response. Given this 
commitment to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Akuffo suppressed labour rights and 
unembedded with unionised labour that consequently invigorated the Social Democratic 
Front (SDF), an offshoot of the TUC, to vie for 120 out of the 140 seats in the 1979 general 
elections but secured only 3 seats. 
James Callaghan, took personal interest in Akuffo’s request for his efforts to restore law and 
order within the military and civil service as well as acceptance of the austerity programme. 
In response, the Prime Minister wrote to inform Akuffo on 6th October, 1978 of his 
government’s preparedness to assist Ghana to revitalise her economy subject to the 
conditions of the IMF. Akuffo welcomed this gesture in his reply to Callaghan on 28th 
October, 1978. While the UK government appreciated the efforts of Akuffo to revive the 
economy and return the country to democracy, it was not oblivious to the fact that the IMF 
conditions could create a recipe for another military intervention. In J.S. Wall’s67 letter to 
B.G. Cartledge68 on 17th November 1978 the U.K. government highlighted not only her 
confidence in the Akuffo government but also the inevitability of labour unrests in protest 
 
67 Sir John Stephen Wall is a retired British diplomat. He served as the Head of European Community (Internal) 
Department, FCO 1985 – 1988; Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 1988 - 1990; Private 
Secretary Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister,  1991 – 1993.    
68 Sir Bryan B. Cartledge is a retired British diplomat and academic. He served as FCO, 1975 -1977; Private 
Secretary (Foreign Affairs) to the Prime Minister, 1977- 1979; Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (Defence), 1983 – 1984. 
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against the IMF’s austerity policies. In the last two paragraphs Wall wrote, “Some unrest on 
the part of the labour forces in Ghana was to be expected as a result of the stiff measures that 
the government have been and are determined to take out to put the economy to rights. 
…Further industrial unrest can probably be expected, but the government appear to be 
determined to deal with it” (PREM 16/2060). Mellon, in correspondence with Owen argued, 
“I am convinced that at present Akuffo means to hand over power to a civilian government; 
but he knows this will not survive long if the economy is not on the mend” (PREM 16/2060). 
Akuffo’s first task was to form a government of integrity to steer his scheduled one year in 
office. A few kind words from Prince Charles who personally knew Akuffo and had high 
regard for him added weight to Ghana’s request for aid. After a private conversation with 
Akuffo on 10th January, 1979, Judith Hart69 predicted in paragraph (4) of her feedback dated 
26th February 1979 to the prime minister that the economic situation in Ghana at that time 
was likely to give grounds for the emergence of a socialist party or an ultra-leftist party with 
Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideology (of which the AFRC initially fit the description). In 
essence, Hart had a positive impression of the Akuffo government and made 
recommendations to that effect to creditors. In January, Ghana received £5million from the 
IMF for essential imports with a view to receive the remaining £15million once agreement 
had been reached.  
The positives are that many of the aid provided short term relief in periods of economic 
challenges and were seemingly interest-free but carried with it the objectives of the neo-
colonial project in the sense that it consolidate the core-periphery dependency culture. 
However, in the 9th paragraph, Hart made a submission that inadvertently illustrates how aid 
 
69 Baroness Judith Hart (née Ridehalgh) was a Labour Party politician. Hart served as the Minister of State, 
Commonwealth Office (1966–1967), and as Minister of Overseas Development (1969–70, 1974–75 and 1977-
79) under Prime Minsters Wilson and Callaghan. 
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to Ghana benefited the UK economy. The Ministry of Overseas Department wrote “Almost 
every development project which we discussed as possibilities for our development 
cooperation will bring direct industrial benefit to us, involving vehicles, bridging, cranes, 
railway rolling stock, aircraft, telecommunications, power equipment, trawlers, barges, silos 
and others. There should in due course be a good industrial ‘spin-off’” (FCO 65/2187). While 
it is beneficial for the UK to export her products at its preferred prices under the aid 
arrangements, the prices of Ghana’s exports to the UK were determined by developed states. 
The advanced west found it advantageous to maintain this trading culture and Ghanaian 
officials who argued against the status quo were described with negative remarks in the High 
Commission’s personality notes on Ghanaian diplomats and politicians. For instance Gloria 
Nikoi70 was described as ‘a difficult woman’ by James Mellon (then British High 
Commissioner to Ghana) and his predecessor.  
Aid consists of loans, debt rearrangements/refinancing, technical assistance/cooperation, food 
aid and other assistance.  Ghana’s main trading partner, the UK held about 25 percent of the 
market share with the principal exports being industrial raw materials, foodstuffs and 
machinery. In return, Ghana exported cocoa, timber and gold to the UK economy. With an 
exchange rate of £1= ₵5.35 (in 1979) and a population of about 10.2 million (in 1976), 
agriculture dominated economic activities in Ghana. Agriculture accounted for 42 percent of 
gross domestic product and employed about 60 percent of active labour. The agriculture 
sector was dominated by cocoa which accounted for 60 percent of export revenue and 30 
percent to government revenue (FCO 65/2187). However, as cocoa revenue decreased due to 
falling prices the Ghana government searched for loans to fulfil its role in development. 
 
70 Mrs Gloria Nikoi served under the Akuffo government and was reappointed as the Commissioner of Foreign 
Affairs by the Rawlings-led AFRC government. She was described in personality profile, held by the UK 
government on Ghanaian officials, as being ‘difficult’ in performance of her duties. However, this description 
fits those who are assertive and strict in their engagements with the west. 
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Among the loans advanced to Ghana during this period, was an interest free maintenance 
loan of £20 million signed in November 1978, in cooperation with the IMF, for British spare 
parts. Others consisted of £13 million USAID programme in agriculture; Canadian water 
project; a DM40m loan for agro-water projects – Volta river transportation, Bui river hydro-
electricity, and agriculture in the northern region. 
7.8 Economic Reform and attempts at Development 
Against the background of economic problems, the Akuffo government committed to the 
ODA/IMF austerity proposal. Akuffo agreed to this idea and on 25th August, 1978 devalued 
the cedi by 62 percent (from ₵1.69 = $1 to ₵2.75 = $1). On the same day, Akuffo wrote to 
the British Prime Minister fully aware that the path he was about to take was politically 
treacherous. He stated, “We recognise that the measures that will lead to economic recovery 
will be harsh, and sometimes difficult” (PREM 16/2060). True to his word the SMC II 
presented a rigid budget on 12th September 1978 that reduced the deficit from its existing 
120 percent of gross domestic product to 40 percent representing a two-third reduction of 
deficit funding and severe cuts in government expenditures. The reduction in government 
expenditures and adoption of flexible exchange rates made exports cheaper but nothing 
meaningful to development. The illusion that under the existing conditions the government 
could encourage savings, step up production levels, carry out development programmes, and 
reduce reliance on the banking system failed. 
Following her visit to Ghana and witnessing the economic conditions at first hand, Mrs Hart 
wrote to the Washington office, under the caption ‘Ghana and IMF’ to express two key 
concerns about the impact of the IMF fiscal management and its risk to the transition. She 
noted, “Two points worry me. The first is that any suggestion of further devaluation at this 
time could seriously set back the planned return to civilian government. The second is that 
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the foreign exchange problems here are affecting very seriously the export earning industries, 
whose greater success are vital to Ghana’s recovery” (PREM 16/2060). September 1978 was 
a decisive moment for the Ghana government as the UK government deliberated on Ghana’s 
request for economic assistance. This study discovers that at least two correspondences from 
Kieran Prendergast71 to Bryan Carteledge dated 1st and 29thSeptember,1979 seemed to have 
kept David Owen72 in the dark for a while because both letters suggested that “it has not yet 
been seen by Dr Owen” (PREM 16/2060). On 6th October, 1979 Prime Minister Callaghan 
wrote to inform Akuffo of his approval for a £10 million ECGD commercial credits and £20 
million government programme aid. This was in the form of interest-free loan repayable over 
25 years with a 7 year grace period for the purchase of British goods and services (spare 
parts, raw materials, low-level technological inputs for communication and industry). Of the 
£20million suggested, £5million was offered for most urgent needs and £15million in the 
form of standby credits to be made available subject to a satisfactory agreement with the IMF 
Akuffo was deeply aware that his political survival depended on the assistance he received 
from the external sector to revitalise the economy. While this explains Akuffo’s shift in 
economic policy from his predecessor’s socialist-style to a more neoliberal approach, it also 
created opportunity for the UK government to revive employment in ailing home industries. 
Governments of Ghana have been moderate and generally amenable to Western-oriented 
policies and Akuffo was no exception as noted by Judith Hart when she wrote “General 
Akuffo turned to us first for help and advice in revitalising the Ghanaian economy” (PREM 
16/2060).  
 
71 Sir W. Kieran Predergast served as the Head of Southern Africa Department, FCO (1986-1989). 
72 Dr David Llewellyn Owen was a medical practitioner and British politician. Among other distinguished 
positions held by Owen, he served as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1977-1979) 
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 On 26th January, 1979, Wall requested that Cartledge brought to the attention of the prime 
minister a copy of ‘Ghana’s Annual Review for 1978’ as compiled by Mellon. In summary, 
the 10-point document addressed in paragraphs (1) to (3): Acheampong’s mismanagement of 
the Ghanaian economy and his ineptitude in promoting the Union Government programme; 
(4) to (6) - highlighted the efforts made by the newly reconstituted SMC II administration to 
repair the damage it inherited, and British assistance to the SMC II and its justifications; (7) 
to (8) - approved of Akuffo’s intention to return Ghana to democratic rule but concerned 
about the emergence of leading personalities; (9) highlighted Ghana’s hospitality to British 
officials; and (10) dispatches. The idea was that Owen was convinced that paragraph (6) 
would appeal to Callaghan as a “good example of aid policy sensible applied”. Mellon wrote, 
“I am convinced that at present Akuffo means to hand over power to a civilian government; 
but he knows this will not survive long if the economy is not on the mend. ... The aid and 
credits being spent on spare parts and renewing British equipment are promoting and 
strengthening the kind of exports that keep jobs in areas of the UK particularly vulnerable to 
unemployment” (FCO 16/2060). Thus under the pretext of development, the UK government 
astutely used capital aid and credits on renewable British hardware and spare parts to keep 
jobs in areas of the UK that were particularly vulnerable to unemployment. That is not to 
understate the short-term benefit of UK aid to Ghana, but to illustrate the unfair culture of 
trade between the two historically embedded states.  
There are many reasons why the UK extends aid to Ghana. While many believe that Ghana 
provides a sizeable source of raw material, ready market and employment for British 
industries, there are far-reaching and important benefits. Yet, some aid programme only go to 
further the dependency theory. For instance, the ‘Summary of Requirements’ presented by 
the Ghanaian delegation to the UK government on 30th August, 1978, explains a cause of 
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higher food prices under the SMC II government. The delegation consisted of Air vice-
Marshall Boakye, Dr. J.L.S. Abbey (Commissioner for Economic Planning), Mr Alex E.K. 
Ashiabor, (Governor of Bank of Ghana), and Mrs A.Y. Aggrey-Orleans (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) presented a £27million costed list of items for assistance. However, out of this 
£13.5million related to the Export sector; £11.5mllion for Transport; £1.2million for Water 
resources; and only £0.8million for Agriculture (PREM 16/2060). Donor agencies such as the 
ODA influence the direction of aid because they are accountable to their respective 
parliaments and taxpayers for the loans that they extend to other states (Whitley, 2009: 4). 
Meanwhile, the Akuffo government knew that a successful outcome of aid negotiations must 
first and foremost be preceded by commitment to a kind of political reform that gave 
investors’ confidence in his leadership and of good returns to their investments in Ghana. 
7.9 Political Reforms towards Constitutional Rule 
The political reform was a demonstration by the Ghana government to first, reassure its 
creditors that Ghana was committed to democratic way of doing business to attract foreign 
investment, and second, to meet the expectations of the people particularly the middle class. 
As part of the grand plan towards constitutional rule, the SMC II was to hand over power to a 
wholly civilian non-partisan national government on 1st July 1979 to bring into effect the 
constitution of the 3rd Republic. The choice of 1st July was to commemorate the 19th 
anniversary of Ghana’s Republic Day (1st July, 1960). This was to usher in party political 
activities for a general election with the official handover scheduled for 1st January 1980. 
Had this taken place as planned, it would have been the first local elections in ten years to 
mark the end of a decade long of military adventures in Ghanaian politics. However, latter 
events forestalled the transitional programme. Akuffo invited officials of commendable 
reputations namely Lieutenant General Joshua Hamidu, Air vice Marshall Boakye and Dr 
Joseph Abbey, and declared his intention to return Ghana to democratic governance by 
220 
 
handing over to a ‘national’ coalition government. The political/constitutional reforms 
generated a cross-section of ideas from many Ghanaians, including Kwesi Armah73 but 
Akuffo had his reservation about the interest of this former diplomat.  
On 8th January, 1979 J.S. Wall wrote to B.G. Cartledge to confirm receipt of a signed copy 
of Kwesi Armah’s proposal for political and economic reforms to General Akuffo under the 
caption ‘National Government and the Search for Political and Economic Stability’. Armah 
had written to Akuffo on 20th September 1978 to remind Akuffo that economic progress was 
inseparable from political stability. Armah aimed to convince Akuffo to reengage with party 
politics and abandon the Union Government initiative of Acheampong. However, I contest 
Armah’s idea for the following reasons: First and foremost, the suggestion for a non-elective 
parliament of about 80 to 100 like-minded members who were to vote at its first siting to 
shorten its own life to trigger a general election of three to four political parties was 
problematic. This was because, besides the uncertainty about Armah’s credibility, his 
suggestion was undemocratic and cynical at a time when Ghana aimed to abandon militarism 
and advance democracy for development. Personality profile held by the British High 
Commission on Armah’s character and his unpatriotic acts after his ambassadorial 
assignment casted doubt on the reliability of his proposal. Second, the idea of adherence to an 
overarching Common Policy that overrides policies from political parties was contentious. 
Armah argued that “it is important for the country as a whole to work towards a ‘political 
truce’ remember that the timetable for return to civilian rule has not come about voluntarily”. 
And that “the return to civilian rule is the response to pressure and non-cooperative action 
 
73 Kwesi Armah was the Ghana High Commissioner to the UK during the Nkrumah era. He was described in the 
personality note of the F.C.O. as someone who should not be left unattended in the Prime Minister’s office 
when the latter goes out because he could help himself with the PM’s official letter head and use it as ‘blanche 
carte’ for his own objective. Nkrumah trusted Armah, and after his overthrow the NLC issued an extradition 
order for Armah on charges of embezzlement. The UK courts and Home Secretary Jenkins found no basis for 
the extradition. Armah lived in the UK and maintained contact with some UK government officials.    
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precipitated by professional bodies, students and churches” (FCO 16/2061). The existing 
conditions at that time and Armah’s own credibility discounted the proposal. 
In a confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Accra to the West African 
Division of the FCO in London dated 31st March 1979, Akuffo assured all 16 political parties 
on 29th March, 1979 that the SMC II would only remain in power with the consent of the 
parties. However, 13 out of the 16 political parties called for the SMC II to delay the 
elections mainly because the timetable precluded the leaders of the two main political parties 
– People’s National Party (PNP) and Popular Front Party (PFP) – from contesting the 
presidential and parliamentary elections. Akuffo advised all parties to forward their problems 
to the electoral commissioner and constituent assembly in the first instance and only return to 
the SMC if their problems remained unresolved. Unlike Acheampong, Akuffo was treated 
more favourably by the UK in terms of fiscal control because he accepted the neoliberal 
trajectory at the onset.  Paragraph (3) of the telegram suggests that based on the success of the 
currency change under the Akuffo government, “many Ghanaians believe that the revival of 
the Ghanaian economy can best be directed by a military government” because the economy 
was showing early signs of revival, however, from the point view of UK interest, civilian 
government was preferred (FCO 16/2060). Akuffo knew that parliamentary government was 
impossible without party politics and foreign investment was more feasible in democracy 
though in some instances western government support autocratic regimes so long as it serves 
her interest.  
On 7th February 1979, George Walden74 wrote to Cartledge with a proposal to invite Akuffo 
to the UK from 7th to 12th April, 1979 for talks with Prime Minister James Callaghan’s 
 
74 George G.H. Walden served as the Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary (1978-1981); Head of 
Planning Staff, FCO (1982-1983). 
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government and the Queen. However, this study discovers that paragraph (4) of Cartledge’s 
reply to Walden has been erased and marked “passage deleted and closed, 40 years under the 
Freedom Of Information Exemption”. Meanwhile, the political uncertainty at that time 
militated against Akuffo’s ability to honour the invitation as scheduled. In a signed letter 
from the Office of the Chairman of the Supreme Military Council to the Right Honourable 
Callaghan dated 2nd April, 1979, Akuffo stated “It is with a sense of deep regret that I had to 
ask for postponement in the light of certain developments in the political scene in Ghana 
which require my presence here” (FCO 16/2060). Akuffo’s premonition was right, despite the 
political activities towards election, the austerity deepened the economic hardships and 
created space for possibility of military intervention.  
In a confidential memo from the British High Commission to Sheila Griffith-Jones (West 
African Department, FCO) dated 21st May, Colonel Bernasko (Action Congress Party) and 
Victor Owusu (Popular Front Party) were positive of the election but not oblivious of the 
economic challenges ahead. By April 1979, all 10 presidential aspirants of the six political 
parties and four independent candidates had been confirmed for the June general elections. 
They were Hilla Limann - People’s National Party (PNP); Victor Owusu - Popular Front 
Party (PFP); William Ofori Atta - United National Convention (UNC); Frank Bernasko - 
Action Congress Party (ACP); John Bilson - Third Force Party (TFP); Ibrahim - Social 
Democratic Front (SDF); with Mark Diamond Addy, Kwame Nyanteh, Imoru Ayama, and 
Robert P. Baffour (first Vice Chancellor of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and 
Technology) as independent candidates.  
7.10 The end of the Akuffo regime 
Unlike his predecessor (Acheampong) Akuffo’s relationship with the TUC was not cordial. 
The SMC II government suppressed the ARPB, TUC and students reactions to the effects of 
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the austerity and tough monetary measures. These measures contributed to job losses, 
economic hardships that could not be ignored by the public. In an official correspondence 
from Wall to Cartledge dated 17th November 1978, Wall noted that the labour unrest was a 
natural response to the “stiff measures that the government have been and are determined to 
take to put the economy to rights. … At the same time the government was aware that their 
room for manoeuvre with the IMF is very limited and this will have helped the SMC to 
maintain a firm position” (PREM 16/2060). Akuffo turned against the ARPB and students, 
and suppressed press freedom. In effect, the Civil Servant’s strike collapsed with individual 
unions appealing to the government to relent on its decision to summarily dismiss workers 
who had taken part in the strikes. In response, the government established a body to negotiate 
disputes between itself and the civil servants but it was too little and too late. Middle and 
lower ranks in the military were dissatisfied with the continued economic conditions and 
Akuffo’s reluctance to trial Acheampong on corruption and other charges. Governments are 
installed and removed depending upon what they are able to deliver from whatever resources 
that remained (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 111). Like his predecessors (Busia and Acheampong) 
Akuffo destiny was determined for him by the external creditors. On the one hand, 
governments that advanced neoliberalism in Ghana were abandoned to their fate when labour 
and social unrests threatened their existence. On the other hand governments that advanced 
populist policies (as did Nkrumah) were liked by the people but rejected by external creditors 
who eventually incite local opposition against the government for regime change.  
The essential features of the Akuffo government were that he re-established good relations 
with the creditors but was unable to draw the creditors to revisit the proposals Busia 
submitted at the 1970 Conference that were rejected. By taking a hard stance towards 
unionised labour, Akuffo ignored the embeddedness that was much needed to implement the 
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IMF austerity programme and in effect antagonised public sentiments. This gave support for 
failed coup d'état in May and the subsequent one in June that led to the capture of Akuffo at 
the Holy Spirit Cathedral Church (where this research student worshipped as a young person) 
Thus, in pursuit of investment capital to revitalise Ghana’s economy, Akuffo ignored the 
interest of the productive labour force and acceded to the directives of foreign creditors. 
While many governments in Ghana, past and present, find themselves in this political 
dilemma, it is yet to be discovered the kind of balanced interests that appeal to both external 
creditors and the people of Ghana.  
In sum, though Ghana was a sovereign state the UK’s interest in trade dominated public 
policy. The Diplomatic Report No. 117/80 dated 25th January, 1980 under the heading: 
‘Ghana: Annual Review for 1979’, from Mellon to the FCO illustrates the case of unfair trade 
between Ghana and the UK. In this confidential document the British High Commissioner 
wrote, “The last seven years of military rule have been bad for the Ghanaian economy … But 
during this time our exports rose from £16.5m in 1972 to £119m in 1978. Even with all the 
turbulences which I am about to record for 1979, our exports to Ghana should be about £90m. 
This is what can be achieved in relatively bad year” (FCO 65/2322). Similarly, the 
‘Commercial Background Brief’ prepared by the Department of Trade in London for the 
attention of Mrs Hart illustrates the imbalances of trade and underdevelopment. In paragraph 
(4) it states, “Although UK exports to Ghana have risen over recent years in value and real 
terms, Ghana’s economic position has deteriorated”(FCO 65/2187). At the first ever global 
declaration against corruption summit held in London in May 2016, the then UK Prime 
Minister, David Cameron and the US Secretary of State, John Kerry both admitted that there 
are hundreds of millions of corrupt monies from Africa circulating in economy of Western 
states (https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016).  
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Corruption as stated in the paragraph, could not thrive without the complicity of the West 
who benefit from the stolen public funds from underdeveloped states. Clearly, the UK (like 
other creditors of the conceptual west) say with their mouths (interest to help Ghana develop) 
what they do not mean in their hearts. As the African proverb goes ‘when the buffalos fight, 
it is the joy of the vulture’ because when they kill each other, the vulture gets its food easily. 
Similarly, the main beneficiaries of wars are the leading manufacturers of ammunitions and 
security equipment who deploy subtle ways to engage in war mongering but sponsor Peace 
prizes to conceal their motives. 
7.11 The May 15th Uprising and June 4th Revolution 
The Rawlings-led military coup d'état that failed to overthrow the SMC II in May 1979 had 
been considered by Rawlings and Major (then Captain) Boakye-Djan (Rawlings’ best man in 
1977) but without specific date. In the early hours of that fateful day, Rawlings and a few of 
his colleagues from the Ghana Air Force took control of the Accra Air Force Station at 
Burma Camp, the military headquarters. They captured two MOWAG armoured vehicles 
manned by the Recce Regiment and deployed these on the airfield as they captured senior 
officers on their way to work. However, the capture of the vehicles and men from the Recce 
infuriated the regiment hence the unit refused to support Rawlings. By morning, many 
officers passing through the airfield to work had been arrested. However, by noon soldiers 
from the Recce Regiment led by their Commanding Officer, Major Abubakar Sulemana 
overpowered the Rawlings insurgence and took the latter into military custody (FCO 
65/2178). Rawlings stood trial before a military court but in his defence he cited the 
economic condition that engendered his revolt. This resonated with a large section of the 
general public and the military. Hutington (1957) suggests that the rationale for military 
interventions are not limited to military grievances but of a wider societal problem. After the 
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trial, Rawlings and his men were placed under military guard with strong indication that they 
were to be executed but Akuffo did not appear to favour execution. 
The depositions asserted by Rawlings at his trial and pressure from intelligence to 
imminently execute Rawlings and his men reinvigorated a group of young soldiers led by 
Boakye-Djan75 to stage the June 4th 1979, bloody coup d'état that freed Rawlings from 
military custody to lead the revolution. Rawlings and his men formed the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and embarked on a ‘house cleansing’ exercise to purge 
corruption out of the military and civil society, and advance a moral revolution to improve 
the welfare of the people. On 6th June the AFRC announced its membership as follows: 
Rawlings as chairman, Boakye-Djan as spokesman, Major Mensah Poku, Major Mensah 
Gbedemah, Warrant Officer 1 Obeng, Lieutenant Commander Barnor, Private Owusu Adu, 
Lance Corporal Gatsiko, Corporal Owusu Boateng; and Staff Sergeant Alex Adjei as 
members (Keatley, 1979). The AFRC restructured the service commands with trusted senior 
officers and appointed 12 civilian Commissioners to head strategic government 
establishments. The main objectives of the AFRC were to purge the establishment of 
corruption and uphold social justices to improve the living standards of the people and 
conditions of service of the military. In his broadcast speech to the nation on 5th June, 
Rawlings adopted a Marxian proposition to justify the military intervention as “… a natural 
reaction to the unjustifiable hardships that we have been through during the last few years” 
(FCO 65/2178). Rawlings had been enraged by the falling standard of living and in particular 
the service conditions for junior and non-commissioned officers. And, by all indications, the 
country was in serious economic and political crisis that required some form of intervention. 
 
75 Major Kojo Boakye-Djan was a military intelligence officer and main architect of the June 4th coup d’état that 
freed Rawlings from military custody whilst the latter awaited execution for treason. Boakye-Djan, friend of 
Rawlings and best man at his wedding, broke ties with Rawlings to register his protest against the 31st 
December coup d'état with calls Rawlings to be prosecuted for treason.  
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According to the Guardian, Rawlings’ broadcast to the nation confirmed his belief that Ghana 
needed a moral revolution of accountability and integrity to solve her problems as done in 
other states (Keatley, 1979). The new regime gave legal backing to continue the suspension 
of the 1969 constitution and ruled by decree until a new constitution was promulgated (FCO 
65/2178). Though the June 4th revolution is indelible in the political history of Ghana, it 
owes its place to the military revolt of 15th May, 1979. 
However, few days after the uprising, an internal conflict ensued within the AFRC hierarchy 
between the junior officers and others ranks who actually staged the coup. While the junior 
officers wanted to restore the moral integrity of the army by bringing corrupt senior officials 
to justice, the other ranks sought to better their conditions. In confidential telegrams (211 and 
212) dated 10th June 1979 addressed to the FCO by J. Brasnett76, the author referred to 
discussions that Colonel Vivian (Commanding Officer of CMAT) had with Colonel Dan Prah 
(Chief of Defence Staff) to illustrate the situation in the army. The concerns raised by 
Colonel Prah consisted of the failure to agree on reward to the military; the military 
intelligence’s suspicion about Captain Boakye-Djan’s double-standard; disagreement about 
release of senior officers; takeover of foreign (Syrian, Lebanese and Indian) business; and the 
₵10 million ransom allegedly offered by Lebanese and Indian businesses to some military 
men to assassinate Rawlings and his family (FCO 65/2178).  
According to Brasnett, although Rawlings resented the exploitation by these business 
community, he believed that expatriates were needed to rebuild the economy. In a telegram 
from Brasnett (number 213 of 11th June), the AFRC denied reports that it was communist-
inclined and reaffirmed its commitment to the election schedule and that the AFRC respected 
Ghana’s foreign policy because they valued the nation’s relations with the United Nations, 
 
76 Jon Brasnett was the Deputy High Commissioner in Ghana, 1977-1980 (during the 1979 revolution). 
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Organisation of African Union (now African Union), Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned 
Movement are vital for development.  
On 14th June the already drafted constitution was promulgated, and the UK government 
recognised the AFRC regime the following day. In the immediate aftermath the AFRC drew 
its support from some militant trade union activists without the approval of the leadership of 
the TUC (Asamoah, 2012). The people called for capital retribution against senior military 
officers of the erstwhile SMC I and II governments. On 16th June, the AFRC responded by 
publicly executing Generals Utuka and Acheampong by firing squad. Two days after the first 
executions Ghanaians went to the poll and the PNP led but without an outright majority. On 
26th June, the AFRC carried out the second public execution consisting of Lieutenant 
Generals Akuffo and Afrifa and other senior officers namely Major General R.E.A 
Kotei,(Chief of Defence Staff), Real Admiral J.K. Amedume (Chief of Navy Staff), Air Vice 
Marshall G.Y. Boakye (Chief of Air Staff). This attracted condemnation and sanctions from 
the West and neighbouring African states. At the elections, the PNP won in the round-off and 
the AFRC handed-over to the Limann government on 24th September 1979. With the 
exception of Rawlings, all military senior officers within the AFRC ruling body accepted 
offers from the UK, France, Germany and the US to pursue courses abroad. This astute 
initiative was coordinated by the UK government to allow the Limann administration space 
to govern because the west projected that economic conditions were likely to give rise to 
further military intervention and communist influence if the AFRC leadership remained in 
Ghana. In his report, Mellon stated that “If another AFRC comes on the scene, the Cubans, 
the East German and their Russian masters will be better prepared and Ghana could turn 
eastwards. The survival of Limann’s government is therefore a trade and political interest ..; 
and the general political and aid effort of this High Commission has economic and trade 
229 
 
relevance” (FCO 65/2322). The essential features of the June 4th,1979 revolution was that 
although it restored the moral integrity of the military, the brutality of the military in cases of 
suspected corruption led to a kind of praetorian state not conducive for foreign investment 
and private businesses because investors feared arbitrary confiscation of their investments by 
the military regime. 
7.12 The Limann government of the Third Republic: 1979 to 1981 
The Limann led-PNP government came to power on 24th September, 1979 amidst pressure to 
find solutions to the economic problems that incited the June 4th revolution. The likelihood 
of the new government lasting its full term depended on its ability to revive the anarchic 
economy it inherited. Ghana’s economic infrastructure was damaged, foreign investment was 
very low, and economic rehabilitation was at a standstill. The new government was faced 
with the challenge of explaining the deplorable economic conditions to private investors and 
devise ways to reinvigorate the private sector.  
Meanwhile, Ghanaians became intolerant to the economic rhetoric of the IMF and promises 
by local politicians without concrete evidence of improvements in living standards. Limann 
visited the UK from 12th to 17th May 1981 as his first port of call outside Africa since taking 
office. The main objects were to seek support for the new government on ways to secure 
credit to revive the failing economy. Ghanaians had been appreciative of the government’s 
efforts and hoped that the UK government could influence foreign investment on favourable 
terms. Limann’s ambitions to improve the economy diverted his attention from tensions 
within and the shenanigans of Rawlings and a few of his men. The economy shrunk in terms 
of gross domestic product, investment decreased, and the overall performance of the external 
sector dropped while population grew at 3 percent. In addition world cocoa prices dropped to 
about a third of its 1978 level and the demand as well as price of timber fell. Revenue from 
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gold exports was inadequate to make up for the lost in government revenue from other 
exports. The loss in foreign reserves as a result of the decrease in export revenue meant that 
essential domestic and industrial imports such as medicine and spare parts respectively were 
in short supply. Given the above problems, the IMF was indispensable in the government’s 
effort to rescue the economy by directing foreign capital into export-oriented industries such 
as agriculture, mining, forestry and transportation. In addition, the Limann government 
presented a new investment code to parliament with a view to attract domestic private 
investment into the cocoa and timber industries. The investment code covered investment 
areas such as liberalisation of trade, tax exemptions, and repatriations of profits by foreign 
firms. But the Limann government operated under the shadows of Rawlings and the military. 
Granted that democratically elected governments faced with economic decay were prone to 
military interventions, the creditors could have balanced their economic imperatives with the 
political conditions in Ghana at that time. Apart from a few amendments, the IMF requested 
the Limann government in 1980 to revisit the stand-by arrangements it had with the Akuffo 
government. This consisted of first and foremost a request by the IMF to increase interest rate 
by 1 percent which was done, but later increased by 6 percent (13.5 to 19.5 percent) at the 
request of the IMF.  Additionally, the IMF’s insisted that the Ghana government increased 
cocoa producer prices. Though the Limann government wished to fulfil the party’s manifesto 
by increasing cocoa prices it could not do so at that time because of the decrease of the world 
market price. Cocoa prices were linked to adjustment in the exchange rate hence the Ghana 
Government suggested that the IMF allowed the government to negotiate with the cocoa 
farmers. In pursuit of the IMF’s request, the Limann government removed all subsidies on 
consumer goods and petroleum products, as well as decontrolled prices. The removal of 
subsidies contributed to decreased productivity and inflation. As petroleum subsidies were 
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abolished, transport fares, cost of goods and services rose, and reduced the real incomes of 
the labour force. Realising the dangers of the austerity to democracy, the UK and Ghana 
governments agreed that devaluation was to be avoided at that time because given the low 
level of productivity the conventional benefits of devaluation (reduction in export price and 
increase in import prices to correct the balance of payment deficit) would not have been 
achieved by devaluation of the cedi. In return for the austerity, the Ghana government 
requested for a £40 million concessionary loan of medium term credit and a £200 million 
ECGD support. Given that the economic conditions, financial constraints, pressure from the 
IMF, low productivity, and societal demand for socioeconomic development, the Limann 
government withdrew all cocoa subsidies to increase producer prices per load of produce. In 
essence, the price increases failed to improve the welfare of the farmer because they bought 
fertilisers, seeds and other farming inputs at inflationary prices.  
During the bilateral government talks held at Number 10 Downing Street on 13th May, 1981 
between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Limann, the latter acknowledged that 
although his party’s manifesto had committed to increases in cocoa producer prices, the 
response in productivity was likely to take some time. At this meeting, George Benneh 
(Finance Minister) complained that “Ghana had managed to fulfil virtually all the IMF’s 
requirements so far. However … each time Ghana fulfilled the conditions demanded by the 
IMF, the latter imposed new ones” (PREM 19/473). The present research study puts forward 
that the IMF could have appreciated the imperatives of political survival by advancing 
policies that would not have made the public to perceive the Limann government as puppets 
of the IMF because such views create space for military intervention. In a letter of gratitude 
by the president to the prime minster on the visitation dated 17th May, President Limann 
reiterated his acknowledgement of the conditions in Ghana in his first paragraph. He wrote, “ 
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… and also for the efforts we have so far made to reintroduce sanity into the anarchic 
economic, political and social situation we inherited in September 1979”(PREM 19/473). On 
21st May, the UK government extended an ECGD support and a medium term credit of £25 
million (in lieu of the £40 million requested by Limann) on condition that Ghana continued to 
repay her debts promptly. To demonstrate the UK government’s understanding to the 
political dimensions of the economic decay, the repayable period was held at 5 years (in lieu 
of 2 years) at a 7.5 percent moratorium rate (instead of the 12 to 16 percent market rate). But 
this was insufficient to revive the economy from decay. As the Finance Minister, George 
Benneh puts it, “if the dose of medicine for a very sick person was too small, it might not be 
sufficient to arrest the disease” (PREM 19/473). The logical extension of the Ghanaian 
experience, like many others in Africa, was that the economic was directly linked with the 
political. And given the circumstances that they found themselves in, the PNP government 
had no viable option than to request for foreign investment to revive the economy for 
development and political stability. As Baron Luce77 concluded, “… both the new multiparty 
democracy, and the government’s efforts to restore the economy, were on trial” (PREM 
19/473). Its inability to meet the expectations of the people and creditors simultaneously 






77 Baron Luce (Richard Napier Luce), served as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1979. In 1981, he was promoted to Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs within the same department but resigned in 1982 over the Falklands invasion. 
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SECTION FOUR: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ZOMBIE STATE 
Chapter 8: The Ghanaian Revolution and the Zombie State (1982-1992)   
8.1 Introduction   
This chapter critically examines Ghana’s political economy in the immediate decade (1982 to 
1992) after the Rawlings-led 31st December, 1981 revolution. It initially chronicles trends of 
economic stagnation and decline leading up to the revolution to interpret the development 
trajectory of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)78 government and its 
development outcomes. The second half of the chapter discusses possibilities of a 
developmental state in Ghana to address the protracted underdevelopment that has 
stigmatized a major producers of raw materials to industrial economies.   
The chapter takes a lead from Frimpong-Ansah’s seminal analysis of the political economy of 
decline in Ghana “The Vampire State in Africa”, and boldly introduces the ‘Zombie state’ 
idea to critically examine the development approach adapted by the Rawlings II government . 
It is important to critically examine the political economy of the Zombie State because 
besides the development feats of the Guggisberg and Nkrumah periods, the burden of 
development history in Ghana weighs very much on the Rawlings II government. In this 
sense the aetiology of the Zombie state, development thinking of its leadership, changing 
trends of development in the 1980s and the political and security situations at that time were 
revisited in our analysis. The overarching objective of this study was to provide distinct 
analysis of the political economy of development and decline in the Zombie state and put 
 
78 Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) original membership consisted of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings as 
Chairman, Warrant Officer 1 Joseph Adjei Boadi, Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah, Staff Sgt. Daniel Alorga 
Akata Pori, Chris Bukari Atim, Joachim Amartey Kwei, and Rev. Dr. Vincent Kwabena Damuah (an expelled 
Catholic priest). But by 1982, all except Rawlings and Adjei Boadi resigned over ideological differences, 
arbitrary executions, breach of trust and marginalisation. In 1982/83 the Pro-Eastern government shifted to 
adopt economic liberalisation and structural adjustment. 
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forward logical reasons for the flexible adaptation of the East Asia (EA) ‘developmental 
state’ model in Ghana in particular, and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in general. To achieve 
this, the chapter takes a constructive look at historical evidences of development efforts in 
Ghana mainly from archival sources and related publications for critical examination. The 
chapter concludes with the outcome of these developmental efforts and challenges with 
suggestions of alternative development approach in Ghana. This method of examining 
developments under distinct state forms is relevant because in the absence of structural 
constraints within the global political economy, the ‘behaviour’ of a state conditions its 
economic development.   
8.2 Background  
The 1980s was an era of trade and diplomatic tensions between two superpowers – the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - in what became known as the 
‘Cold War’. The period is also remembered for the surge in technological advancement and 
globalisation, as well as a shift in economic management thinking from planned economies to 
laissez-faire capitalism. In addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank (WB) came under pressure to address Africa’s debt crisis with a view to gather support 
against the East and assert its influence in SSA. The problems in SSA consisted of political 
instability, economic mismanagement and corruption, natural disasters, incapacity to properly 
address structural and policy weaknesses, structural imbalances associated with ‘terms of 
trade’, unfavourable conditions attached to IMF/WB loans, and the burden of debt servicing 
on development. But before the researcher looks for panaceas it is important to recap how the 
problems evolved.    
On the eve of Ghana’s independence on 6th March, 1957, the economy was by far in a much 
better position than many African states, but by the early 1980s it had suffered major setbacks 
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of protracted economic stagnation and decline. Much of the historical account on Ghana 
suggests that until the early 1970s the economy maintained its lead in the world’s production 
of raw cocoa beans to developed economies with an average output of some 370,000 metric 
tons per year. Having inherited some £200 million in reserves from the colonial government 
as export revenues held on her behalf, Ghana was by far richer than many SSA states at 
independence. While other SSA states have experienced protracted economic decline, the 
Ghanaian experience is unique not only for its unique political history for African unity and 
attempts at industrialization but also for the comprehensive manner in which successive 
governments contributed to its economic decline.  
Indeed, the general optimism and euphoria for economic development and political stability 
held by many Ghanaians at independence evaporated causing some to unfortunately express 
their willingness to trade their political freedom for economic development - recolonization 
of SSA states for economic development. Although the Ghanaian experience poses questions 
to policy makers, academics, and donors, about how to address protracted economic decline, 
it is not the first state in SSA to envisage unfavourable economic management prescriptions 
by the IMF (Anheier and Siebel, 1987).   
This chapter provides political economy interpretation of the PNDC government’s adoption 
of the IMF neoliberal development policies and its outcome to set forward the precise case 
for the strategic transference and adaptation of the EA developmental state model in Ghana. 
In doing so, the author introduces the ‘Zombie State’, as a metaphorical concept of the 
‘unconscious reincarnated state’ that makes every effort to develop the political economy but 
lacks the capacity and ends up devouring its achievements (Drezner, 2011). Better still, a 
‘dead-alive’ state that aims to introduce radical life to a new political order aimed at 
economic recovery but does so with inadequate capacity and legitimacy. The inception of the 
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‘Zombie State’ was without a grand plan or reliable source of finance to rehabilitate the 
economy. In his resignation letter addressed to Chairman Rawlings, Chris Bukari Atim, a 
founding member of the PNDC conceded that the major cause of conceptual conflict within 
the hierarchy of the regime immediately after the coup was the non-existence of purposeful 
programme about where the revolution was going. Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah, the most senior 
military officer in the PNDC and leader of the first Ghanaian government delegation to visit 
the UK after the revolution, acknowledged that “the fundamental problem in Ghana was that 
of the economy …, no Minister of Finance had yet been appointed” three months into the 
revolution (FCO 65/2834). Similarly, the West African Department of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office noted that “the PNDC remains an incoherent and inexperienced group 
basically of students and revolutionaries. No clear political direction has yet emerged” (FCO 
65/2834). These narratives resonate with the idea of the ‘zombie’ that acts on its feeling 
without conscious experience to guide its reactions. The patriarchs of the revolution reacted 
to how they felt about the economic decline without formulated ideas or conscious 
experience about how to overcome the problems. The 1980s was a period of speculation and 
untrammelled movements in capital but one without productive or politically conceived 
developmental purpose though public and private service activities were underpinned by 
neoliberalism.    
Although the Rawlings era extended to three governments - June-September 1979 as the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); 1982-92 as the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC); and 1992-2000 as the National Democratic Congress (NDC), this study 
focuses on the PNDC era. The Zombie State era represents a decade of dramatic shift in 
Ghanaian politics from free-market to socialism to economic liberalisation in response to the 
prevailing economic crisis in 1982 and the IMF/WB conditions for development loans. The 
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Rawlings II ‘Zombie’ state introduced a new state order and strived to move the political 
economy of Ghana from decay to development through social market ideas but succumbed to 
economic liberalisation because the World Bank was the main reliable financier for 
development. In doing so, the PNDC government initiated a series of International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) programs in Ghana with some overlapping the 
other. These consisted of the PNDC’s - National Programme for Economic Development; a 
Five-year development plan (1982-1986); a Public Investment Programme, (1992-1994); and 
a subsequent Public Investment Programme (1993-1995).   
8.3 Historical Overview of the Zombie State in Ghana (1982 – 1992)  
The ‘Zombie State’ was directly incepted through the 31st December, 1981 military coup led 
by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings who became the Head of State from 1981 to 1992. 
The revolutionary governing body, the PNDC, abolished the constitution of the 3rd Republic 
and ruled by decrees. The 31st December 1981 Revolution was organised by a group of 
‘other ranks’ (non-commissioned) soldiers, mainly from the Recce regiment in direct 
response to the intolerable living conditions of lower-rank soldiers and the average Ghanaian. 
It aimed at cleansing the establishment of corruption, redistribute income and promote 
participatory democracy. Although reasons, motives and explanations offered for military 
interventionism are often diverse, they highlight growing disaffection of economic conditions 
within the military and the state (Bennett, 1963; Huttington, 1968; Kraus, 1970).  
After several years of military dictatorship, the transport system and cocoa sector in Ghana 
reached breaking point. The problem was aggravated by severe drought, bushfires, and 
sudden repatriation of some 1.5 million Ghanaians from Nigeria. Scarcity of energy supplies 
meant that petroleum products were rationed between domestic and industrial needs while 
electricity supplies were geographically alternated. Rawlings saw an opportunity in the 
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economic difficulties to stage his comeback with a view to rehabilitate the economy. He was 
convinced that the key nemesis to development was corruption and imperialism. Hence, the 
initial primary objectives of the ‘Zombie State’ were to achieve socio-economic development 
through society-oriented programmes, eradicate corruption and attract foreign direct 
investment to rehabilitate the economy on pro-social terms. It can be argued that against this 
background the zombie was a bit naïve for abstracting that it could rehabilitate the economy 
on pro-socialist ideas. Under the caption ‘GH₵150 milion to be raised locally to revive 
Afram plains’ - major agricultural area, the government initiated a 110-kilometre autarkic 
road reconstruction from Kye-Amanfrom to Amankwaakrom and Torkor to increase 
agricultural productivity to feed the nation. In the same publication marking the ‘10th 
anniversary of Nkrumah’s death’ Rawlings pledged to continue with the developments 
initiated by the late president (Daily Graphic, 27th April, 1982).   
However, on 30th June 1982, the political milieu in Ghana suddenly changed following the 
murder of three high court judges and a retired major of the Ghana Army. Justices Kwadwo 
Adjei Agyepong, Poku Sarkodie and Cecelia Koranteng-Addow as well as retired Major Sam 
Acquah were abducted, murdered and burnt by close operatives of the PNDC for being 
‘enemies of the revolution’ (Joy News documentary, 2018). This study discovers that some 
members of the PNDC became aggrieved after Justices Agyapong and Sarkodie had reviewed 
and reversed the convictions of some individuals convicted during the AFRC regime. Sam 
Acquah, while Head of Human Resource at Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC) 
had signed the dismissal letters of workers, including Amartey Kwei, for vandalising 
parliament properties in a strike action during the Limann era. And, Justice Koranteng-
Addow had dismissed the legal action brought by the dismissed workers of GIHOC against 
management. Against these backgrounds, the three judges and retired major were seen as 
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threat to the revolution, a reason for their abduction and gruesome murders during curfew 
hours. According to Sam Okudjeto79 the PNDC sowed a seed of hatred against the judiciary 
hence the tragedy. In a recent investigatory documentary by a local media, Deputy 
Superintendent of Police (retired) Edmund Oheneasah80  suggests that during interrogation of 
Lance corporal Amedeka , the latter provided credible confession about his key role in the 
murders (Joy News, 2018).  
Following international and domestic pressures, the PNDC on 15th July 1982 set up the 
Special Investigation Board (SIB) under the chairmanship of Justice Samuel Azu Crabbe with 
Reverend Professor K.N. Dzobo and Messers C.E. Quist, T.O. Lindsey, J. Amui as members 
of the board to investigate the tragedy and make recommendations. According to Kofi 
Bentum Quantson, former head of the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI), it was almost 
impossible for the accused persons to have acted without authorisation from the PNDC 
hierarchy because the restrictions imposed by the curfew required special pass to enable their 
movements from one place to the other (Joy News, 2018). The SIB recommended that ten 
persons, including two members of the PNDC - Joachim Amartey Kwei and Staff Sergeant 
Alorga Akata-Pori (both members),  Captain (retired) Kodjo Tsikata - Special Advisor to the 
PNDC government and Head of National Security, Lance Corporals Samuel K. Amedeka, 
Samuel Michael Komla Senyah, Godwin Kwowu, Mama Nsurowuo, Victor Gomoleshio, and 
ex-soldiers Tonny Tekpor and Johnny Dzandu be charged with complicity in the murders but 
this was not fully implemented for political reasons. The facts relating to the complicity of 
 
79 Sam Okudjeto is a professional legal practitioner, academic and former president of the Ghana Bar 
Association. He is a moderate political thinker and activist. 
80 DSP Edmund Oheneasah (retired) is a surviving member of the first Police investigative Team into the 
murders. He uncovered evidence of the Harbour Waybill number 09337 signed by Amedeka for the release of 
the two new Fiat vehicles that were used in the murders and obtained confessions from Amedeka. He exiled to 
the United Kingdom during the PNDC era. 
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the PNDC’s inner circle – the sanctioning of the murders, issuance of curfew pass, 
information of the residence of the murdered, and release of the vehicles used in the 
abductions and murders - still remain a mystery. In the end, Tsikata, Akata-Pori, Kwowu, 
Nsurowuo, Gomoleshio were not prosecuted for lack of evidence, Amartey Kwei, Senyah, 
Dzandu and Tekpor were executed by firing squad, and Amedeka escaped in a jail break 
incident and now lives in exile. George Agyekum, Chairman of the Public Tribunal charged 
with the trial of the accused persons at that time now admits that the SIB failed to explore 
allegations against Rawlings and Tsikata (Joy News, 2018). The PNDC intimidated the 
prosecution by arresting Chief Superintendent of Police Jacob J. Yidana, the head of the 
police investigative team charged with investigating the murders, but his colleagues - Deputy 
Superintendent of Police Edmund Oheneasah, and Assistant Superintendent of Police 
William Oduro - fled the country. After Rawlings had left office in 2000, the New Patriotic 
Party government by an Act of Parliament established the National Reconciliation 
Commission in 2004 chaired by Justice (retired) Azu Crabbe to provide a formal forum of 
truth and reconciliation for victims of human rights violations during the PNDC era. However 
the indemnity provisions of the 1992 constitution initiated under Rawlings’ administration 
restrained the commission from making recommendations to bring justice to the victims and 
relatives of deceased persons.   
In addition, there were tribal tensions within the Ghana Armed Forces as many soldiers from 
the northern and Akan regions who assisted Rawlings in the revolution felt marginalised by 
soldiers from the Ewe tribe. By November 1982, five out the seven original members of the 
PNDC had resigned due to the events that took place. Personal conflicts between Rawlings 
and his former colleagues resulted in several coup attempts to overthrow the PNDC 
government (Ray, 1986). Among these were the June 19th 1983 Halidu Giwa-led coup and 
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jailbreak of several soldiers including Lance Corporal Amedeka; and the Major Quashigah-
led coup (Quashigah of the Ewe tribe and a close ally of Rawlings, had previously foiled 
Giwa’s coup but staged his own in 1989 and was arrested but not executed). The disaffected 
soldiers from the northern region in particular, resented Rawlings for deceiving them to 
collaborate the overthrow of their northern native – President Limann.  
In addition, pressure groups such as the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies 
(ARPB), Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship (FPD), and People’s Movement for 
Freedom and Justice (PMFJ) did not conceal their antipathy towards the PNDC and went at 
great lengths to pressure the government to revert to democratic rule. Moreover, the political 
economy during the 1980s was very challenging for the zombie state in asserting its authority 
over politics and economic development. Persistent decline in oil prices during the early 
1980s resulted in significant decrease in real per capita income in Nigeria with high 
unemployment and pressure on overstretched public services. The remedial action of the then 
President Shehu Shagari was to repatriate about 1.5 million Ghanaians. With increased 
unemployment and decline in agricultural productivity as a result of the severe drought and 
bushfires, the capacity to produce for the local population and export sector was severely 
hampered and exacerbated the economic problems the PNDC inherited.    
8.4 Overview of the economic problems in the run up to the ‘Zombie’ state   
Before taking a critical examination of the development trends of the ‘zombie’ state, it is 
appropriate to give an overview of the economic problems that contributed to the legitimacy 
of the ‘Zombie’ state. Lessons drawn from attempts by the ‘Predatory’ and ‘Vampire’ states 
suggest that structural weakness of economic decline - low productivity and monetary 
fragility – emanated from both internal and external factors (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). The 
colonial core-periphery development model ignored the development needs of Ghana except 
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where it served the interest of the imperial trade. The colonial economy was designed to 
produce raw materials for export to western industries at relatively lower prices and to import 
finished products at higher prices. This increased Ghana’s balance of payment deficits and 
furthered its dependency on foreign aid for development. And attempts by the Ghana 
government to secure international trade agreements with major buyers to improve export 
revenue were disappointing. It is a fact that governments are installed and removed for what 
they do with available resources, but without international trade agreements the economy has 
no backbone. Efforts by major cocoa producer such as Ghana to reach trade agreements with 
cocoa buying states have been met with disinclinations by buyers to enable them have control 
over Ghana’s export revenue and development.  
In addition, the level of underdevelopment and structural weaknesses as identified on the eve 
of independence sowed a seed of dissatisfaction within the Nkrumah government to engage 
in aggressive modernization in lieu of a moderate approach to mitigate the substantial 
increase in foreign indebtedness. Furthermore, the administrations after the Nkrumah 
government did not seem to have fully appreciated the implications of the Nkrumah legacy. 
With an estimated total current revenue and grants of GH₵4,396.82 million, made up of 
GH₵4,129.3 million in tax revenue and GH₵257.5 million in non-tax revenue, and GH₵10 
million in grants, the excessive expropriation of productive surplus through taxation was 
counterproductive to savings and investment. Yet, the Limann government did not keep in 
line with its planned budget expenditure of GH₵5,999.1 million due to unexpected 
distortions of world market prices, inflation and commitment to honour its debt obligations. 
In the 1980-81 fiscal year, actual public expenditure rose to GH₵9,103.62 to overrun planned 
deficit to some GH₵4,706.8 million. Of the planned deficit GH₵4,243.7 million was used to 
fulfil Ghana’s debt obligations to restore confidence with its trading partners and improve 
243 
 
credit worthiness to re-establish external lines of credit (RG 6/4/173). This was against the 
backdrop of shortfalls in cocoa and import duties due to decreasing world market prices of 
Ghana’s export commodities and foreign exchange constraint at that time.   
In 1980-81, government borrowing increased domestic and external debts from 
GH₵7,621.1million to GH₵11,473.7 million. The height of the economic challenges of the 
Limann government that eventually contributed to the revolution and abolishment of liberal 
politics was rightly noted by George Benneh81, in his 1981-82 Budget Proposal to parliament 
few months before the military coup. On 5th August, 1981, the minister admitted to 
parliament that the financial policy of the Limann government has failed to deal with “the 
fundamental and urgent economic problems of the country” and by this he urged government 
“to take immediate realistic steps to tackle these problems” (RG 6/4/173). Imbalances in 
government finances, low level of cocoa producer prices, high rate of inflation, loss of 
confidence in the local currency with low and falling production levels in agriculture all 
contributed to intolerable economic hardships requiring urgent and pragmatic solutions.   
This current study asserts that it is unfair to fault the Limann administration for aspects of the 
economic crisis that were beyond his control. First, the absence of International Cocoa 
Agreement since its expiration in 1978 resulted in severe price fluctuations and uncertainties 
to government revenue and its capacity to development. According to studies conducted by 
Gill and Duffus and the International Cocoa Organisation (1991) on world cocoa production, 
no country has been more central to the debate of cocoa production than Ghana. The 
centrality of Ghana in global cocoa debate stresses the characteristic qualities of her cocoa in 
terms of size of beans, moisture and fat content, colour, aroma but also the contribution of 
 
81 Professor Emeritus George Benneh graduated with a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. He served 
as Minister for Lands and Natural Resources, Fuel and Power (1979-80); and Finance Minister (1980-81) under 
the Limann government. Professor Benneh was the Vice Chancellor of the University of Ghana (1992-1996).  
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cocoa to the development of Ghana (Piasentin and Klare-Repnik,2004; Fold and Ponte,2008; 
Breisinger et al., 2009). However, the emergence of Ghana as the world’s leading cocoa 
producer did not insulate her from price fluctuations. The introduction of cocoa and its 
exponential growth in the colonial era; stagnation during the cocoa protestation in the 1930s 
and rapid growth in the early 1960s; near collapse from the mid-1960s to early 1970s; and the 
revival from 1983 through the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) defined development 
in Ghana during these periods (Breisinger et al., 2008). The development of the political 
economy of Ghana is inconceivable without the cocoa sector because of its major 
contribution to government revenue, employment to nearly one million farmers, and attempts 
at poverty alleviation strategies (World Bank 2007b and 2008). Second, the Limann 
government was politically dormant in both the adaptation of appropriate statecraft to win 
parliamentary support for the 1981-82 budget and gathering of intelligence for its own 
security.   
This study gathers that between June and August, 1981 the conditions of economic decline 
engendered a standoff between the executive and legislature. In paragraph (2) and (3) of the 
1981-82 budget proposal the finance minister expressed government’s concerns over the 
suspension of all parliament proceedings related to the Budget Proposal (RG6/4/173). The 
call by the legislature upon government to take immediate steps to tackle the economic 
problems highlights the disaffection of parliament with the presidency and a stark caveat of 
insecurity within the Limann government. Despite the precarious situation that the 
government found itself in, international donors ignored the risk to democracy and went at 
full length to pressure the government into initiating the World Bank/IMF austerity policies. 
In part, the government increased import duty on cars from 35 to 45 percent of cost insurance 
freight to raise revenue and control imports, introduced stricter expenditure control measures, 
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and increased hospital fees. In addition, it introduced the Cocoa Council Bill, increased 
minimum wages, improved food supplies and public transport, and considered increasing 
cocoa producer prices in relation to other policy matters that formed the basis of negotiations 
for an international cocoa agreement. Some of these measures helped to procure a fleet of 
‘Tata’ buses (Green Line, City Line and City Express) to replace the relative old 
‘Willowbrook’ operated by the Omnibus Services Authority (OSA). It could be argued that 
while the Limann government aimed to advance market-oriented development through thrift 
fiscal management, inflationary controls, efficient resource management, and correcting 
balance of payment, it did so at the expense of nurturing democracy. This was because the 
austerity measures exacerbated the existing economic hardships at that time and incited 
military intervention to overthrow the democratically elected government.   
In the post-colonial period ‘complex interdependence’ – use of non-coercive approach to 
attain transnational objectives – became the preferred option for sovereign states in relating to 
each other on trade, development and governance (Keohane and Nye, 2011). Market systems 
are vital in creating wealth and promoting innovations but the role of the state in rectifying 
market failings to mitigate class crisis and ensure political stability cannot be underestimated 
if democratic developmental states are to emerge in SSA. Neoliberal trajectory to ‘rollback’ 
the state resonates with Charles Darwin’s ‘On the Origins of Species’ (1864) whereby only 
the fittest (wealthy) survives. It is no secret that the World Bank’s initiative to ‘rollback’ the 
state in development during the 1980s and 90s widened the gap between the rich and the poor 
and contributed to class conflicts. It is against this background that this study provides a 
critical examination of the role of the Zombie state in development and the implications of 
the IMF/World Bank’s policies – austerity programme, massive devaluation of the cedi, 
attempts to reduce budget deficit, reorganization of the public sector and increased producer 
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prices to cocoa farmers – to the political economy of Ghana. This study concentrates on the 
early and late periods of the PNDC regime (although the mid era is touched upon) for precise 
analysis of the main issues associated with the rollback of the state.   
8.5 Rollback of the state in the development of Ghana (1982 to 1992)  
The pressures within the economy that led to the removal of the Limann government could 
not be conjectured to have evaporated with his overthrow. Many policy makers in the Zombie 
era knew that the legitimacy of the PNDC government was intrinsically linked to its capacity 
and commitment to advance development for the people. Revolutionary rhetoric and patriotic 
slogans were inadequate to ensure improvement in the living standards of the people. It took 
the oppression and suppression of civil liberties and institutionalisation of fear, described in 
Adu-Boahene (1988) as ‘the culture of silence’ to initiate the austerity measures of the World 
Bank.  
However, the arbitrary culture of the military regime and associated revolutionary organs – 
Peoples Defence Committee (PDC) and Workers Defence Committees (WDC) - stirred fear 
among both domestic and foreign investors to urge international donors to seek reassurance 
from the PNDC before considering aid. The uneasy sentiments felt by foreign donors 
inhibited the free flow of investible capital for production and development. First and 
foremost, the suspension of democratic provisions, abolition of the constitution of the 3rd 
republic and establishment of public tribunals with extra-judicial powers over the 
conventional courts significantly eroded investor confidence to freely undertake business. 
Second, the spate of human rights violations by the military and paramilitary units such as the 
64 regiment (popularly called commando) and Civil Defence Organisation (popularly called 
militia or CDO) were common. Given these, the Zombie state was under no illusion about the 
urgency to dissociate with Libya, respect human rights and place economic liberalism at the 
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forefront of public policies and trade relations. This study discovers that in the interest of 
development, the Ghana government marginally restrained its relations with Libya, and made 
progress on the remaining two issues.   
Against this background, the PNDC government diametrically shifted its development 
thinking - from social-market to neo-liberal capitalism - in an attempt to win the interest of 
western governments for aid to rehabilitate the economy and consolidate power. In 1982, the 
government abandoned its socialist-oriented Four Year Economic Recovery Programme due 
to lack of funding from socialist allies and its unpopularity with the World Bank (Frimpong-
Ansah, 1992). In the same period, the contribution of cocoa, timber and other agricultural 
crops to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) significantly decreased. In 1982, the regime was in 
no doubt that although the conditions of the World Bank/IMF were inimical to the beliefs of 
the revolution, it was the only viable means to tackle the economic decline.  
Neo-liberal attempts to ‘roll-back’ the state at a crucial period necessary for state-led 
development was regrettable. In this regard, Kwesi Botchway82 led the initiative to instil 
financial discipline for economic stability as prescribed by the Bretton Woods conditions 
because the strategy was conditioned to aid. Rimmer (1992: 243) suggests that between 1983 
and 1992, Ghana received about US$0.7 billion from the World Bank; US$1.64 billion from 
the IMF; and US$3 billion from the 'Paris Club' (creditor countries that provide conditional 
debt treatment to debtor countries). The economic austerity, deregulation, privatization, 
extensive liberalization, retrenchments, and cuts in government spending did little to revive 
the underdeveloped economy of Ghana. In the late 1980s and 1990s the triumph of 
 
82 Professor Kwesi Botchway is a Ghanaian academic, economist and politician. Botchway became a member of 
the PNDC and served as Finance Secretary (1982-1992) subsequent to Secretary of Finance and Economic 
Planning (1982-1995) under the NDC. Botchway is a member of the NDC and a moderate social democrat. 
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neoliberalism marked the end of post-war development as international markets undermined 
the ability and role of the state in development (Hodges, 2015: 436). 
However, among the reforms demanded by the multinational financial institutions to ensure 
comprehensive economic reforms there was none more political than the devaluation of the 
cedi (Herbst, 1993). Other measures aimed at increasing the share of cocoa to GDP, reduce 
balance of payment deficit and improve government revenue base (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). 
Both the government and donors agreed that the achievement of these objectives required a 
major overhaul of the economy through intensive economic rehabilitation of radical monetary 
and exchange rate measures, import reduction and increased domestic food productions. The 
dilemma for underdeveloped states is a choice between accepting austerity to appease the 
international donors and agitate the people or advance social-oriented programmes unpopular 
to capitalists. The approach advanced by the PNDC de facto government in its relationship 
with the international financial institutions were steady. For this reason, the study focuses on 
the policies of implementation during the early 1980s to interpret and contest the PNDC 
government’s approach to development and its implication to possibilities of a democratic-
developmental state in Ghana.  
In April 1983, the PNDC conceded that the economic management and financial assistance 
needed to reverse the long-standing structural imbalances and rehabilitation of the economy 
were feasible through a series of excruciating comprehensive economic adjustments –   
monetary stabilization and fiscal management – initiated by the IMF and leading multilateral 
financial organisations. But first, the concerns of western donors – Ghana/Libya relations, 
human rights violations and commitment to democracy – were revisited for reassurance. To 
do so, a Ghana government delegation led by Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah visited the U.K. in 
late 1982 and engaged with senior level government officials to allay anxieties about the 
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PNDC and appeal for aid. After Nunoo-Mensah had been delayed for a few months to testify 
in the murders of the judges, he travelled to the UK under the pretext of negotiating a deal 
with a British aircraft company to renegotiate for better terms in a previous contract for a 
fleet of passenger airliners (FCO 65/2834). Nunoo-Mensah explained that Libya’s generosity 
of some US$20 million worth of oil was without strings. Ghana could not afford to ignore the 
generosity of the Libyan government at a crucial time when the World Bank conditions 
included withdrawal of fuel subsidies. Although in the age of globalisation western donors 
have resorted to less coercive channels of negotiations to achieve transnational objectives 
than in the colonial era, the power imbalances continue to favour donor interests. Complex 
interdependence refers to the important but declining use of coercive power and increasing 
reliance on the roles played by international financial institutions, multinational corporations 
and transnational organizations to reshape the economics and politics of sovereign states 
(Keohane and Nye Jr., 2011: 58). The use of diplomacy, trade, humanitarian and financial 
instruments are all part of effective less-coercive measures used by donors to influence and 
control the political economy of Ghana and other SSA states.   
By allowing market forces to determine oil prices on the local market without the state’s 
intervention contributed to higher prices of goods and services, workers agitations for wage 
increases, lower real incomes, and political uncertainty. Yet, the Libyan donation was 
economically awkward because it was easy for western economies to mitigate the benefits by 
imposition of stiffer conditions of aid - higher tariffs, higher interest rates, and raising the 
threshold of reserves. While Rawlings denounced any special relations with Gaddafi, except 
for their mutual interest in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU – now African Union), 
there was reasonable suspicion to suggest that the Libyan leader extended generosity to 
facilitate anti-western agendas in the sub-region. The influence on Rawlings became more 
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evident in the late 1980s when Ghana stood by Libya in the latter’s dispute with the US over 
Libya’s alleged complicity in the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 (Talking Drums, 1986).   
The appointments of two pro-western Ghanaian technocrats in the persons of Kwesi 
Botchway and Joseph Abbey83 respectively led to a new dawn in negotiations with the World 
Bank/IMF. This shift galvanised support for the Government of Ghana to engage with the 
Consultative Group for Ghana in Paris in November 1983, following thirteen years without 
such meeting. The meeting was chaired by David Knox84 and attended by eleven multilateral 
institutions85, eight bilateral donors86 and seven observers87 to consider ‘Ghana’s Medium-
Term Economic Recovery Programme 1984-1986’ and ‘Policies and Programmes for 
Adjustment’. However, Larbi (1998: 181) suggests that the hostile political milieu in the 
immediate period after the revolution was not conducive for the PNDC government to take 
audacious initiative for market-oriented public management reforms. Against this 
background, the PNDC is credited with the introduction of a New Public Management 
(NPM) reform that enabled Ghana to embark on a two-tier Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP) – (ERP I from 1984 to 1986) and (ERP II from 1987 to 1989) of short, medium and 
long-term objectives (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991). The first tier of the programme (ERP I) aimed 
to restore foreign investor confidence; control inflation; rehabilitate socio-economic 
 
83 Dr. J.L.S. Abbey ….. He was appointed as Secretary for Trade by the PNDC and later served as Ghana’s High 
Commission to the UK from October 1986 –September 1990. 
84 Mr David Knox was the Vice President of the World Bank – West African Region. 
85 The multilateral institutions were the World Bank; International Monetary Fund, Economic Community Of 
West African States; United Nations Development Programme; International Fund for Agricultural 
Development; United Nations; World Food Programme; European Investment Bank; European Commission; 
Arab Bank for Development of Africa; and African Development Bank. 
86 The bilateral donors consisted of the UK, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Italy and the US. 
87 The observers included representatives from China, Brazil, Netherlands, Spain, Republic of Korea, the Saudi 
Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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infrastructure, improve agricultural productivity, stimulate export, curb ostentatious 
consumptions, mobilise local and foreign resources to enhance standards of living. The 
second (ERP II) took a lead from the outcome of the first and focused on ensuring economic 
growth rate of around five percent per annum, stimulate savings and investment, enhance 
public sector management and restructure the external sector for growth (Dzorgbo, 2001; 
Sowa, 2003).   
The salient measures of ERP I focused on achieving three main objectives: (i) restructuring of 
relative prices; (ii) correcting the overvaluation of the cedi; (iii) and improving the financial 
position of the government sector. In addition, the programme aimed to increase import of 
foreign goods to stimulate economic activities but the composition of the imports were not 
developmental enough. While capital imports tend to increase productivity to offset balance 
of payment deficit in the long-term, the flooding of local economy with foreign made 
consumable goods displaced local industries and increased balance of payment deficit. In 
pursuance of the three objectives the Executive Board of the IMF approved a request by the 
Ghana government for the procurement of SDR88 US$120.5 million under the Compensatory 
Financing Facility to ease the shortfall in export revenue during 1982, and also agreed to a 
one-year stand-by arrangement amounting to SDR US$238.5 million in five equal phases 
upon meeting the relevant performance criteria (T 534/22).  
This study discovers that by March 1984 Ghana had satisfactorily completed the first 
segment of the programme. In pursuance with the second review the IMF tasked two 
 
88 Special Drawing Rights (SDR or XDR) is a unit of account adopted by the IMF in 1969 to serve as the 
supplementary foreign-exchange reserve of assets by which a claim to currency held by IMF member countries 
may be exchanged. This mechanism aimed to resolve the shortfalls of preferred foreign-exchange reserve 




missions89 to Ghana during December 3rd to 19th and January 7th to 22nd 1984 respectively 
to review the progress of the programme and set credit ceilings as performance criteria for the 
end of the first and second quarters of 1984 fiscal year. The missions were further tasked to 
set indicative credit targets for the third and last quarters and to discuss the 1984 budget 
proposal within the context of the overall financial programme and comprehensive policies. 
These were to address the exchange rate and prices of goods and services. The visits were 
followed by a confidential letter from the Ghana government to J. de Larosiere90 in which J.S. 
Addo and K. Botchway reviewed progress of the programme, outlined the 1984 budget and 
performance criteria for March and June 1984, and indicated further measures to address the 
exchange rate and retail prices of petroleum products as well as domestic goods and services.  
8.6 Pricing Policy  
The partial reversion of price control policy, adaption of flexible pricing of non-food items 
domestically manufactured and retention of price caps on essential consumer items initiated 
by the government did not go far enough in meeting the expectations of the donors. Under the 
pricing policy, all commodities not captured under the rubric of ‘essential items’ were set by 
the Price and Incomes Board (PIB) in consultation with the importers, manufacturers and 
sellers to harmonise the scope of prices and reduce deviations from the equilibrium. In 1983, 
the Ghanaian economy experienced a sharp increase in demand of goods and services without 
corresponding supply. To mitigate the undesirable trend, the government reviewed the price 
control policy (PCP) to only 23 essential items that required Cabinet approval. The 
deregulation of pricing helped to mitigate high inflation during the period of severe drought 
 
89 The first mission consisted of Messrs Kratz (Head-AFR) Ballali (AFR), Huh (ETR), Diamond (FAD), Mrs. Ramos 
(secretary-ETR) and Mrs. Ramos (secretary-ETR). The second, consisted of Messrs Ali Agah (advisor to the 
Executive Director for Ghana) and H. Alaoui-Abdallaoi (Assistant to the Executive Director). 
90 Mr. Jacques de Larosière, is a retired French international civil servant and banker. He served as Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund from 17th June 1978 to 15th January 1987. 
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and repatriation of about 1.5 million Ghanaians from Nigeria. In relation to cocoa prices, the 
government in consultation with the World Bank increased producer prices to GH₵900 per 
headload or GH₵30,000 per ton (representing 50 percent increase) under the Export 
Rehabilitation Credit (ERC) arrangements. However, the withdrawal of government subsidies 
on petroleum products from GH₵1 billion to GH₵500 million through gradual price 
increases from GH₵15=US$1 on 21st April, 1983, to GH₵23=US$1 on 10th October, 1983 
and GH₵32=US$1 increased cost of production and incited agitation for wage increases.  
A critical examination of the pricing policy in respect of cocoa (main export product) and 
petroleum products (main cost item) reveals that the austerity programme pressured the 
zombie state to extract more than it injected. Peel (1984) suggests that while cocoa producer 
prices received a 65 percent increase from GH₵12,000 to GH₵20,000, petroleum prices 
double and tariffs were raised on a whole range of services. Quentin Peel of the Financial 
Times further wrote on Tom Clausen’s (President of the World Bank) concern about the 
cocoa farmer under the headlines ‘The economics of desperation’. In this article Clausen was 
quoted to have asked “Why has the Ghana cocoa farmer lost interest?” and “Why does he get 
paid less than one-third of the world market price for his crop?”(Financial Times, 1984).  
This study challenges the earnestness of the concern because the austerity conditions of the 
World Bank for devaluation, radical exchange rate reforms and removal of subsidies on 
petroleum products significantly eroded cocoa farmers’ incomes in real terms. And while 
gold made little benefit out of the exchange rate adjustment, it could not compensate for the 
loss in cocoa revenue. In essence, the Zombie state became over dependent on the cocoa 
industry and foreign aid. Being a product of a relatively inelastic supply, farmers could not 




This among others factors compelled the government to cut down its projected revenue from 
GH₵12.6 billion to GH₵10.2 billion, and expenditure from GH₵17.1 billion to GH₵15.1 
billion, resulting in the reduction of the overall budget deficit from GH₵4.9 billion to 
GH₵4.4 billion but rose to GH₵5.9 billion in 1984. The government remained optimistic in 
spite of the fall in cocoa production and hoped that continued increases in cocoa market 
prices and restructuring of the Cocoa Marketing Board would increase cocoa contributions. 
However, the benefits of cocoa prices increase to farmers were eroded by increases in cost of 
production and transport due to the withdrawal of petroleum subsidies. This study discovers 
that the very nature of Ghana’s main exports in terms of their price elasticity of demand and 
supply (availability of substitutes, perishability, weather, supply time etc.) limit opportunities 
for the government to influence prices of exports. Meanwhile, the removal of petroleum 
subsidies increased costs of production since almost every productive sector of the economy 
relied on petroleum energy.  
With the increased cost of production, producers increased prices of goods and services, and 
labour agitated for wage increases. To ameliorate the effect of the withdrawal of the 
petroleum subsidies, the government increased salaries of civil servants by 40 percent in 
April 1984 with similar measures for the private sector and rest of the public sector. The 
benefits of these measure were temporal because the rising trend in cocoa revenue was 
suddenly held back by the severe drought in the early 1980s. Agricultural activities focused 
on the production of staple food to feed the nation and curb rising food prices. In essence, the 
pricing policy mitigated possibilities of deepened economic crisis but was not countervailing 
enough to rehabilitate the economy from decline and indebtedness.   
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8.7 Exchange Rate Policy  
In 1981, the Limann government initiated negotiations with the World Bank for an Export 
Rehabilitation Credit (ERC) but the discussion stalled because the government was reluctant 
to accept the austerity conditions attached – devaluation, increased interest rates, reduction in 
government capital and recurrent expenditures, and reform of the Cocoa Marketing Board. 
However, in a confidential letter from Botchway to Larosiere in October 1983, the PNDC 
government devalued the cedi by almost a thousand percent (991 percent) from GH₵2.75 = 
US$1 to GH₵30 = US$1 within six months (based on the rate of inflation and price index) to 
eliminate administrative complexities of multiple exchange system and promote international 
competitiveness. In addition, the government increased interest rates from 35 to 40 percent to 
attract savings and control excess demand. However, these measures also added to the 
liquidity problem as investors opted to transact business in foreign currencies to mitigate 
sudden loss in value of the cedi. For instance, the 1980/81 budget of the Limann government 
was presented in millions of cedis but the 1983/84 budget presented by the Rawlings II was 
presented in billions of cedis. This study discovers that the government deliberately 
concealed the facts and modus operandi of the exchange rate policy from the public to avoid 
political resentment. Telegram (117) sent from the British High Commission in Accra to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on 29th March, 1984, suggests that Botchway 
misled parliament and donors by failing to disclose the ‘true’ intent of the budget statement 
though he had directed all commercial banks to further devalue the cedi and fix the exchange 
rate at GH₵35=US$1. The telegram stated that “although the word ‘devaluation’ was 
scrupulously avoided, the cedi has been effectively devalued by 16.66 percent” (T 534/22). 
The PNDC government was anxious and determined to abide by the conditions of the World 
Bank/IMF but was not transparent enough to the public. Botchway astutely introduced the 
devaluation to the general public as exchange rate adjustment to avoid public agitation.  
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8.8 Fiscal Management  
Fiscal management simply refers to the means by which government adjusts its spending 
levels and taxation to influence the political economy of the state. As part of the adjustment 
program, the Zombie state officialised the tax base to increase government revenue and 
stimulate economic activity. Increase in import duties and external assistance from the World 
Bank – Reconstruction Import Credit and Export Rehabilitation Credit – were to enable the 
government to raise enough revenue to increase the development budget from GH₵1.4 
billion in 1983 to GH₵6.2 billion in 1984. However, the credit expansion was less than 
projected because of the challenges encountered by importers in accessing credit after almost 
a thousand percent devaluation of the cedi. Meanwhile, the projected increase in net domestic 
assets from GH₵20.67 billion to GH₵25.67 billion rose to only GH₵22.60 billion. The 
devaluation of the cedi by almost tenfold was not wholly in the interest of the Ghanaian 
economy because the domestic economy had to give out more to receive less than 
proportionate in return.     
To mitigate the undesirable effects of the 1983 programme, Botchway projected increased tax 
relief for low income earners and minimum wages increase to GH₵40 per day, set up a 
Cocoa Pricing Committee, plan for US$ 641 million in export earnings as against US$ 992 
million of import expenditures, increased subsidies for education and increased property tax 
(T534/22). However, against the background of the massive devaluation and high inflation 
over the years the pay rise did little to boost the morale of labour. The expectations of the 
1984 budget of yielding remarkable growth in exports aided by foreign investments to 
ameliorate the balance of payment deficit was rather outrun by increased imports.  
With shortfalls in government revenue and rollback of the state in development, capital 
expenditures and oil subsidies decreased. It is fair to assert that the central bank was too 
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optimistic in its projections for economic recovery because there were many unpredictable 
factors that stood to affect the programme. For instance, in a telegram from P.C. Diggle to 
R.G. Ware on 3rd March 1984 entitled ‘Ghana: Review of Stand-By Arrangement - 
EBS/84/60’, the precariousness of the Ghanaian situation in relation to possibility of total 
shut down of Ghana’s main energy source, the Akosombo hydroelectric dam, in the event of 
persistent drought within six weeks was rightfully noted to derail the projected prospects. 
Moreover, delays in the disbursement of International Development Assistance (IDA) export 
rehabilitation credit held back growth for development. Given these outcomes this study puts 
forward that the Rawlings II zombie state was committed to development but did not fully 
comprehend the complexities of the political economy and required capacity to properly plan 
and implement the appropriate measures needed to rehabilitate the Ghanaian economy from 
decline.  
8.9 Ineffectiveness of the ‘Zombie State’ and Prospects for ‘Developmental State’  
In the late 1980s, the ineffectiveness of development programmes initiated by the ‘predatory 
state’ of the colonial era, ‘vampire state’ of the immediate post-independent period and 
‘zombie state’ of the 1980s were gradually giving way to a new approach to development in 
Ghana. Academics, donors, development partners, politicians, and policy makers have all 
been drawn to the notion of a ‘developmental state’ model for Ghana in particular, and Africa 
in general, that can learn from and rival the dramatic successes of East Asia. But besides a 




The Berg91 Report on African development entitled ‘Accelerated Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa’ revived the argument for a neoliberal approach to development in the late 
1970s. The report unravelled failures of the state to strengthen the neoclassical argument for 
the prescriptive adaption of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). However, in the early 
1990s, the neoliberal approach had proved ineffective in transforming underdeveloped 
economies in SSA. It was only then that the Bretton Wood institutions acknowledged the 
leading contributions of the state in development. Policy makers, scholars and donors 
revisited the role of the state in development, with many concluding that the measures put 
forward by the Bretton Woods establishments in the 1980s had required the continent to do 
what it could not do. A critical analysis of political state forms and economic market systems 
suggest that there is no unique formula to economic development but that which yields the 
best results has been achieved through trial and error. Therefore, development is not 
automatically assured under democratic/authoritarian governance or by liberal free-
market/planned economy (Radice, 2008). Possibilities of development depend on the 
prevailing political ideologies, ownership of means of production – state and private, 
embedded autonomy of the state with private interests, appropriate mechanisms for 
distribution of surplus values and capacity/commitment of the state to development. It is also 
important to examine state theories in the search for a developmental state because even 
though the people of a society socially construct development, development is shaped by the 
prevailing conditions of the state. A state at war does not undertake economic development 
plans applicable in peaceful times, but adapts plans that suits the current condition, and 
 
91 Professor Elliot Berg (1927-2002) was an American Economist, author and educator. His work, the Berg 
Report (1981) - ‘Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa’ was in response to a World Bank request in 
1979 for analysis of the development problems in Africa, and a review of a set of policies agreed in 1980 by 
African Chief of State (Lagos Action Plan). The Report conditions economic liberalisation to development. 
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makes every effort to attain peace through development. In this sense the PNDC is credited 
with restructuring the administrative pillars necessary for development. 
The chronicle of institutional reforms in Ghana seems to suggest that besides Nkrumah’s 
government Ghana embarked on the trajectory of decentralization. The enactment of 
legislative instruments such as the Municipal Ordinance, 1943; Native Authority Ordinance, 
1944; Local Government Act, 1961;  Local Government Administrative Decree (NRCD-258) 
1972; Local Government Law (235;246;272;306); and Local Government Act (462) 1993 all 
support this view. While Nkrumah aimed for strong central government (Agyeman-Dua, 
2001), Busia preferred decentralised administration and therefore introduced a four-tier 
public administrative structure consisted of – Regional Committees of Administration; 
District Councils; Local and Urban Councils; and Town/Village Development Committees 
(Kessey, 1995).In 1988, the PNDC government took the decentralisation agenda a step 
further to create a four-tier Metropolitan and three-tier Municipal/District assemblies. 
However, the structure of the traditional system consisting of clan heads from the various 
tribes competed for the chief’s attention for rewards – position and development. While 
patrimonialism forms part of the traditional system in many SSA states there are related 
conventions and practices within the traditional system that run counter to efforts to address 
uneven distribution of public resource and corruption. For instance, it is acceptable for the 
custodian of stool lands and traditional values - paramount chiefs - to expect loyalty, gifts and 
privileges from the people in his traditional area without opposition. Members of parliament 
and public officials in regional and district assemblies build relations with the traditional 
authorities to safeguard their office. Incumbent governments appease traditional authorities 
with development to increase the party’s chances for parliamentary seats and presidency at 
the elections.  
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On the positive, regional and district development agencies collaborate with traditional 
authorities to identify development priorities and adapt strategies of implementation. 
However, in instance of unbridled patronage and clientelism, disproportionate development, 
class conflicts and labour migrations occur to derail development. In essence, the debate 
about patrimonial development states is an abstraction in search for alternative means by 
which the developmental state can emerge out of patrimonial systems without losing the core 
elements of embedded autonomy, economic growth and improvement for the well-being of 
society. The practice of embedded autonomy in patrimonial developmental states helps to 
retain the legacy of developmental impacts even after leadership change (Vu, 2007).  
This goes far in addressing the pontification of development projects initiated by ousted 
government to save Ghana millions of dollars in abandoned project. This present study puts 
forward that in lieu of abandoning work-in-progress development projects on basis of 
partisan politics, a newly elected government that is focused on development must take 
inventories of uncompleted public funded developments as evidence when it assumes office, 
and make every effort to complete these projects whilst ensuring that misappropriation of 
public funds by previous governments are fairly investigated. Sadly, though the merits of 
Weber’s ideal-type bureaucratic model to economic development are well documented, its 
implementation in Ghana is held back by some indigenous cultural practices and over-
politicisation of development. Traditional etiquettes and exhortations such as ‘no one visits 
the palace empty handed (without a present)’ has been misconstrued and extended to public 
offices. Hence, the need for proper administrative oversight and paradigm shift in current 
working culture and occupational ethics cannot be overemphasised in the search for 
developmental state in Ghana. This can be achieved through a kind of public sector reforms 
founded on the ten principles of Weberian bureaucratic structure mentioned earlier. Its 
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success relies on the embeddedness of the state with private businesses, traditional 
institutions, non-governmental think-tanks, education sector, and the media to change the 
attitudes of civil society for economic development and human flourishing. 
This chapter has critically examined the political economy of development and decline in the 
zombie state to put forward a convincing case for the adaptation of a kind of democratic 
developmental state that is compatible with the Weberian bureaucratic structure, and works to 
achieve the developmental aspirations of Ghana. It covered the historiopolitical and economic 
conditions subsequent to the inception of the zombie state to explain the PNDC government’s 
decision to accept the World Bank/IMF austerity development paradigm. It then discussed 













Chapter Nine:  Conclusion 
The central argument of this thesis is that over the years the political economy of Ghana has 
been resistant to a number of colonial and post-colonial development strategies adopted by 
the predatory colonial state as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4; vampire state in Chapters 5 and 
6; and Zombie state in Chapters 7 and 8. In this concluding chapter, the major findings of the 
thesis are drawn together with a view to discuss their implications to development and 
possibilities of learning from the EA developmental state as a model for economic growth 
and development in Ghana in particular, and Sub-Saharan Africa in general. This chapter is 
organised in three broad sections. The findings of this study draw on two sources of data. 
First, findings from archival research as outlined in Chapter 1, and critical literature review as 
discussed in Chapter 2; The first section discusses the principal findings of the colonial 
development strategy of dependency by the predatory state; state-led import-substitution 
industrialisation by the vampire state; and market-led development by the Zombie state to 
assess their implications to development. The second section delineates original contributions 
of the study, whilst the third section concludes with suggestions for alternative paradigm of 
development. These three sections charter the travails of Ghana’s attempt at development and 
makes original contribution to the debate for alternative development strategies to address the 
protracted underdevelopment.  
9.1 Research Findings: Colonial Dependency Development  
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the importance of learning from colonial development theories 
and concluded that the colonisation of Africa and introduction of a core-periphery 
‘dependency’ model of development was an attempt by western governments to primarily 
solve the internal conflicts and contradictions of capitalism in the conceptual west. In these 
chapters the development thinking, attitude and real motives of the colonial empire were 
reviewed. The analysis focused on Chamberlain’s Development Policy (1895), Guggisberg’s 
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Ten-year Development Plan (1920-1930), and a number of Colonial Development Acts 
(1929, 1940, 1945, and 1950) that formed the principal policies of colonial development and 
birth of ‘New Imperialism’ during the early 20th Century. By imperialism, the thesis refers to 
the expansion of Europe into Africa and integration of the latter into a global capitalist 
system to solve socio-economic problems of powerful states while systematically 
engendering underdevelopment of weaker states. First, contrary to Wicker’s (1958) assertion 
that colonialism was in the best interest of the colonies, this recent study discovers that 
colonial development was primarily designed to extract African resources to solve the socio-
economic problems in Europe (HL Deb 09, December 1929). Declassified archival 
information on the activities of the British Parliament and Colonial Office available to this 
study suggest that the idea of colonial development was not introduced to develop Africa for 
Africans but to further the interest of European capitalists in the overall attempt to solve the 
socio-economic problems in Europe and the Americas.  
Basically, colonial dependency development was designed to export the social conflicts in 
Europe to Africa for solutions. In so doing the colonial masters designed a core-periphery 
model of colonial development whereby identified areas of economic significance in Africa 
were connected by transport and communication networks to further the production and 
exportation of raw materials at relatively lower prices to western industries and used the 
colonies as markets for finished goods from Europe and the America at relatively higher 
prices. As Chamberlain noted, the establishment of communication and transport networks in 
the colonies, enabled British trade with the West African colonies to grow as much as those 
with their European counterparts (HC Deb 22 August 1895).  
In a related strand, this present study discovers that Chamberlain had sanctioned the fourth 
Anglo-Ashanti war (1896) and War of the Golden Stool (1900) because according to 
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Raymond E. Dumett, Chamberlain had been convinced that of all the colonies in West 
Africa, the Gold Coast held the greatest potential of a rapidly expanding returns for private 
profit and revenue, hence the selective construction of railway networks from the mining 
sectors of Ashanti to the coast was planned to reduce transport cost to one-sixth and transport 
time to one-tenth for overall profit maximisation (Dumett, 1975: 298). This social relation of 
exploitation resonates with the metaphorical predatory state (core/metropole) that fed on the 
preyed state (periphery/colonies) but ensured the existence of the latter to provide its next 
meal (raw materials) for its (predator) sustenance. Through critical analysis of literature and 
archives on colonial development it is more evident that development attempts in the colonies 
were directed by anticipatory inducements of remunerative returns to the colonial 
governments than anything else (Rodney, 1972; Dumett, 1975; Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis elaborated on how colonial development of Africa by Europe 
was grounded in the ideological construct of colonialism for imperialists’ trade objectives. 
Archival sources suggest that while Governors were tasked to ensure unfettered access to raw 
materials in Africa to western industries and protected British market share in Africa, they 
were cautioned against the use of colonial funds for the industrialisation of Africa. The 
Chamberlain Policy of Colonial Development laid the foundations for centrally planned 
development programme (HC Deb 22 August 1895) but there exist enough evidence to 
suggest wide gaps between the ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ of science as an important resource for 
colonial development (Hodge, 2007: 15). Despite the apathy or better still aversion of the 
colonial government to the industrialisation and development of SSA, a few colonies such as 
the Gold Coast envisaged some level of economic development (Lewis et al., 1959: 20-21).  
In essence, the predatory state politicised development with the principal objective of 
strengthening the British economy through a core-periphery dependency model of 
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development that in the end contributed to the underdevelopment of Africa. A study of the 
social relations between Britain and its tropical colonies during 1850 and 1960 (Havinden 
and Meredith, 1996; Kenny, 1997) unravelled major contradictions between ‘colonialism and 
development’ to suggest that the elements of ‘constructive imperialism’ inherent in the 
Chamberlain policy of development was so “deplorable” that by the time of independence 
many Africans lacked the expertise for industrialisation. Although there were attempts to 
water down the implications of colonialism by associating colonial development with 
community participation, this approach to development was unsustainable because the 
colonies were not involved in the decision making process (Carmen, 1996: 46-47).  
Of the series of development studies conducted in Ghana in the 1950s three (3) important 
discoveries of the Ghanaian economy namely fragility of the economy, need for balanced 
development, and constraints to development were most important. First, the notion of 
‘fragility’ suggests that development efforts in Ghana during the immediate post-independent 
period required fiscal and monetary discipline in trade and financial sectors. Second, the 
‘balanced growth’ theory of Sir Arthur-Lewis acted to mitigate inflation and high import 
expenditure on consumables by limiting the rate of non-agricultural expansion to agricultural 
growth. And third, that in the abundance of land, development was constrained by lack of 
capital and skilled labour (Lewis, 1953). That the weakness and fragility of Ghana’s economy 
on the eve of independence on 6th March, 1957 contained the seed of its own destruction 
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 91) are true as evident by archival sources in Chapters 3 and 4. The 
implications of the colonial development strategies were that, on the eve of decolonization 
the Ghana economy was assessed by development experts (Seers and Ross, Arthur Lewis and 
Cardinall) to have weak economic structures consisted of monetary fragility; weak public 
service with lack of proper orientation to promote development; and an external financial 
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reserve that concealed the structural weaknesses and gave false hope to the Nkrumah 
government to advance unsustainable rapid development programmes (Frimpong-Ansah, 
1992: 144 – 146). Sadly, the unfortunate legacies of colonial development were worsened by 
incoming indigenous policy makers through mismanagement and public corruption.  
9.2 Research Findings: Modernisation/Import Substitution Industrialisation 
Development 
The period of immediate post-war development in Ghana were mainly undertaken by the 
Nkrumah and Busia governments. However, reasons accounting for post-war 
underdevelopment in SSA are first and foremost, rooted in the internal conflicts and 
contradictions of capitalists’ forms of production, exchange and distribution by Europe and 
its social relations with SSA. Secondly, indigenous governments mismanaged the economy 
and ignored the essentials of Weberian bureaucratic system in the affairs of public 
administrations. The new wave of decolonization and Marxian-style labour resistance in 
Europe made it impossible for European elites to continue the exploitation of the working 
class during the immediate post-war era. In response to the uprising, European states 
advanced a Welfare state but this initiative compelled wealthy capitalists to search for 
investment opportunities abroad.  
Their adventures contributed to the reshape of the colonial development paradigm from 
dependency to modernization because it was expedient to invest intensive capital and 
technology in Africa where labour power was relative cheaper. By this, the idea of neo-
colonialism and modernisation development became a way of enabling powerful states to 
intervene in the affairs of weaker states in the interest of western businesses. Such 
interference even in the absence of direct military intervention were advanced through 
international financial institutions, economic, socio-political, and technical means of 
development aid to control the latter. In this sense, the essence of neo-colonialism is that the 
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state which is subject to it is, in theory, free from colonial domination and has all the outward 
trappings of international sovereignty but in reality its economic and political policies are 
controlled by powerful states (Nkrumah, 1965). In using the evidences gathered to assess 
President Truman’s pronouncement of modernisation as a development strategy in response 
to world poverty, this thesis discovers that modernisation was first and foremost, a subtle 
strategy of economic and geo-political importance to the West aimed to counter Soviet 
influence in underdeveloped states and enable western capitalist to astutely utilise cheap 
labour in Africa. 
External loans and technical assistance in their various forms were used (and remains in use) 
by powerful states as economic tools to influence the economics and politics of 
underdeveloped African states. The break-up of former colonies into smaller independent 
states (balkanization) and subtle ways adopted by the west to ‘divide and rule’ Africa unity 
rendered the new states incapable of independent development without the assistance of their 
colonial masters (Nkrumah, 1965). Archival data on Ghana’s development reveals that of all 
the governments of Ghana (military/civilian) none has been independent from foreign aid for 
purposes of development. Basically, neo-colonialism is so subtle that even in the absence of 
direct military conflict, powerful states hide under the guise of international financial 
institutions, politics, economic, social, and technical means of development to control and 
influence underdeveloped states. In this sense, neo-colonialism represents another phase in 
the imperialist agenda to extend its territory of control into Africa.  
Although the vampire state represents a state that mis-manages the economy through bad 
policies, excessive rent seeking and borrowing, the performance of the Nkrumah government 
were influenced by endogenous and exogenous factors of economic and political dimensions. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Britain’s attitude towards the Volta River Project (Accra Dispatch 
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No. 35 of 30th November, 1959), the restrictions imposed on colonial development assistance 
by the introduction of the Ghana Independence Bill (HL Deb 31 January 1957), and 
cancellation of a US$35 million United States loan to Ghana (Daily Graphic, 8th June 1951: 
1; Daily Graphic, 12th June 1951: 1; Nkrumah, 1965) were a few examples of the exogenous 
economic powers relied upon by developed states to influence development in Ghana. The 
political dimension ending the Nkrumah government mainly had to do with his ideological 
tensions with the West. By early 1966, Nkrumah had indicated to all that the Volta River 
Project was the key to the transformation of Ghana into a modern industrialised state that 
would seek the liberation of Africa from colonial control. Though the success of the Volta 
River Hydroelectric Project is accredited to the vision and commitment of Nkrumah, its 
essence contributed to his overthrow barely few months after the dam was commissioned in 
1965.  
On the endogenous side, this thesis discovers that even though Africa’s development lagged 
behind Europe’s, Nkrumah’s attempt at rapid development was constrained by lack of 
financial ability and fragility of the economy to sustain rapid development. Given this, 
alternative financing through heavy external borrowing and excessive taxation on cocoa 
risked serious indebtedness and damaged long-term prospects of development. It may be 
recalled that Ghana’s foreign exchange reserves as at independence in 1957 was well over 
£200 million but by 1966 it had accumulated nearly £300 million in debt (FCO 65/128). 
Moreover, the Nkrumah government misjudged the effects of Ghana’s removal from the 
British pound system on trade, balance of payment, foreign reserves, investor confidence, 
development and economic stability. Besides the economic challenges at that time, many of 
those who later constituted the NLC leadership had personal problems with Nkrumah for 
their alleged roles in corrupt and or subversive activities as discussed in Chapter 6, hence the 
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arguments put forward by the senior security officers for the coup - to restore confidence 
abroad about Ghana’s development capabilities and investment opportunities; sanitize the 
economy from widespread corruption (Wolfers, 1969) were red herrings.  
The Nkrumah era witnessed rapid growth in capital investment and projects than other 
administrations due to contributions from cocoa and his own commitment and ideas to 
development. However, this study puts forward that besides his achievements Nkrumah made 
fundamental errors in the timing of his policies and expressions of his personal thoughts 
about capitalism. Although Nkrumah’s reaction to opposition activities created space for 
military intervention, his response to the assassination attempts on his life and western 
interferences for regime change could be argued as being proportionate, reasonable and 
necessary within the context of Ghana’s nascent democracy. By the mid-1960s Nkrumah 
took the view of a centralised state authority but failed to instil the crucial elements of 
Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy to guide public policy formulation and implementation for 
development. Despite this, the benefit of hindsight teaches us that Nkrumah had better 
opportunity than his successors to transform Ghana into a developmental state had he set his 
priorities within the constraints of available resources and adopted Polanyi’s (1957) idea of 
embedded market in upholding the interests of Ghana and foreign capitalists. 
This thesis further discovers that but for the intervention of the UK government, the NLC 
with the connivance of the Progress Party had intended to disenfranchise Komla A. 
Gbedemah and the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) from contesting the 1969 general 
elections. Attempts at development by the NLC government was on the directives of the IMF 
but in the end its liberal market initiatives of economic liberalisation and stabilisation rather 
worsened the economic conditions that it inherited. By Afrifa’s own admission, just few 
months after Nkrumah’s overthrow, it was conspicuous that President Nkrumah and the CPP 
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would have won a genuinely free general elections at that time (Afrifa, 1967: 124). In 
essence, the NLC could not change the desires of the people for Nkrumah’s ‘big push’ 
development ambition. Busia had hoped to secure foreign aid on flexible terms with the help 
of Prime Minister Wilson (his former lecturer at Oxford University) however with the 
departure of the Wilson government in 1970, the Busia government with J.H. Mensah as 
Economic Minister reluctantly agreed to the austerity conditions of the IMF and ODA loans 
for the Medium Term Development Plan. In introducing the 1971/72 budget, J.H. Mensah 
presented a state-led Keynesian-oriented budget to stimulate economic growth and 
development but the foreign donors insisted on Adam Smith’s market-led budget.  
Although Mensah argued in support of Keynesian-based development strategies, the 
IMF/ODA preferred austerity development strategies with the full knowledge of the risks 
they posed to liberal democracy in the Busia administration (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). In an 
official correspondence to the FCO, Huijsman noted that the Busia government needed to 
take “some unpalatable but necessary Government action” if it were to reschedule Ghana’s 
debts (OD 30/393). Yet, this study discovers that judging by the pessimistic comments posed 
by Morris in his letter and the concerns raised by the Busia government, it was obvious to 
both the Ghana and British governments that the seven point recommendation put forward by 
the ODA (OD 30/393) was impractical under the political and economic conditions to the 
extent that it set Busia to fail in nurturing democracy and development.  
It is of interest to note that although the origins of the Ewe and Ashanti rivalry dates before 
independence, the aetiology was deepened during the Nkrumah era. In 1956, Nkrumah 
supported the Ewes to acquire part of the Trans Volta Togoland (the relinquished German 
territory in post-war era) to expand the Volta region, but legislated for the people of Brong 
and Ahafo to secede from the Ashanti kingdom in 1959 as a subtle retribution to the Ashanti 
271 
 
opposition to the Cocoa Duty bill. In addition, the Akan dominated PP despised the CPP for 
Nkrumah’s apathy to the inhumane treatment and unfortunate death of a leading member of 
the UGCC, J.B. Danquah at the Nsawan Medium Security prisons following his detention for 
political reasons. 
That cocoa farmers are rational thinkers and would seek to maximise their interests through 
lobbying the state to intervene in international trade agreements to stabilize cocoa 
prices/revenues for long-term development planning is true. The cocoa producer prices paid 
to local farmers by the state were intrinsically linked to trends in the world market price of 
cocoa, and had effects on jobs, revenues, development and legitimacy of the government. 
There was a general feeling among developing states that developed states were not enthused 
to enter into international economic cooperation agreements that gave developing states 
access to trade in order to help the developing states to help themselves. This study 
recognises the sentiments of cocoa farmers about the non-existence of international cocoa 
agreement and its implications to the politics and economics of the cocoa industry, and 
asserts that world market price of cocoa has direct impact on the success of development and 
democracy in Ghana. 
Evidences from confidential documents of correspondence (letters, telegrams, personal 
messages and meetings) between Prime Ministers Harold Wilson and Busia suggest that 
among other things, the UK government considered Ghana as an important player in seeking 
peace in Nigeria to facilitate UK oil interests, hence Ghana used the Nigerian case as a 
leverage to discuss Ghana’s debt problem (FCO 65/128; FCO 65/130). Despite this the UK 
government maintained its position not to convince the other creditor states to renegotiate 
Ghana’s external debts to facilitate development loans. While the French expressed 
willingness to participate in further negotiations, the United States and Canada were 
272 
 
sympathetic to Ghana. The new German government gave strong indications to follow the 
path of the UK government but the latter was less enthusiastic. While the re-arrangement deal 
increased Ghana’s original debts by about £35 to £40 million (FCO 65/130), the Ghana 
government was by the re-arrangement obliged to implement the neoliberal austerity policies 
of the IMF even in the face of economic contractions and risk to democracy (Bennett, 1973; 
Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). In the end, Busia did not secure the loans he had anticipated and 
capitulated to the ODA austerity conditions that led to the devaluation of the cedi, and with it 
his overthrow by the military. It was not until the late 1980s that donors appreciated that 
although African leaders such as Busia worked towards free-market economic reforms, they 
lacked the political will and legitimacy to implement austerity strategies in the face of 
domestic resistance (Nielson et al., 1989; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992). That the intention of 
Busia to develop Ghana was authentic can be judged by his commitment to reschedule 
Ghana’s external debt to enable his government to finance a deficit development budget for 
economic revival. Yet his optimism for steadfast commitment by the UK government leads 
this chapter to the logical conclusion that Busia was not entirely conversant with the stark 
truth about capitalist development and egocentrism of Machiavellian politics. 
9.3 Research Findings: Neoliberalism and Market-led Development 
The pressures within the vampire state that led to its fall did not evaporate with the 
introduction of neoliberalism in the zombie state. As noted in Chapters 6 and 7, neoliberalism 
was in actual fact the guide to economic policy in Ghana before the 31st December Ghanaian 
Revolution of the zombie state came into effect. Attempts by the PNDC government in 1982 
to shift toward a socialist-oriented 4-Year Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) trajectory 
did not proceed because it was opposed by western governments at a time when socialist 
states were unable to provide the needed finance. This situation was exacerbated by other 
factors such as the severe drought and near collapse of agriculture; repatriation of Ghanaians 
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from Nigeria; murders of the judges and ex-army officer; 122.8 percent inflationary rate in 
1983; and relics of the cold war sentiments as discussed in Chapter 8. The PNDC was of the 
understanding that since the economic decline of Ghana was as a result of corruption, 
financial indiscipline and mismanagement, a domestically-engineered growth strategy of self-
sufficiency was apt for economic recovery (Jeffries, 1996). Against this background the 
revolutionaries initially attempted to redistribute income but faced challenges from local and 
foreign investors. The government then accepted to implement the IMF’s ERP 1 (1983-1986) 
aimed at arresting the economic decline by addressing the internal and external economic 
imbalances and realign incentives to stimulate economic growth. This resulted in an 8 percent 
growth in GDP in 1984 and 5 percent in 1985. During 1987 to 1990, the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) as part of the ERP II focused on agricultural development, 
privatisation and building institutional capacity but its success was not felt until the early 
1990s when the austerity was relaxed to court political popularity for transition to democratic 
rule in 1992 (Jeffries, 1996). In essence, the IMF macroeconomic policies did not achieve 
sustainable growth and development because developed states were unwilling to engage in 
truthful fiscal and structural reforms to transform Ghana into a democratic developmental 
state. By implication, the zombie state consolidated its position with the aid of market-led 
strategies but was devoured by the same capitalists’ production process because the overall 
idea of the ERP was anti-Keynesian and unsustainable within the context of the level of 
poverty and underdevelopment in Ghana at that time. 
9.4 Original Contributions to Knowledge and Literature 
This thesis contributes to knowledge in the field of political economy in so far as it critically 
examines the central role of state theory in the discursive analysis of African development. 
The thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by providing a theoretically informed 
historical exposition of the political economy of state formation in Ghana through a critical 
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examination of the process of development efforts of three distinct states – the first two are a 
predatory and vampire states, and the third a zombie state. This bridges politics with 
economics, and assert a more realistic role of the state in development. In effect, this study 
brings politics back into the narrative of economic development in Ghana. The thesis further 
makes original contribution to the developmental state debate using Ghana as a case study. It 
critically examines, for the first time, the political economy of development and 
underdevelopment in Ghana (1895 to 1992) from Karl Polanyi’s orientation. 
The thesis puts forward that, given the lessons drawn from the East Asian experience, African 
states must be permitted to project development as a forerunner to democracy, where it is not 
feasible to simultaneously implement both. Indeed, if developmental states were to be 
measured by democracy ushering in development, then many developed states in Europe and 
Asia that initially used unprecedented hegemonic powers for the state to temporarily repress 
democratic political values for social egalitarianism (Ritzer, 2003) would not have passed the 
test. Moreover, previous government administrations (Guggisberg and Nkrumah) that were 
economically successful in the Gold Coast adopted state-led approach to development. 
However, restrictions on colonial development loans burdened newly independent states with 
increased roles of the state in development affairs. Possibilities for democratic developmental 
states exist but the sequence of occurrence may be different. Development may initially take 
precedence over democracy, and usher in democracy when the economic capacity of the state 
is able to sustain democratic values. Rueschemeyer (1992) cross-national statistical study 
suggests that capitalist development and democracy are compatible, but comparative 
historical studies based on the imperative of political economy holds that economic 
development was and is well matched with many political forms.  
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9.5 Developmental State in Ghana - the political economy of growth and development   
The prospects for economic development and good governance in Ghana have been the most 
prioritized subject issue confronting policy makers, donors, academics, development partners 
and politicians since the colonial period. The ineffectiveness of various development efforts 
from a colonial development strategy of dependency of 1895-1956 to a state-directed import 
substitution industrialization of 1957 to 1966, and further on to a market-directed 
development of 1967 to 1992 all justify the need for alternative paradigm of development. In 
the late 1980s, the ineffectiveness of development programmes initiated by the ‘predatory 
state’ of the colonial era, ‘vampire state’ of the immediate post-independent period and 
‘zombie state’ of the 1980s were gradually giving way to a new trajectory to development in 
Ghana that can learn from and rival the dramatic successes of East Asia (Fourie, 2011). This 
idea is significant because series of development models put forward by the colonial 
administration, Ghanaian governments and more lately the Bretton Wood institutions to roll-
back the state in development have proven ineffective in ensuring sustained economic 
development and good governance in Ghana. Lessons drawn from the various attempts at 
development suggest that the state is indispensable in development, yet possibilities for the 
kind of state that promotes economic development and good governance emerges out of 
experimentation rather than planned models (Routley, 2014). Though some cultural values 
and beliefs in SSA can retard development, there are possibilities of harnessing moral values 
from diverse ethnic backgrounds and patrimonial societies for developmental objectives 
(Kelsall and Booth, 2010). In doing so, this study departs from previous attempts at 
normative developmental models towards critical examination of possibilities for 
development approaches that are compactable to SSA states with some adaptions for growth 
and human flourishing. However, developmental state is not without divergent propositions 
due in part to these three main reasons – definition, composition and outcomes.   
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The interpretation of developmental state has become a subject of interest for policy makers 
and academics due to its floridity and contestability (Evans, 2010). Among the many 
keywords that are associated with the developmental state discourse, ‘embedded autonomy’ 
and ‘Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy’ stand out as imperative to any idea of development 
state. Evans (1998) concept of embedded autonomy refers to the state’s ability to connect 
with interest groups for developmental outcomes without allowing its initiatives to be 
adversely affected by the group. Though this is not absolutely compactible with Ghanaian 
culture it sets good standards for the public service to learn and benefit from Weber’s theory 
of bureaucratic management. In doing so, traditional authorities such as the Regional  and 
National House of Chiefs, heads of family clans, the local government systems, religious 
bodies and educational institutions all have key roles in bringing this idea into being. The 
generalised abstraction of an East Asian developmental state model (Johnson, 1993) as 
standard for emulation by underdeveloped states is rightly criticised for attempting to 
homogenise a concept that is not pre-determinable but emerges out of experimentation (Ohno 
and Ohno, 2012). Furthermore, developmental state is relative to the circumstance of specific 
and distinctive experimentation but it remains imperative that the state demonstrates 
commitment to, and capacity for development (Vu, 2007). And although these requirement 
do not lend itself to easy projection of developmental states, they allow for states to be 
developmental without economic growth in so far as the factors to growth are outside their 
control (Mkandawire, 2001). In this respect, the Guggisberg and Nkrumah administrations 
stand out from the various administrations that Ghana has ever had. Other administrations 
had either drawn closer to, or failed entirely in their pursuit of economic development. And, 
since the composition of development is relatively determined by individual societies, it is 
impractical to attempt development policies that homogenises development for SSA states. 
While classical micro and macro-economic growth indicators such as gross domestic product, 
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per capita income, consumer price indexes, level of industrialisation are important factors in 
determining development (Doner at al. 2005), contemporary developmental outcomes must 
extend beyond the perimeters of economic growth and improved living standard to human 
flourishing, broad-based legitimacy, development-oriented political leadership for all 
(Musamba, 2010; Lin and Monga, 2011).  
Against the background of optimistic ideas held by many with interest in the development of 
Ghana in particular, and SSA in general, it is has become prudent to consider the other side of 
the discourse – the pessimists – to present a broader analysis about the prospects of 
developmental state in Ghana. From the afore-mentioned analysis, this study puts forward 
that the possibility for adaptation (not transference) of the East Asian experience to Ghana 
depends on the state’s cohesion with business community and society. This view challenges 
Musamba’s, (2010) pessimism of transferring the East Asia experience to SSA states on the 
basis of geo-political shifts, diverse institutions, lack of capacity and commitment. This 
present study argues that with the necessary adjustments to the East Asian model, SSA states 
stand a good chance of successful adaptation when foreign donors and local politicians 
become truly committed to the development of Ghana. This is so because while developed 
states have the capacity to implement full scale economic liberalisation, underdeveloped SSA 
states such as Ghana cannot do so at the ongoing levels of economic and political 
predispositions. During Europe’s immediate post economic depression era and more recently 
in East Asia (Hiyashi, 2010), state-led development programmes placed local industries on 
reasonable pedestal to economic growth to promote fairer competition and development. 
Unfortunately, similar compassion has not been extended to SSA states.  
The failure to acknowledge these differentials and act decisively hinders possibility of Ghana 
emerging as a developmental state. The era of pejorative narratives and labelling of SSA 
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states as being predatory, weak and kleptocratic (Diamond, 2008), must give way to good 
conscience and coherent policies that acknowledge the historical development of the political 
economy of Ghana and make every effort to address corruption, mismanagement, unfair 
trading policies and distributive systems. It is the position of this study that as the pejoratives 
give way to social-market approach to development, possibility of developmental state would 
become apparent, as in the case of Japanese where workers who were previously labelled as 
‘unproductive and lazy’ in the twentieth century became the ‘nucleus’ of development (Ohno 
and Ohno, 2012). But the kind of developmental state likely to emerge in Ghana remains 
unclear. As a contribution to knowledge in the search for developmental state in Ghana, this 
study examined three forms of developmental state that are feasible to emerge given the 
above considerations. These are (i) pro-rural developmental state; (ii) democratic/semi-
democratic/authoritarian developmental state; and (iii) developmental patrimonial state 
(Routley, 2014).   
First, the agriculture sector of Ghana is dominated by the production of raw cocoa beans for 
export. It accounted for about half of export revenue and 30 percent of government revenue 
(FCO 65/2187). And given that Ghana is an agricultural economy presupposes that the 
promotion of rural and agricultural development draw the prospects for the emergence of a 
pro-poor rural developmental state even closer to realisation. However, in his contribution to 
the debate on developmental states emerging in Africa, Mkandawire (2011: 72) suggests that 
many African leaders do not seem to appreciate this fact and as such have neglected 
agriculture. This study challenges Mkandawire’s assertion, and argues that though it appears 
that African leaders have neglected agriculture ‘the devil is in the details’.  
Many SSA states have tried the agricultural development trajectory only to find themselves in 
protracted budget deficits due to low prices paid for their produce and reluctance of 
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developed states to enter into binding trade agreements to guarantee prices for long-term 
development. Hence it is not only the case that African leaders have neglected the 
agricultural trajectory but that industrial states have neglected Africa by failing to have trade 
agreements that guarantees African produce for the benefits of long-term development 
planning and implementation. Such experience discourages African leaders to invest more in 
the very sector (agriculture) that promises development and industrialisation. For instance in 
1968, Prime Minister Busia appealed to industrial states to enter into an International Cocoa 
Agreement with Ghana to mitigate price fluctuations and enable the government plan for 
long-term development but the response was shallow. Again in 1981, the Limann government 
tried unsuccessfully to renew the elapsed agreement. Price fluctuations in the absence of 
international agreements to bridle world cocoa market price has over the years had negative 
impacts on farmers’ income and government revenue for development. The assertion that 
agricultural development would lead to developmental outcomes and possibilities of 
developmental state in Africa is inconceivable unless leaders of developed states become 
committed to trade agreements that guarantees revenue for underdeveloped states. This is 
because by the very nature of the determinants of elasticity of demand and supply 
(perishability, close substitutes, long-gestation period, and weather) many agricultural 
products are vulnerable to market forces. To illustrate this assertion using Ghana, an increase 
in cocoa production to 567,000 tonnes in the 1964-65 period, contributed to a fall in world 
cocoa prices from its 1958 price of US$840 to $204 in July 1965 (Bennett, 1973). In addition, 
price fluctuations and distortions can be ameliorated when exchange rate adjustments are 
effected to provide fiscal resources for higher real producer prices (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992: 
113). Interestingly, the absence of international cocoa agreement enables the major buyers in 
the developed states to manipulate the price mechanism and control the economics and 
politics of producer states in Africa.  
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Meanwhile, lessons drawn from the various cocoa protestations in Ghana suggest that while 
some states may be successful in adopting threats of unrest and rural rebellion as in South 
Asia (van Donge et al., 2012: 19), others risk revenue by engaging in such actions because of 
the very nature of their exports - availability of substitutes, degree of necessity - and fear of 
losing market share. A number of recent researches (Evans, 1995; van Donge et al., 2009; 
Routley, 2014) have all been drawn to the importance for land reforms to improve agriculture 
and narrow class distinctions in SSA.  
Second, in the 1980s many SSA states including Ghana came under military dictatorship 
however a combination of internal and external pressures for the rule of law has changed the 
means by which power is attained and legitimized - from the ‘barrel of the gun’ to the ‘ballot 
box’. The shift in politics generates reasonable impression in recent literature that the desired 
form of development states to stimulate economic growth and human flourishing are most 
likely to embody democratic attributes (Edigheji, 2010; Musamba, 2010). This view differs 
strikingly to the success narrative of the East Asia developmental states because EA states 
were not democratic at the onset of their developmental projects. Though the politics and 
economics of every state are connected, the notion of predetermined economic development 
outcomes on the basis on particular state form is misleading, and one that needs to be 
approached circumspectly. Neither democracy nor authoritarianism can make claim of being 
a necessary or sufficient condition for the emergence of developmental state on its own. And 
while authoritarian states are not necessarily developmental (Fritz and Menocal, 2007; Vu, 
2007) the best development outcomes are not guaranteed under democracy (Musamba, 2010). 
Ghana was among one the first states in SSA to progress from authoritarianism in the early 
1980s; to semi-democratic by the end of the 1980s; to democracy from 1992 but did not 
necessarily lead to the desired developmental outcomes. It is the assertion of this study that 
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possibilities for the emergence of developmental state in Ghana goes beyond Vu’s (2007) 
‘capacity’ and ‘commitment’ requirements to the actual assessment, planning, 
implementation and periodic evaluation of development initiatives.  
The historical development of Ghana and its trade relations with the conceptual West make it 
imperative for democracy to be associated with the search for developmental state because 
majority of donor states are democratic. However, recent expansion of Chinese power and 
economic investment in Africa could change the political pendulum and challenge the 
dominance of western democracy in SSA states. While authoritarianism benefits from long-
term development planning and implementation, the electoral dispensation provided by 
constitutional democracy contributes to the abandonment of development projects started by 
previous governments of the opposition party. Politicisation of national development projects 
puts pressure on state resources because the cost of abandoned projects continue to attract 
moratorium and increases national debts without developmental benefit. For instance after the 
overthrow of the Nkrumah government, the NLM abandoned work-in-progress development 
projects mainly for political reasons while Ghana continued to service the debts related to 
these projects. This trend is common in SSA politics as “Each new ruling group that 
successfully captures the state denounces earlier rulers, policies and development projects to 
justify its own. Ideology and development strategies become contentious issues leading to 
discontinuation in the development process. … The formulation and implementation of 
development policies focuses on short-term gains that directly benefits governments and 
leaders” (Dzorgbo, 2017).  
Indeed, multi-party democracy has enabled incumbent governments to abandon development 
initiatives of previous governments to discredit the latter for electoral gains at a huge cost to 
the economy. Many of the abandoned projects in the key sectors driving Ghana’s economy - 
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agricultural, transport, manufacturing, mining, and forestry – illustrate wastage and pressure 
of debt burden associated with short-term tenure of government. In this sense, the study 
argues in support of a strand in literature (Kelsall and Booth, 2010) suggesting that the 
electoral system present a challenge to long-term development planning needed to 
rehabilitate the political economy of underdeveloped state such as Ghana’s unless the state 
becomes embedded with society (Evans, 2010). To become developmental, the Ghana 
government with the genuine co-operation of donors need to promote broad-based 
partnership with interest groups to harness the human resource capabilities necessary for 
building a kind of Weberian bureaucratic system that advances long-term development 
planning and implementation for sustainable development and human flourishing.  
Third, there is a flurry of misleading assumptions that the kind of clientelist patterns 
associated with the centralization of authority in developmental patrimonial states runs 
counter to development. Booth (2010) challenges this stance and suggests ways of adapting 
clientelism to benefit developmental states. Patrimonialism refers to a process of governance 
whereby power is centralised in an individual or a few individuals who treat public resources 
as private property to attract loyalty from subordinates. The terminology was developed by 
Kelsall and Booth (2010) to described patrimonial states that are able to adapt centralized 
authority to facilitate taxation and long-term developments. Interestingly, different kinds of 
patrimonial behaviours have varied implications to development. And although, patrimonial 
and clientelist behaviours can have negative impacts on embedded autonomy (Evans, 1995), 
the two can be beneficial when skilled leadership is combined with competent bureaucracy to 
strategizes long-term development planning and efficient tax systems to raise productivity 
and revenue for development (Booth,2010). This present thesis concludes with a submission 
to policy makers to promote historical knowledge of development and decline of the political 
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economy at pre-tertiary level and consider the idea of developmental state as an alternative 
model for economic growth and development in Ghana in particular and SSA in general. It 
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